Verification in Staged Tile Self-Assembly

We prove the unique assembly and unique shape verification problems, benchmark measures of self-assembly model power, are $\mathrm{coNP}^{\mathrm{NP}}$-hard and contained in $\mathrm{PSPACE}$ (and in $\mathrm{\Pi}^\mathrm{P}_{2s}$ for staged systems with $s$ stages). En route, we prove that unique shape verification problem in the 2HAM is $\mathrm{coNP}^{\mathrm{NP}}$-complete.Comment: An abstract version will appear in the proceedings of UCNC 201

Locked and Unlocked Polygonal Chains in 3D

In this paper, we study movements of simple polygonal chains in 3D. We say that an open, simple polygonal chain can be straightened if it can be continuously reconfigured to a straight sequence of segments in such a manner that both the length of each link and the simplicity of the chain are maintained throughout the movement. The analogous concept for closed chains is convexification: reconfiguration to a planar convex polygon. Chains that cannot be straightened or convexified are called locked. While there are open chains in 3D that are locked, we show that if an open chain has a simple orthogonal projection onto some plane, it can be straightened. For closed chains, we show that there are unknotted but locked closed chains, and we provide an algorithm for convexifying a planar simple polygon in 3D with a polynomial number of moves.Comment: To appear in Proc. 10th ACM-SIAM Sympos. Discrete Algorithms, Jan. 199

Greedy Selfish Network Creation

We introduce and analyze greedy equilibria (GE) for the well-known model of selfish network creation by Fabrikant et al.[PODC'03]. GE are interesting for two reasons: (1) they model outcomes found by agents which prefer smooth adaptations over radical strategy-changes, (2) GE are outcomes found by agents which do not have enough computational resources to play optimally. In the model of Fabrikant et al. agents correspond to Internet Service Providers which buy network links to improve their quality of network usage. It is known that computing a best response in this model is NP-hard. Hence, poly-time agents are likely not to play optimally. But how good are networks created by such agents? We answer this question for very simple agents. Quite surprisingly, naive greedy play suffices to create remarkably stable networks. Specifically, we show that in the SUM version, where agents attempt to minimize their average distance to all other agents, GE capture Nash equilibria (NE) on trees and that any GE is in 3-approximate NE on general networks. For the latter we also provide a lower bound of 3/2 on the approximation ratio. For the MAX version, where agents attempt to minimize their maximum distance, we show that any GE-star is in 2-approximate NE and any GE-tree having larger diameter is in 6/5-approximate NE. Both bounds are tight. We contrast these positive results by providing a linear lower bound on the approximation ratio for the MAX version on general networks in GE. This result implies a locality gap of $\Omega(n)$ for the metric min-max facility location problem, where n is the number of clients.Comment: 28 pages, 8 figures. An extended abstract of this work was accepted at WINE'1

Contraction Bidimensionality: the Accurate Picture

We provide new combinatorial theorems on the structure of graphs that are contained as contractions in graphs of large treewidth. As a consequence of our combinatorial results we unify and significantly simplify contraction bidimensionality theory -- the meta algorithmic framework to design efficient parameterized and approximation algorithms for contraction closed parameters