Conflicts Between Dispute Settlement Mechanisms in Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO — What Should WTO Do?

It was a tremendous pleasure to participate in a symposium that honored one of the giants of the World Trade Organization\u27s (WTO) Appellate Body—Professor Yasuhei Taniguchi. Professor Taniguchi served as a distinguished member of the Appellate Body from 2000 to 2007, during which time he served on the division for twenty-one appeals, many of them addressing landmark issues. In tribute to him, this article focuses on an issue that was a key element in the last dispute on which Professor Taniguchi served as member of the Appellate Body. This dispute concerned Brazil\u27s restrictions on imports of retreaded tires and raised important questions about the relationship between regional trade agreements and commitments to the WTO. The subject of this article—the relationship between the dispute settlement mechanisms of various free trade agreements, customs unions or regional trade agreements (RTAs) and the WTO\u27s Dispute Settlement Understanding—is one that has already seen considerable debate among scholars. This debate is poised to become more relevant and more intense with the proliferation of free trade agreements and RTAs. This article outlines the most common types of dispute settlement mechanisms contained in RTAs and the problems that can arise from the overlap or conflict between these RTA dispute settlement provisions and the Dispute Settlement Understanding of the WTO. This article also discusses the most recent case in which such a conflict arose—the Appellate Body\u27s report in Brazil Tyres. In Brazil Tyres, the Appellate Body examined Brazil\u27s ban on the importation of used and retreaded tires and the exemption from that ban that Brazil adopted to implement an adverse ruling from a decision of an RTA dispute settlement tribunal. Brazil contended that the WTO panel was correct in finding that Brazil\u27s exemption from the ban for certain retreaded tires was permissible because it was mandated by a Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR) tribunal. The Appellate Body reversed the panel, finding that taking action to comply with a MERCOSUR dispute settlement panel did not necessarily provide sufficient justification for Brazil\u27s action. Brazil was still required to meet the requirements of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and WTO covered agreements, particularly, in this case, the chapeau of Article XX. This article concludes that there are a number of problems that can arise—or have already arisen—due to the overlap in dispute settlement processes between the WTO and RTAs, and WTO members should take immediate action under the Doha Round mandate to address these conflicts and clarify the legal relationship between RTA and WTO dispute settlement provisions

Refocussing therapy : the effectiveness and uniqueness of a God-based therapy method : a thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Psychology at Massey University, Albany, New Zealand

Refocussing Therapy (RFT) is a God-based theory and psychotherapy approach. The aim of the present study was to evaluate the effectiveness and uniqueness of RFT using a quasi-experimental mode of investigation. Over a period of four months pre- and post-treatment assessments of 49 RFT clients' mental health status and religious coping were made using the TOP v 4.1 and RCOPE measures. Changes were also assessed for a comparison group of 10 pastoral care (PC) recipients. Significant positive treatment gains were reported by RFT clients, while PC recipients had smaller but generally positive treatment gains. Positive religious coping improved for both the RFT group and the PC group. However, negative religious coping reduced significantly for the RFT group but increased for the PC group. Findings offer preliminary support for the effectiveness of RFT. and indicate that RFT impacts significantly upon clients' clinical status and religious coping. Further research is recommended to determine the efficacy of RFT

Multilateral Economic Institutions and U.S. Foreign Policy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Multilateral Int\u27l Dev., Multilateral Insts., & Int\u27l Econ., Energy, & Envtl. Pol\u27y of the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 115th Cong., Nov. 27, 2018 (Statement of Jennifer A. Hillman)

Virtually every major international gathering of world leaders recently has ended in failure—or at least failure to reach enough agreement to issue a concluding statement or communique. These failures come at a time when many have been looking for signs that world leaders would come together to address the most pressing problems facing the world—including climate change, the breakdown in the rules of the international trading system, the need everywhere for good jobs that pay a living wage, and rapidly growing income inequality. The failure of these meetings to produce formal agreements—or even specific paths to reaching agreements in the future—despite the high stakes has left many questioning the ability of the world’s leaders to meet global challenges, shedding a spotlight on the institutions and fora that were established for the purpose of achieving multilateral solutions—particularly the World Trade Organization (WTO), the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The failure to reach agreements can best be seen as part of a long-term trend toward increased complexity in the world that makes it nearly impossible to reach traditional multilateral binding accords, combined with a waning of faith on the part of many countries in multilateralism and multilateral institutions. A number of clear trends emerge from the failures to reach accords at virtually all recent international gatherings: 1) Government policies and international arrangements for collective decision-making have not kept pace with changes in the world, especially the high degree of international economic integration and interdependence. Much of the increasing complexity in the international economic order stems from the explosive growth in the number and size of multinational corporations and financial institutions, many of which now dwarf the size of most of the nations in the world. Added to the complexity is the increase in the speed at which goods, money and technology moves around the globe in our digital age. 2) Learning to operate in this vastly more complex world will require more multilateralism, not less. As countries emerged from the era of colonialization and began opening their markets, the number of players on global stage increased, making reaching consensus among a much larger group of disparate interests more difficult. But because the most significant problems facing the world cross many international boundaries, solving them will require that countries come together to find regional, plurilateral, or global solutions. 3) It is essential that the international economic institutions be updated and improved, not destroyed or left to wither. Because it is clear that reaching major new binding accords or creating new international institutions is quite difficult, the best and most achievable solution is to renovate our existing institutions. Each needs to modernize and improve their governance structures to ensure that work can get done despite the increases in complexities and to update their mandates to ensure the ability to address the problems of the 21st century, many of which are quite different from those that existed in the 1940s when these institutions were created. Given that the crisis is most acute at the WTO, this testimony will focus on what must be done to renovate the World Trade Organization and why doing so is critical, both for the trading system and for the continued existence of a rules-based international economic order. The need for the WTO and its dispute settlement system to remain viable is particularly critical if we are to address the challenges presented by the explosive growth of China and its transformation into the largest exporter of goods in the world

Cook\u27s The burning of the White House (Book Review)

A review of Cook, J. H. (2106). The burning of the White House. Washington DC: Regnery History. 433 pp. $29.99. ISBN 978162157478

Is the Oral Microbiome Important in HIV-Associated Inflammation?

Alterations in the gut microbiome during HIV infection have been implicated in chronic inflammation, but the role of the oral microbiome in this process is less clear. The article by M. K. Annavajhala, S. D. Khan, S. B. Sullivan, J. Shah, et al. (mSphere 5:e00798-19, 2020, https://doi.org/10.1128/mSphere.00798-19) investigated the relationship between oral and gut microbiome diversity and immune activation in patients with HIV on antiretroviral therapy. In this study, oral microbiome diversity was inversely associated with inflammatory markers such as soluble CD14 (sCD14), but surprisingly similar associations were not seen with gut microbiome diversity. Oral microbiome diversity was also associated with periodontitis in these patients. This study highlights the importance of continuing multisite examinations in studying the gastrointestinal tract microbiome and also stimulates important directions for future research defining the role of the oral-gut axis in HIV-associated inflammation

Having a say: ‘access to justice’ as democratic participation

Despite the pervasiveness of civil law in Western societies and the impact of its judicial creation and administration, citizens are too often bystanders in litigation; they are either represented by lawyers, and/or increasingly required to resolve these problems themselves without the assistance of legal representation. In terms of access to justice policy and initiatives, the response to this critical problem represents one of the most contested issues on the law-and-society agenda and there have been continuing debates over the meaning of access, its objectives, and its success. The question that arises in this regard is pertinent – can access to justice initiatives empower individuals to meaningfully participate in the legal decisions and processes that affect their lives and by extension, the democratic process? This paper critically examines whether, given the structure of the civil justice system, participation by self-represented litigants is a legitimate or viable foundation for access to justice initiatives

Why the Ryan-Brady Tax Proposal Will Be Found to Be Inconsistent with WTO Law

The tax-reform plan released by Speaker of the House Paul Ryan and House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Kevin Brady is intended to improve our corporate tax system by, among other things, taxing companies based on where they sell their goods, not where the business is located or where the goods are made. To do so, the ambitious reforms would set up a system in which corporations pay taxes on their U.S. sales revenues, with deductions permitted for the cost of input materials and labor, along with exclusions for the value of export sales. Although policymakers rarely need to take the World Trade Organization (WTO) or its rules into account when devising tax policy, the proposal outlined in the Republican Blueprint for a cash flow tax does have significant WTO implications. While many proponents have said that plan is fully consistent with our WTO obligations, or at least that the WTO-consistency of the plan is “ambiguous,” that contention rests on a blurring of the distinction between taxes imposed on imports with rebates or exclusions for exports, combining the two under the overall notion of “border adjusted taxes” or BTAs. As this Issue Brief explains, as currently described, the Ryan-Brady taxes on imports are a clear violation of WTO rules while the rebates or exclusion from taxes for exports presents a murkier picture. The speed with which WTO disciplines can be imposed also vary between imports and exports. Claims that the cash-flow tax’s application to imports violates the WTO would follow the traditional WTO dispute settlement rules, potentially taking two or more years for a decision on whether a violation has occurred, with significant additional time added on for compliance and possible further litigation over whether any changes the US might make in response to an adverse ruling bring about actual compliance. Disputes claiming that the exemption for exports from the sales revenue base violates the WTO rules on subsidies would, on the other hand, potentially be subject to the WTO’s expedited dispute process for claims involving prohibited export subsidies or relatively fast action by our trading partners to impose countervailing duties on US exports that cause injury to their domestic producers. As a result, any U.S. violations would likely generate several opportunities for relatively expeditious reprisals by other WTO member states

Changing Climate for Carbon Taxes: Who’s Afraid of the WTO?

Carbon taxes have recently become a major source of discussion in the Washington, DC policy community. Supporters contend that they offer an efficient way to simultaneously create incentives to emit less carbon dioxide and reduce the budget deficit. Leading think tanks from both the left and the right, including Brookings, the American Enterprise Institute, and Resources for the Future, have hosted dialogues on how to structure the tax and use the revenues. Meanwhile, lawmakers have proposed two carbon tax bills during this congressional session: 1) Senators Boxer (D-CA) and Sanders (I-VT) put forward a plan to assess coal, oil, and gas producers a $20-per-ton carbon tax; and 2) Rep. Henry Waxman (D-CA), along with Rep. Blumenauer (D-OR) and Senators Whitehouse (D-RI) and Schatz (D-HI) released a discussion draft of a bill that would impose a fee of between$15 and $30 per ton on greenhouse gas emissions from power plants, factories, refineries, and other major emitters of carbon dioxide. Should such a carbon tax be enacted, it will in all likelihood be accompanied by measures to ensure that the U.S. industries that would be most heavily affected by the tax are not placed at a competitive disadvantage with respect to competitor producers operating in countries that have not imposed any restrictions or taxes on carbon usage. Any such efforts to “level the playing field” will raise numerous questions regarding their compatibility with U.S. international obligations, especially their legality under agreed upon rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and in particular, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Can such a carbon tax be applied in a way that does not violate U.S. obligations under the WTO Agreements? I believe the answer is yes, provided that policymakers carefully design such a tax, keeping in mind the basic requirements of the WTO not to discriminate in favor of domestic producers or to favor imports from certain countries over others. The key is to structure any accompanying border measure as a straightforward extension of the domestic climate policy to imports. If so designed, there should be few questions about the measure’s consistency with the WTO rules. Even if questions were raised, the United States would have strong defenses within the WTO system. And even if those defenses were somehow to fail, the United States would be able to make adjustments should some aspect of its carbon tax system be found wanting. A non-discriminatory tax enacted in good faith to address climate change should pass muster with the WTO. Therefore, the threat of WTO challenges should not deter policymakers from adopting a carbon tax system now