Crime and Unemployment: Evidence from Europe

This paper investigates the impact of unemployment on crime using a country-level panel data set from Europe that contains consistently-measured crime and police force statistics. Unemployment has a positive impact on monetary crimes, and instrumenting unemployment with the exchange rate produces larger estimates than those obtained from OLS specifications. The unemployment rate is decomposed into various components such as gender-specific and education-specific unemployment. The analysis of specific population sub-groups’ unemployment reveals that about 65% of the overall impact of unemployment on crime is attributable to the unemployment of males with low education.

Joblessness and Perceptions about the Effectiveness of Democracy

Using micro data on more than 130,000 individuals from 69 countries, we analyze the extent to which joblessness of the individuals and the prevailing unemployment rate in the country impact perceptions of the effectiveness of democracy. We find that personal joblessness experience translates into negative opinions about the effectiveness of democracy and it increases the desire for a rouge leader. Evidence from people who live in European countries suggests that being jobless for more than a year is the source of discontent. We also find that well-educated and wealthier individuals are less likely to indicate that democracies are ineffective, regardless of joblessness. People's beliefs about the effectiveness of democracy as system of governance are also shaped by the unemployment rate in countries with low levels of democracy. The results suggest that periods of high unemployment and joblessness could hinder the development of democracy or threaten its existence.unemployment duration, democracy, education, development, World Values Survey

Is Leisure a Normal Good? Evidence from the European Parliament

Prior to July 2009, salaries of the members of the European Parliament were paid by their home country and there were substantial salary differences between parliamentarians representing different EU countries. Starting in July 2009, the salary of each member of the Parliament is pegged to 38.5% of a European Court judge's salary, paid by the EU. This created an exogenous change in salaries, the magnitude and direction of which varied substantially between parliamentarians. Parliamentarians receive per diem compensation for each plenary session they attend, but salaries constitute unearned income as they are independent of attendance to the Parliament. Using detailed information on each parliamentarian of the European Parliament between 2004 and 2011 we show that an increase in salaries reduces attendance to plenary sessions and an increase in per diem compensation increases it. We also show that corruption in home country has a negative effect on attendance for seasoned members of the Parliament.labor supply, corruption, EU

The Impact of Institutions and Development on Happiness

This paper demonstrates that institutional factors influence the subjective well-being of individuals differently in rich versus poor countries. A lower level of corruption, a more democratic government and better civil rights increase the well-being of individuals in rich countries, whereas an increase in per capita income has no impact. On the contrary, in poor countries the extent of corruption, democracy and civil rights have no influence on happiness, but an increase in per capita income impacts happiness positively. This stark contrast may be due to the difference of preferences over income and institutional factors.

Is Leisure a Normal Good? Evidence from the European Parliament

Prior to July 2009, salaries of the members of the European Parliament were paid by their home country and there were substantial salary differences between parliamentarians representing different EU countries. Starting in July 2009, the salary of each member of the Parliament is pegged to 38.5% of a European Court judge’s salary, paid by the EU. This created an exogenous change in salaries, the magnitude and direction of which varied substantially between parliamentarians. Parliamentarians receive per diem compensation for each plenary session they attend, but salaries constitute unearned income as they are independent of attendance to the Parliament. Using detailed information on each parliamentarian of the European Parliament between 2004 and 2011 we show that an increase in salaries reduces attendance to plenary sessions and an increase in per diem compensation increases it. We also show that corruption in home country has a negative effect on attendance for seasoned members of the Parliament.

Raising MEPs’ salaries causes them to attend fewer meetings, but cutting their salaries increases their attendance rate.

What impact does a parliamentarian’s salary have on the amount of effort they put into representing citizens? Naci Mocan and Duha Altindag outline results from a study on salary changes which took place as part of a change in procedures in the European Parliament in 2009. They note that MEPs who experienced an increase in salary in 2009 attended fewer meetings, while those who experienced a pay cut raised their attendance rate. The results suggest that there is a significant link between the effort of parliamentarians and the amount that they are paid

Sleep and Epilepsy

It is well known that clinical and EEG manifestations of many epilepsy syndromes are related to sleep-and-waking cycles. Epilepsies are thought as disorders reflecting abnormalities in neuronal networks underlying sleep process. Patients with epilepsy, on the other hand, are generally reported to have poor sleep quality when compared with healthy controls. Furthermore, poor sleep quality or sleep-deprivation may worsen seizure control and set a vicious cycle. Anti-epileptic drugs may also affect sleep architecture. Here, we aim to review the complex relationship of sleep and epilepsy in the light of relevant literature

Does It Matter How and How Much Politicians are Paid?

An important question in representative democracies is how to ensure that politicians behave in the best interest of citizens rather than their own private interests. Aside from elections, one of the few institutional devices available to regulate the actions of politicians is their pay structure. In this paper, we provide fresh insights into the impact of politician salaries on their performance using a unique law change implemented in 2012 in Turkey. Specifically, the members of the parliament (MPs) in Turkey who are retired from their pre-political career jobs earn a pension bonus on top of their MP salaries. The law change in 2012 significantly increased the pension bonus by pegging it to 18 percent of the salary of the President of Turkey, while keeping the salaries of non-retired MPs unchanged. By exploiting the variation in total salaries caused by the new law in a difference-in-differences framework, we find that the salary increase had a negative impact on the performance of the retired MPs. In particular, the overall performance of these MPs was lowered by 12.3 percent of a standard deviation as a result of the increase in salary caused by the new law. This finding is robust to numerous specification tests. Furthermore, the results obtained from an auxiliary analysis suggest that one of the mechanisms through which MPs reduce their performance is absenteeism