Direct and indirect government venture capital investments in Europe

This paper provides evidence of the broad government presence in the European venture capital industry. Two forms of intervention are considered: first, direct stand-alone government venture capital funds and, second, indirect private funds to which governments commit funds as limited partners. The overall government presence seems to be much more important than previously documented, as we find that the government intervenes, on average, in 42.2% of venture capital investments in Europe. We also show that European countries are heterogeneous in their use of these two channels, and we consider possible early explanations for this choice of policy mix. Lastly, we provide some evidence on the consequences of these policies in terms of SME's perceived access to financing

Bridging the equity gap for young innovative companies: The design of effective government venture capital fund programs

Governmental venture capital funds (GVCs) are created by policymakers around the world to support young innovative companies (YICs) with the aim of \u201cbridging the equity gap\u201d. In this paper, we study the heterogeneity in the design of GVC programs in Europe and identify the design features that are most effective in achieving the desired outcomes of this policy. Specifically, we focus on the probability that GVC-backed companies will receive additional funds from private venture capital investors and, ultimately, changes in their growth and innovation outcomes. We find that the choices of location, colocation, syndication and industry focus of a GVC program substantially influence the extent to which it is able to achieve such goals. Important policy implications are discussed

Direct and Indirect Government Venture Capital Investments in Europe

This paper provides evidence of the broad government presence in the European venture capital industry. Two forms of intervention are considered: first, direct stand-alone government venture capital funds and, second, indirect private funds to which governments commit funds as limited partners. The overall government presence seems to be much more important than previously documented, as we find that the government intervenes, on average, in 42.2% of venture capital investments in Europe. We also show that European countries are heterogeneous in their use of these two channels, and we consider possible early explanations for this choice of policy mix. Lastly, we provide some evidence on the consequences of these policies in terms of SME's perceived access to financing

Private equity: where we have been and the road ahead

© 2019 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. We provide an overview of the systematic evidence relating to the impact of private equity (PE) backed buyouts over the last two decades. We focus on performance; employment and employee relations; innovation, investment and entrepreneurship; longevity and survival. We also explore a future research agenda in the context of a maturing PE industry

The impact of private equity on firms׳ patenting activity

The paper analyses the impact of private equity (PE) backed leveraged buyouts (LBOs) on innovative output (patenting). Using a sample of 407 UK deals we find that LBOs have a positive causal effect on patent stock and quality-adjusted patent stock. Our results imply a 6% increase in quality-adjusted patent stock three years after the deal. The increase in innovative activity is concentrated among private-to-private transactions with a 14% increase in the quality-adjusted patent stock. We also find evidence suggesting that PE firms facilitate the relaxation of financial constraints. In sum, our findings suggest that PE firms do not promote short-term cost-cutting at the expense of entrepreneurial investment opportunities with a long-term pay-off

How does governmental versus private venture capital backing affect a firm's efficiency? Evidence from Belgium

We investigate the implications of venture capital (VC) investor type (government or private) on the operating efficiency of a sample of 515 Belgian portfolio firms up to 3 years after the investment. We find that the government VC-backed firms display significant reductions in productivity. No significant differences in efficiency are found in firms backed by private VC compared with their non-VC-backed peers. Finally, significant reductions in efficiency exist in targets of government VC compared to their non-VC-backed peers

The impact on productivity of management buyouts and private equity

International audienceA management buyout (MBO) is a form of transaction in which management teams acquire a firm or its division(s) from its current shareholders. As managers often lack sufficient financial resources, these operations are executed with the help of financial backers known as private equity (PE) firms. The transaction is typically financed with a mixture of equity and debt, the latter being a larger proportion of the total deal value than the former.<br/