The Role of Antitrust Policy in the Development of Australian-New Zealand Free Trade

This article examines some antitrust aspects of the Australia-New Zealand free trade accord. The first section will trace the development of trans-Tasman2 free trade, noting the long history of efforts to liberalize trade between the two countries. The next part analyzes the role antitrust law played in the movement to free trade. The final two sections raise a number of outstanding issues and problems yet to be resolved by Australia and New Zealand policy makers

The Role of Antitrust Policy in the Development of Australian-New Zealand Free Trade

This paper examines some antitrust aspects of the Australia-New Zealand free trade accord. The first section will trace the development of trans-Tasman free trade. Efforts to liberalize trade between the two countries have a long history. The next part analyzes the role antitrust law played in the movement to free trade. The final two sections raise a number of outstanding issues and problems yet to be resolved by Australian and New Zealand policy makers

The Role of Antitrust Policy in the Development of Australian-New Zealand Free Trade

This paper examines some antitrust aspects of the Australia-New Zealand free trade accord. The first section will trace the development of trans-Tasman free trade. Efforts to liberalize trade between the two countries have a long history. The next part analyzes the role antitrust law played in the movement to free trade. The final two sections raise a number of outstanding issues and problems yet to be resolved by Australian and New Zealand policy makers

The Case Against Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide

The arguments in favour of legalising voluntary euthanasia and doctor-assisted suicide initially appear convincing. We should, it is said, respect people’s autonomy, euthanasia is a compassionate response to unbearable suffering, it has (supposedly) worked well in those nations that have implemented it, and so on. But on closer analysis, the arguments are far less persuasive. Such a new law is unnecessary given the current legal ability of all but the most incapacitated to take their own life and the availability of palliative care. Any euthanasia law — even one carefully drafted with requisite safeguards — is susceptible to noncompliance and vulnerable to abuse. Moreover, any law would face the ineradicable reality of self-imposed pressure the vulnerable experience to “do the right thing”. This article sets out ten reasons why euthanasia should not be legalised and contends that the case for decriminalising it has not been made out by the proponents of it

Charity Begins at the Politically Correct Home? The Family First Case

Is advancing the traditional or nuclear family a non-charitable purpose? Is it “controversial” and impermissibly political “propaganda” in the 21st century to advocate the two-parent, opposite-sex, married couple as the optimal domestic configuration in which to have and raise children? The New Zealand Charities Registration Board thought so and deregistered the organisation that had the temerity to advance it: Family First New Zealand. This article examines the Family First deregistration decision. The case is a particularly clear example of official institutional antipathy towards the conservative political and religious understanding of domestic personal relations

Regulating Religious Coercion

This Article examines the nature and regulation of religious coercion. Direct religious coercion denotes situations where the government expressly applies sanctions to ensure conformity with religious goals. Indirect religious coercion describes situations where, although the state may not have intended to pressure citizens to comply with or participate in some religious activity, it nonetheless takes advantage of social, psychological or peer pressure that has the same conformity-inducing effect. Indirect religious coercion is a real problem for those who dissent from majoritarian religious practices. But an open-ended inquiry into it can, as critics point out, be a highly unpredictable and subjective exercise. On balance, the Article concludes that the concept does deserve recognition by the courts. The Article develops a modified indirect coercion test to guide judges in First Amendment cases. A two-step test is expounded to streamline the inquiry, identify the key criteria,and render the test more workable

A Real Threat or a Mere Shadow? School Chaplaincy Programs and the Secular State

Williams v Commonwealth is an important decision for many reasons. In this article I shall focus on the broader normative arguments concerning state-funded chaplains, specifically those in public schools. I will address each of the principal objections to publicly-funded school chaplains, and endeavour to answer each one. The main criticisms of school chaplains and the Australian Federal Government’s National School Chaplaincy and Student Welfare Program (‘NSCSWP’), as it is now called, can be usefully drawn from an article by Greens member of the New South Wales Upper House, Dr John Kaye. After considering the major objections, I will next briefly discuss the religious test argument and then conclude with some brief thoughts on the compatibility of chaplaincies with the secular state. The US Supreme Court once had to decide whether legislative chaplains paid out of the public purse were a ‘real threat’ under the Constitution versus a ‘mere shadow’ on the Establishment Clause. For over a century, chaplains compensated out of public funds had said a prayer at the start of each day’s proceedings of the Nebraska state legislature. The majority of the Supreme Court concluded the paid chaplains represented no ‘real threat’ to religious freedom nor to the principle of the nonestablishment of religion. That same conclusion ought to be reached in respect of state-funded school chaplains in Australia

Companies as Religious Liberty Claimants

Can a company bring a claim alleging that its religious freedom has been violated? Some recent authority suggests ‘yes’, at least insofar as the company is a one-person company or a closely held corporation. This article examines the subject, the goal being the exploration of a coherent and principled basis for the granting, if at all, of the right for an ordinary business corporation to sue to enforce the right to religious freedom, or to claim an exemption designed for religious persons or organizations. The determining principle governing the legitimacy of a claim ought to be the nature of the act and not the actor