Current and wave effects around windfarm monopile foundations

publisher: Elsevier articletitle: Current and wave effects around windfarm monopile foundations journaltitle: Coastal Engineering articlelink: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.coastaleng.2017.01.003 content_type: article copyright: © 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved

The incentive gap: LULUCF and the Kyoto mechanism before and after Durban

To-date, forest resource-based carbon accounting in land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF) under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), Kyoto Protocol (KP), European Union (EU) and national level emission reduction schemes considers only a fraction of its potential and fails to adequately mobilize the LULUCF sector for the successful stabilization of atmospheric greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations. Recent modifications at the 2011 COP17 meetings in Durban have partially addressed this basic problem, but leave room for improvement. The presence of an Incentive Gap (IG) continues to justify reform of the LULUCF carbon accounting framework. Frequently neglected in the climate change mitigation and adaptation literature, carbon accounting practices ultimately define the nuts and bolts of what counts and which resources (forest, forest-based or other) are favored and utilized. For Annex I countries in the Kyoto Mechanism, the Incentive Gap under forest management (FM) is significantly large: some 75% or more of potential forestry-based carbon sequestration is not effectively incentivized or mobilized for climate change mitigation and adaptation (Ellison etal. 2011a). In this paper, we expand our analysis of the Incentive Gap to incorporate the changes agreed in Durban and encompass both a wider set of countries and a larger set of omitted carbon pools. For Annex I countries, based on the first 2years of experience in the first Commitment Period (CP1) we estimate the IG in FM at approximately 88%. Though significantly reduced in CP2, the IG remains a problem. Thus our measure of missed opportunities under the Kyoto and UNFCCC framework - despite the changes in Durban - remains important. With the exception perhaps of increased energy efficiency, few sinks or sources of reduced emissions can be mobilized as effectively and efficiently as forests. Thus, we wonder at the sheer magnitude of this underutilized resource

Banking of Surplus Emissions Allowances: Does the Volume Matter?

In the European Emission Trading scheme the supply of allowances exceeds emissions - cumulating, according to our estimates, in a surplus of 2.7 billion tonnes by 2013/2014. We find that initially the surplus was acquired by power companies so as to hedge future carbon costs. As the surplus exceeds this hedging demand, additional allowances need to be acquired as speculative investment. This requires higher rates of return and implies that expected future carbon prices are highly discounted. This could explain the recent drop in carbon prices. The analysis shows that the volume of unused allowances matters for the discount applied to future carbon prices. We use our supply-demand framework to assess currently discussed policy options set-aside, reserve price for auctions and adjustments of emission targets

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Elektrisk influens på fordon under kraftlednin

Do the strategic decisions of multinational energy companies differ in divergent market contexts? An exploratory study

In the European energy industry, different countries’ national institutional frameworks have evolved divergently in response to increasing concerns about environmental issues. This paper explores the influence of these divergent national institutional frameworks on the strategic behavior of multinational company (MNC) subsidiaries. Differences in MNC subsidiaries’ strategic decisions in different countries, regardless of common capabilities and strategies, illustrate the importance of this influence. The paper focuses on the strategic decisions that determine which energy technology MNCs choose to acquire or invest in. MNCs are the predominant force in the European energy industry, and our understanding of their strategic decisions regarding choice of technology is an essential step in achieving a low-carbon energy industry. Our analysis is based on a longitudinal case study of Vattenfall, a Swedish multinational energy company. Findings confirm that even in the energy industry—a capital-intensive, national, and institution-based industry—MNCs follow their core global strategy to such an extent that it may prevail over local institutional considerations. Nevertheless, as European energy markets become deregulated and renewable energy matures, local institutions are likely to play a more dominant role, and MNCs will increasingly need to comply with local institutions’ guidelines. The paper offers recommendations for policymakers and several managerial implications.</p

The Role of Hedging in Carbon Markets

In the European Emissions Trading System, power generators hold CO2 allowances to hedge for future power sales. First, we model their aggregate hedging demand in response to changes in expectations of future fuel, carbon and power prices from forward prices. This partial equilibrium analysis is then integrated into a two period model of the supply and demand of CO2 allowances considering also emissions impact and banking of allowances by speculative investors. We find that hedging flexibility can balance a CO2 allowance surplus in the range of 1.1 - 1.6 billion t CO2 at discount rates of future carbon allowances between 0 - 10%. If the surplus exceeds this level, then the rate at which today's carbon prices discount expected future prices increases. This points to the value of reducing the surplus estimated to be 2.6 billion t CO2 allowances in 2015 by about 1.3 billion t CO2, thus ensuring that hedging makes a significant contribution to stabilise carbon prices