Democracy, rationalism, and Popper

2018年11月7日(水)、イスタンブール大学よりTurgut Gümüşoğlu氏をお招きし、グローバル地域文化学会第6回大会において、学術講演会を開催しました。第6回グローバル地域文化学会大会学術講演記録(Address before The 6th Annual Meeting of the Doshisha Society for Global and Regional Studies)application/pdfdepartmental bulletin pape

高位收穫田の化學的研究 : 其の三 大阪府下に於ける高位收穫田の調査並に研究 : 其の四 兵庫縣下に於ける高位收穫田の調査並びに研究(農藝化学)

application/pdfThe differences between the representative fertile paddy soils and their neighbouring infertile soils in Osaka and Hyogo Prefectures were investigated in the field and laboratory. The results may be summariesed as follows: (1) The average depth of cultivating layers of fertile fields was 17cm., while that of infertile fields was 11.9cm. (2) The compact layers which had been caused by plowing fertile rice fields were not hard so that the roots of rice plants can penetrate more or less, but those of infertile fileds were very hard as if a "hard pan". (3) In most cases, the underground water levels of low yield fields were relatively higher than those of high yield fields. (4) The difference of subsoils between these two soil groups was not distinct, but in low yield fields, there is much heavy clay soil in which the penetration of water is very slow. (5) The drying effects of low yield rice fields have a tendency to be greater than those of high yield fields, while the difference of total nitrogen contents between these two fields was insignificant. (6) The free iron contents are generally more in the subsoils than in the surface soils. In many sandy soils, iron is solved away from the surface soils. But any definite difference between the high yield rice soil and the low yield one can not be recongnized, except the soils of Takawashi and Tannan-mura. (7) It was observed that the "total acidity" of high yield surface soils is relatively lower than that of low yield surface soils, while it was reversed in compact layers caused by plowing and in subsoils. The pH values of the surface soils have the same tendency, that is, greater in high yield fields than in low yield fields. But any defiinite differences were not observed in compact layers caused by plowing and in subsoils. (8) The definite differences between high yield rice fields and law yield ones in ignition loss, base exchange capacity and etc., could not be recognized.Bulletin of the Naniwa University. Ser. B, Agricultural and natural science. 1952, 2, p.59-73departmental bulletin pape

Studies of CP Violation in B→J/ψK* Decays

journal articl

Appendix from A geometric process of evolutionary game dynamics

This document contains the proofs of all formal results in the Results section of the main text

Fraction of sticky cells and population size at end of evolution.

Level plots show the fraction of sticky cells and population size on the surface and in liquid for different parameter combinations of R (cell division rate of sticky cell) and Pm (migration rate). Each row of plots corresponds to one differentiation strategy. From left to right the level plots show (1) fraction of sticky cells on surface, (2) fraction of sticky cells in liquid, (3) population size on surface, (4) population size in liquid. Fraction of sticky cells ranges from 0 (blue) to 1 (red). The population size ranges from 0 (white) to the carrying capacity (green). The carrying capacity of the surface is 10.000 (100 x 100 positions on the hexagonal grid) and the carrying capacity of the liquid is 5.000 (K). All values are determined at the end of evolution (T = 400.000 time steps).</p

Figure 4

<p>In a model with <i>2K</i> phenotypes consisting of a pair of strategy and tag, cooperation evolves depending on the benefit to cost ratio. For small mutation rates, the critical benefit to cost ratio for evolution of cooperation is given by <i>b/c>(K+1)/(K−1)</i> (red line). If the benefit to cost ratio exceeds this critical value, then cooperators are more abundant than defectors averaged over time. With increasing mutation rates, the populations become more mixed which favors defectors. Hence, the critical benefit to cost ratio increases with a higher mutation rate, as shown for <i>u = 0.01</i> and <i>u = 0.001</i>. In all cases, the critical benefit to cost ratio decreases with the number of tags <i>K</i> and converges to <i>1</i> for <i>β</i>→∞. The following parameters are used: population size <i>N = 100</i>, intensity of selection <i>β = 0.1</i>, cost of cooperation <i>c = 0.2</i>, averages over 10⁸ time steps.</p

Dynamics of eco-evolutionary feedback in cooperator and cheater strains of the yeast <i>S. cerevisiae</i> , as observed in the experiment of Sanchez and Gore.

<p>There are two basins of attraction, with a different outcome expected from each. If there are too few cooperators to start, not enough simple sugars are produced and the population collapses. On the other hand, if the initial number of cooperators is sufficient, the system converges in spiraling fashion to an equilibrium in which cooperators and cheaters coexist.</p

Figure 2

<p>Evolutionary chromodynamics in finite populations. The red cooperator population is invaded by red defectors at <i>t</i>≈1200. At <i>t</i>≈4500, cooperation is established based on blue tags. Blue defectors invade at <i>t</i>≈6000. The time unit is given by one individual learning event (pairwise comparison). For example, after <i>t</i> = 5000 each individual had <i>100</i> learning events on average. The following parameters are used: population size <i>N = 50</i>, intensity of selection <i>β = 1.0</i>, cost of cooperation <i>c = 0.5</i>, benefit from cooperation <i>b = 1.0</i>, mutation rate <i>u = 0.01</i>.</p

Model structure.

The model structure consists of two parts: ecology and development. Ecology: cells can express two phenotypes, non-sticky cells or sticky cells. The sticky and non-sticky cells occur in one of two niches: the liquid or the surface. Cells in liquid are well mixed. Cells on the surface are placed on hexagonal grid and can only stay on the surface when being sticky or directly surrounded by sticky cell. Cells can migrate from the liquid to the surface and vice versa. Migration to the surface is only possible when being sticky or when a cell is directly surrounded by sticky cell on the surface. Development: three differentiation strategies are examined in the model: (1) pure strategy, (2) probabilistic strategy, (3) decision-making strategy. In the pure strategy, cells only express one phenotype and can switch via mutations. In the probabilistic strategy, cells have a probability P to differentiate. In the decision-making strategy, cells can differentiate in response to the environment. Cells sense two environmental cues: the niche in which they occur (N) and the fraction of surrounding sticky cells (i.e. stickiness, S). Cells differentiate when the sum of regulatory input, weighted by connection weights (W1 and W2), exceeds the activation threshold (θ).</p

Figure 1

<p>Payoff matrix for chromodynamics of cooperation. Interactions that lead to nonzero payoffs only occur between individuals using the same tag. For a given tag, defectors always dominate cooperators. By continuously changing the ’secret handshake’ ( = tag), cooperators can run away from defectors. For a cultural model, it turns out if <i>b/c</i>>(<i>K</i>+1)/(<i>K</i>−1), then cooperators can run faster than defectors.</p