Political discourse in football coverage : the cases of Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana

Football coverage in newspapers is both an arena for and a mirror of political discourse within a society. The paper argues that discourses within football coverage referring to political issues reflect dominant – and, possibly, contesting – “truths”, which themselves are linked to power relations and political struggles within a given society. The comparison of Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana, two neighbouring countries in very different conditions (particularly with regard to their historical trajectories and the degree of societal consensus), and more particularly, the comparison of dominant discourses on the topics of patriotism, peace and good governance related to the World Cup qualification of both national teams supports the hypothesis of a strong context-relatedness of a politically loaded “football language”. For instance, whereas in Ghana patriotism is, when football comes in, quickly merged with pan-africanism, the Ivorian team renewed the heated political debate about “Ivorianess” by putting forward a notion of inclusive patriotism.Die Fußball-Berichterstattung in Zeitungen stellt eine Arena, aber auch einen Spiegel der politischen Diskurse innerhalb von Gesellschaften dar. Der vorliegende Text argumentiert, dass Sportberichte dominante, aber auch Gegen-“Wahrheiten” reflektieren, die in Verbindung zu Herrschaftsbeziehungen und politischen Auseinandersetzungen in einer bestimmten Gesellschaft stehen. Der Vergleich von Côte d’Ivoire und Ghana, Nachbarstaaten in sehr unterschiedlichem aktuellen Kontext (im Hinblick auf den Verlauf der jüngeren Geschichte und in der Ausprägung von gesellschaftlichem Konsens), und im besonderen der Vergleich von prägenden Diskursen zu den Themen Patriotismus, Frieden und Good Governance in der Berichterstattung über Qualifikation zur sowie Leistung bei der Fußball-Weltmeisterschaft 2006 durch beide Nationalmannschaften stützt die Hypothese einer starken Kontextgebundenheit der politisch aufgeladenen „Fußballsprache“. Während in Ghana beispielsweise Patriotismus schnell mit „Panafrikanismus“ gepaart wird, sobald von Fußball die Rede ist, hat das ivorische Team die politisch hitzig geführte Debatte über die „Ivoirité“ weiterentwickelt, indem eine inklusivere Form des Patriotismus breite Unterstützung findet

Reshaping Political Space? The Impact of the Armed Insurgency in the Central African Republic on Political Parties and Representation

This paper analyzes the declining importance of political parties in the Central African Republic (CAR). It argues that the problematic attitude of elites who are fluctuating between violent and peaceful behavior in order to further their own careers is jeopardizing both peace and democracy. The author hypothesizes that both political parties and rebel movements are failing to adequately represent (ethnoregional) interests, but that parties are suffering more in the course of the enduring war and the peace process. Patterns of elite behavior are presented as the main explanation for the resulting crisis of representation, with international actors’ preference for inclusionary power-sharing deals seen as the main aggravating factor.Central African Republic, peace process, political parties, rebel movements,representation

Major Flaws in Conflict Prevention Policies towards Africa. The Conceptual Deficits of International Actors’ Approaches and How to Overcome Them

Current thinking on African conflicts suffers from misinterpretations (oversimplification, lack of focus, lack of conceptual clarity, state-centrism and lack of vision). The paper analyses a variety of the dominant explanations of major international actors and donors, showing how these frequently do not distinguish with sufficient clarity between the ‘root causes’ of a conflict, its aggravating factors and its triggers. Specifically, a correct assessment of conflict prolonging (or sustaining) factors is of vital importance in Africa’s lingering confrontations. Broader approaches (e.g. “structural stability”) offer a better analytical framework than familiar one-dimensional explanations. Moreover, for explaining and dealing with violent conflicts a shift of attention from the nation-state towards the local and sub-regional level is needed.Sub-Saharan Africa, Conflict Prevention, Conflict Factors, Root causes, Conflict Prolonging Factors, Escalation Patterns, Peace Order, Structural Stability

Not Always in the People’s Interest: Power-sharing Arrangements in African Peace Agreements

Peace agreements form a crucial element of strategies to bring security from outside: they involve third-party mediators during the negotiation stage and often peacekeeping troops to guarantee the agreement at an implementation stage. Peace roundtables usually involve top politicians and military leaders, who negotiate, sign, and/or benefit from the agreement. What is usually and conspicuously absent from peace negotiations is broad-based participation by those who should benefit in the first place: citizens. More specifically, the local level of security provision and insecurity production is rarely taken into account. This paper reviews parts of the academic debate on power sharing and war termination, touching on some key findings by the main researchers working on the topic. The ambivalent African experience with Arend Lijphart’s four main ingredients of consociational democracy (grand coalition, minority veto, proportional representation, group autonomy) is summarized. Recent major African peace agreements (1999-2007) are analyzed, and their power-sharing content detailed. Most agreements contain some—though varying— power-sharing devices. Most striking is the variation regarding the important question of who is sharing power with whom. Obviously, only those present at the negotiation table can really count on being included in major ways. Finally, three country cases are analyzed over a longer time period: Côte d’Ivoire (2002-2007), Liberia (1994-2003), and Central African Republic (1996-2007). The conclusion focuses on the factors of failure of peace agreements that place a heavy emphasis on power sharing.Power sharing, peace agreements, consociational democracy, Central African Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia

The Production of Insecurity by African Security Forces: Insights from Liberia and the Central African Republic

Little attention has been paid to the factual effect of the state’s security forces on the security of African citizens. Reports about security forces’ contribution to widespread insecurity are frequent: the protectors become violators and their appearance causes fear, not security. In many African crisis countries the realization of better security forces appears to be an elusive goal, either because violent conflicts are not definitively settled and therefore do not allow for decent reform or because a lack of capacity as a result of material constraints is not easy to remedy. The self-help mechanisms used to compensate for the lack of state-sponsored security need more attention. However, it has to be acknowledged that the ideal of a neutral and effective force loyal to the state is shared by a great majority of the population. This contribution compares the experiences of Liberia and the Central African Republic, two extreme cases of strong and weak international involvement, respectively, in post-conflict security-sector reform.Liberia, Central African Republic, security, armed forces, security-sector reform

Breaking the "Insecurity Trap"? How Violence and Counter-violence are Perpetuated in Elite Power Struggles

Half a century after independence, African elites, at least those in conflict-ridden countries, often live in constant fear for their life. Real or invented coup attempts, political assassinations, beatings of opposition leaders, the distribution of death lists, etc. have a profoundly traumatizing and self-perpetuating effect. Purges, not least in the security apparatus, are not uncommon, particularly after changes in government, be they peaceful or violent. These purges come at a cost: the excluded elites are frequently tempted to use violence to come back into the 'dining room' - and the excluding government tries to prevent reentry by all means. This contribution draws a dense picture of elite (in)security in three African countries (Central African Republic, Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia). A comparative analysis of elite security needs and devices is undertaken, permitting the author to draw some preliminary conclusions: The ineffectiveness of state institutions (presidential guards, etc.) in breaking the insecurity trap by providing special elite-protection services is obvious. The record of private security services is most debatable and efforts by international actors need to be looked at more closely: UN peacekeepers can be effective when they are sufficient in number and have the appropriate mandate. The record of French interventions in former colonies has over time become ever more ambivalent and has lost any preventive meaning.Ein halbes Jahrhundert nach der Unabhängigkeit leben die Eliten zumindest der durch Konflikte zerrissenen Staaten in beständiger Lebensangst. Tatsächliche oder erfundene Putschversuche, politische Attentate, das Verprügeln von Oppositionspolitikern, die Verbreitung von Todeslisten etc. haben tief traumatisierende und sich selbst verstärkende Effekte. Säuberungen, vor allem im Sicherheitsapparat, sind nicht unüblich, gerade nach friedlichen oder gewaltsamen Regierungswechseln. Diese Säuberungen produzieren Kosten: ausgeschlossene Eliten sind oft geneigt, Gewalt anzuwenden, um ins 'Speisezimmer' zurückzugelangen, und die Regierung versucht, diese Wiederkehr mit allen Mitteln zu verhindern. Der vorliegende Beitrag zeichnet ein dichtes Bild der (Un)Sicherheit von Eliten in drei afrikanischen Staaten (Zentralafrikanische Republik, Côte d'Ivoire und Liberia). Vorgenommen wird eine komparative Analyse von Bedarfen und Mechanismen der Elitensicherheit, um zu folgenden vorläufigen Ergebnissen zu kommen: offensichtlich ist die Ineffizienz staatlicher Einrichtungen (Präsidialgarden etc.), durch spezifischen Elitenschutz die Unsicherheitsfalle zu durchbrechen. Die Bilanz privater Sicherheitsdienste ist umstritten und die Bemühungen internationaler Akteure müssen näher betrachtet und differenziert werden: UN-Friedenstruppen können effizient sein, wenn sie in ausreichender Zahl und mit dem richtigen Mandat auftreten. Die Bilanz französischer Interventionen in Exkolonien ist dagegen allmählich immer ambivalenter geworden und hat mittlerweile jegliche vorbeugende Wirkung verloren

The Production of Insecurity by African Security Forces: Insights from Liberia and the Central African Republic

Little attention has been paid to the factual effect of the state's security forces on the security of African citizens. Reports about security forces - contribution to widespread insecurity are frequent: the protectors become violators and their appearance causes fear, not security. In many African crisis countries the realization of better security forces appears to be an elusive goal, either because violent conflicts are not definitively settled and therefore do not allow for decent reform or because a lack of capacity as a result of material constraints is not easy to remedy. The self-help mechanisms used to compensate for the lack of state-sponsored security need more attention. However, it has to be acknowledged that the ideal of a neutral and effective force loyal to the state is shared by a great majority of the population. This contribution compares the experiences of Liberia and the Central African Republic, two extreme cases of strong and weak international involvement, respectively, in post-conflict security-sector reform.Die Produktion von Unsicherheit durch afrikanische Sicherheitskräfte: Einsichten aus Liberia und aus der Zentralafrikanischen Republik. Der tatsächliche Beitrag staatlicher Sicherheitskräfte zur Sicherheit afrikanischer Bürger wird selten erörtert. Es häufen sich die Berichte, wonach Sicherheitskräfte die schon existierende Unsicherheit erhöhen: die Beschützer werden zur Bedrohung und ihr Erscheinen erzeugt Angst, nicht Sicherheit. In vielen afrikanischen Krisenstaaten erscheint es als illusorisch, bessere Sicherheitskräfte zu bekommen, weil entweder die gewaltsamen Konflikte noch nicht endgültig beendet wurden und daher eine grundlegende Reform nicht möglich ist oder der Mangel an Kapazität lässt sich wegen materieller Engpässe nicht beheben. Selbsthilfemaßnahmen zur Kompensation der fehlenden staatlichen Sicherheitsgewährleistung verdienen größerer Aufmerksamkeit. Gleichzeitig muss anerkannt werden, dass eine große Mehrheit der Bevölkerung dem Ideal neutraler, effizienter und dem Staat gegenüber loyaler Sicherheitskräfte anhängt. Der vorliegende Beitrag vergleicht Erfahrungen in Liberia und in der Zentralafrikanischen Republik, zwei Extremfällen von massiver bzw. schwacher internationaler Einwirkung in die postkonfliktive Sicherheitssektorreform

Not Always in the People's Interest: Power-sharing Arrangements in African Peace Agreements

Peace agreements form a crucial element of strategies to bring security from outside: they involve third-party mediators during the negotiation stage and often peacekeeping troops to guarantee the agreement at an implementation stage. Peace roundtables usually involve top politicians and military leaders, who negotiate, sign, and/or benefit from the agreement. What is usually and conspicuously absent from peace negotiations is broad-based participation by those who should benefit in the first place: citizens. More specifically, the local level of security provision and insecurity production is rarely taken into account. This paper reviews parts of the academic debate on power sharing and war termination, touching on some key findings by the main researchers working on the topic. The ambivalent African experience with Arend Lijphart's four main ingredients of consociational democracy (grand coalition, minority veto, proportional representation, group autonomy) is summarized. Recent major African peace agreements (1999-2007) are analyzed, and their power-sharing content detailed. Most agreements contain some 'though varying' power-sharing devices. Most striking is the variation regarding the important question of who is sharing power with whom. Obviously, only those present at the negotiation table can really count on being included in major ways. Finally, three country cases are analyzed over a longer time period: Côte d'Ivoire (2002-2007), Liberia (1994-2003), and Central African Republic (1996-2007). The conclusion focuses on the factors of failure of peace agreements that place a heavy emphasis on power sharing.Friedensabkommen bilden die wichtigsten Bestandteile von Strategien, um Sicherheit 'von außen' herzustellen. Sie involvieren außenstehende Mediatoren während der Verhandlungsphase und häufig Friedenstruppen, um die Einhaltunge des Abkommens zu garantieren, in der Implementierungsphase. Bei Friedensverhandlungen treffen sich Spitzenpolitiker und Personen der militärischen Führung, die das Abkommen verhandeln, unterzeichnen und/oder direkt davon profitieren. Dagegen ist eine breite Partizipation derer, die in erster Linie aus dem Frieden Nutzen ziehen sollten, nicht üblich und seltsamerweise nicht vorgesehen. Insbesondere die lokale Ebene, die Sicherheit bereitstellt oder Unsicherheit erzeugt, findet keine Beachtung. Der vorliegende Beitrag fasst Teile der akademischen Debatte zu Machtteilung und Kriegsbeendigung zusammen, indem zentrale Ergebnisse der wichtigsten zum Thema arbeitenden Wissenschaftler aufgegriffen werden. Die ambivalente Erfahrung mit Arend Lijpharts vier Hauptbestandteilen der Konkordanzdemokratie (Große Koalition, Minderheitenveto, Verhältniswahl und Gruppenautonomie) in Afrika wird zusammengefasst. Jüngere afrikanische Friedensabkommen (1999-2007) werden auf ihren Gehalt an Machtteilung hin analysiert. Die meisten Abkommen enthalten - allerdings unterschiedliche - Mechanismen zur Machtteilung. Am auffälligsten ist aber die Variation in der zentralen Frage, wer mit wem Macht teilt. Es ist offensichtlich, dass nur die bei Verhandlungen teilnehmenden Akteure damit rechnen können, substanziell mit einbezogen zu werden. Schließlich werden drei Länderfallstudien über einen längeren Zeitraum analysiert: Côte d'Ivoire (2002-2007), Liberia (1994-2003) und Zentralafrikanische Republik (1996-2007). Die Schlussbemerkung konzentriert sich auf Faktoren für das Scheitern von Friedensabkommen, die Elemente der Machtteilung stark hervorgehoben hatten

Reshaping Political Space? The Impact of the Armed Insurgency in the Central African Republic on Political Parties and Representation

This paper analyzes the declining importance of political parties in the Central African Republic (CAR). It argues that the problematic attitude of elites who are fluctuating between violent and peaceful behavior in order to further their own careers is jeopardizing both peace and democracy. The author hypothesizes that both political parties and rebel movements are failing to adequately represent (ethnoregional) interests, but that parties are suffering more in the course of the enduring war and the peace process. Patterns of elite behavior are presented as the main explanation for the resulting crisis of representation, with international actors’ preference for inclusionary power‐sharing deals seen as the main aggravating factor.Umgestaltung des politischen Raums? Die Auswirkungen der bewaffneten Rebellion auf politische Parteien und Repräsentation in der Zentralafrikanischen Republik Dieses Diskussionspaper analysiert die schwindende Bedeutung politischer Parteien in der Zentralafrikanischen Republik. Argumentiert wird, dass das problematische Verhalten der Eliten, die zwischen gewaltsamen und friedlichen Handlungsweisen hin und her wechseln, um ihre eigene Karriere zu befördern, letztlich Frieden und Demokratie gefährdet. Der Autor stellt die Hypothese auf, dass sowohl politische Parteien als auch Rebellenbewegungen darin versagen, (ethnoregionale) Interessen adäquat zu repräsentieren. Allerdings leiden Parteien deutlich stärker im Verlauf des Kriegs‐ und Friedensprozesses. Verhaltensmuster der Elite werden als wesentliche Erklärung für die daraus resultierende Krise der Repräsentation dargestellt, während die Präferenz internationaler Akteure für inklusive Machtteilungsarrangements als hauptsächlicher verschärfender Faktor angesehen wird

Major Flaws in Conflict Prevention Policies towards Africa. The Conceptual Deficits of International Actors’ Approaches and How to Overcome Them

Current thinking on African conflicts suffers from misinterpretations (oversimplification, lack of focus, lack of conceptual clarity, state- centrism and lack of vision). The paper analyses a variety of the dominant explanations of major international actors and donors, showing how these frequently do not distinguish with sufficient clarity between the ‘root causes’ of a conflict, its aggravating factors and its triggers. Specifically, a correct assessment of conflict prolonging (or sustaining) factors is of vital importance in Africa’s lingering confrontations. Broader approaches (e.g. “structural stability”) offer a better analytical framework than familiar one-dimensional explanations. Moreover, for explaining and dealing with violent conflicts a shift of attention from the nation-state towards the local and sub-regional level is needed.Saharan Africa, Conflict Prevention, Conflict Factors, Root causes, Conflict Prolonging Factors, Escalation Patterns, Peace Order, Structural Stability