Coverage of the 2011 Q fever vaccination campaign in the Netherlands, using retrospective population-based prevalence estimation of cardiovascular risk-conditions for chronic Q fever

Background: In 2011, a unique Q fever vaccination campaign targeted people at risk for chronic Q fever in the southeast of the Netherlands. General practitioners referred patients with defined cardiovascular risk-conditions (age >15 years). Prevalence rates of those risk-conditions were lacking, standing in the way of adequate planning and coverage estimation. We aimed to obtain prevalence rates retrospectively in order to estimate coverage of the Q fever vaccination campaign. Methods: With broad search terms for these predefined risk-conditions, we extracted patient-records from a large longitudinal general-practice research-database in the Netherlands (IPCI-database). Afte

Coverage of the 2011 Q fever vaccination campaign in the Netherlands, using retrospective population-based prevalence estimation of cardiovascular risk-conditions for chronic Q fever

Background: In 2011, a unique Q fever vaccination campaign targeted people at risk for chronic Q fever in the southeast of the Netherlands. General practitioners referred patients with defined cardiovascular risk-conditions (age >15 years). Prevalence rates of those risk-conditions were lacking, standing in the way of adequate planning and coverage estimation. We aimed to obtain prevalence rates retrospectively in order to estimate coverage of the Q fever vaccination campaign. Methods: With broad search terms for these predefined risk-conditions, we extracted patient-records from a large longitudinal general-practice research-database in the Netherlands (IPCI-database). Afte

Middle east respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) infections in two returning travellers in the Netherlands, May 2014

Two patients, returning to the Netherlands from pilgrimage in Medina and Mecca, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, were diagnosed with Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) infection in May 2014. The source and mode of transmission have not yet been determined. Hospital-acquired infection and community-acquired infection are both possible

Experiences of carriers of multidrug-resistant organisms: a systematic review

Contains fulltext : 202240.pdf (publisher's version ) (Open Access)OBJECTIVES: A comprehensive overview of the ways control measures directed at carriers of multidrug-resistant organisms (MDRO) affect daily life of carriers is lacking. In this systematic literature review, we sought to explore how carriers experience being a carrier and how they experience being subjected to control measures by looking at the impact on basic capabilities. METHODS: We searched Medline, Embase and PsychINFO until 26 May 2016 for studies addressing experiences of MDRO carriers. Twenty-seven studies were included, addressing experiences with methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (n = 21), ESBL (n = 1), multiple MDRO (n = 4) and other (n = 1, not specified). We categorized reported experiences according to Nussbaum's capability approach. RESULTS: Carriage and control measures were found to interfere with quality of care, cause negative emotions, limit interactions with loved ones, cause stigmatization, limit recreational activities and create financial and professional insecurity. Further, carriers have difficulties with full comprehension of the problem of antimicrobial resistance, thus affecting six out of ten basic capabilities. CONCLUSIONS: Applying Nussbaum's capability approach visualizes an array of unintended consequences of control measures. Carriers experience stigmatization, especially in healthcare settings, and have limited understanding of their situation and the complexities of antimicrobial resistance

Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) infections in two returning travellers in the Netherlands, May 2014

Two patients, returning to the Netherlands from pilgrimage in Medina and Mecca, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, were diagnosed with Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) infection in May 2014. The source and mode of transmission have not yet been determined. Hospital-acquired infection and community-acquired infection are both possible

Case of seasonal reassortant A(H1N2) influenza virus infection, the Netherlands, March 2018.

A seasonal reassortant A(H1N2) influenza virus harbouring genome segments from seasonal influenza viruses A(H1N1)pdm09 (HA and NS) and A(H3N2) (PB2, PB1, PA, NP, NA and M) was identified in March 2018 in a 19-months-old patient with influenza-like illness (ILI) who presented to a general practitioner participating in the routine sentinel surveillance of ILI in the Netherlands. The patient recovered fully. Further epidemiological and virological investigation did not reveal additional cases

Which sectors should be involved in public health emergency preparedness, response, and recovery decision-making? A RAND-modified consensus procedure among European Union country experts

Background: The COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated the imperative for multisectoral collaboration and a whole-of-society approach to managing public health emergencies (PHE). However, there are currently no guidelines available on which sectors should be included in public health emergency preparedness and response (PHEPR). There is also a lack of guidance on how to encourage multisectoral collaboration during emergencies. This study gathers insights from European experts to identify key sectors for PHE preparedness, response, and recovery. Methods: A multi-stage Delphi study was conducted with European PHE experts to compile (i) a consensus-driven list of priority sectors for PHE decision-making, and (ii) a list of recommendations on how to incorporate multisectoral collaboration in PHEPR plans. Results: Of the 28 predefined sectors, consensus was reached among experts on 12 sectors that should be included in decision-making during preparedness, response, and recovery. One additional sector was identified as relevant during the response phase. Furthermore, consensus was reached for ten suggested recommendations on how to incorporate multisectoral collaboration in national PHEPR plans. Conclusions: This study provides the collective opinion of European PHE experts on a list of 13 sectors that should be included in decision-making during PHE preparedness, response, and/or recovery. It also provides ten recommendations on how to improve multisectoral collaboration. These can be used as systematic checklists when PHEPR experts consider how to integrate different sectors and multisectoral collaboration in PHE management. Trial registration: Not applicable.</p