The Euratom Safeguards On-site Laboratories at the Reprocessing Plants of La Hague and Sellafield

In the European Union, nuclear material is reprocessed from irradiated power reactor fuel at two sites ¿ La Hague in France and Sellafield in the United Kingdom. These are the largest nuclear sites within the EU, processing many hundreds of tons of nuclear material in a year. Under the Euratom Treaty, the European Commission has the duty to assure that the nuclear material is only used for declared purposes. The Directorate General for Energy (DG ENER), acting for the Commission, assures itself that the terms of Article 77 of Chapter VII of the Treaty have been complied with. In contrast to the Non Proliferation Treaty, the Euratom Treaty requires to safeguard all civil nuclear material in all EU member states ¿ including the nuclear weapons states. The considerable amount of fissile material separated per year (several tonnes) calls for a stringent system of safeguards measures. The aim of safeguards is to deter diversion of nuclear material from peaceful use by maximizing the chance of early detection. At a broader level, it provides assurance to the public that the European nuclear industry, the EU member states and the European Union honour their legal duties under the Euratom Treaty and their commitments to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Efficient and effective safeguards measures are essential for the public acceptance of nuclear activities.JRC.E.7-Nuclear Safeguards and Forensic

Characterization of Spent Nuclear Fuels by Ion Chromatography-Inductively Coupled Plasma Mass Spectrometry

Ion chromatography coupled to ICP-MS has been applied for the characterization of two different fuel samples (UO2) and mixed oxide (MOX) and the results compared with other techniques.JRC.E - Institute for Transuranium Elements (Karlsruhe

Characterization of Spent Nuclear fuels by Ion Chromatography-Inductively Coupled Plasma Mass Spectrometry

Abstract not availableJRC.E-Institute for Transuranium Elements (Karlsruhe

COMPUCEA 2nd Generation Performance Evaluation

COMPUCEA (Combined Procedure for Uranium Concentration and Enrichment Assay) is used for on-site analytical measurements in support of joint Euratom-IAEA inspections during physical inventory verification (PIV) campaigns in European Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU) fuel fabrication plants. The analytical technique involves the accurate determination of the uranium element content by energy-dispersive X-ray absorption edge spectrometry (L-edge densitometry) and of the 235U enrichment by gamma spectrometry with a LaBr3(Ce) detector. For evaluation of the LaBr3 spectra a modified version of the NaIGEM code is used, which has recently been adapted to handle the presence of reprocessed uranium. This paper describes the technique, setup and calibration procedure of the instrument. Results from PIV campaigns in 2007 and 2008 are presented, which demonstrate the performance of the technique. First results obtained with a sandwich detector configuration for enhanced detection efficiency of the passive gamma spectrometry are discussed.JRC.E.8-Nuclear safeguards and Securit

COMPUCEA: a high-performance analysis procedure for timely on-site uranium accountancy verification in LEU fuel fabrication plants

COMPUCEA (Combined Procedure for Uranium Concentration and Enrichment Assay) is used for on-site analytical measurements in support of joint Euratom- IAEA inspections during physical inventory verification (PIV) campaigns in European Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU) fuel fabrication plants. The analytical technique involves the accurate determination of the uranium element content by energy-dispersive X-ray absorption edge spectrometry ( L-edge densitometry) and of the 235U enrichment by gamma spectrometry with a LaBr3(Ce) detector. For evaluation of the LaBr3 spectra a modified version of the NaIGEM code is used, which has recently been adapted to handle the presence of reprocessed uranium. This paper describes the technique, setup and calibration procedure of the instrument. Results from PIV campaigns in 2007 and 2008 are presented, which demonstrate the performance of the technique. First results obtained with a sandwich detector configuration for enhanced detection efficiency of the passive gamma spectrometry are discussed.JRC.E.7-Nuclear Safeguards and Forensic