Implementation vulnerabilities in general quantum cryptography

Quantum cryptography is information-theoretically secure owing to its solid basis in quantum mechanics. However, generally, initial implementations with practical imperfections might open loopholes, allowing an eavesdropper to compromise the security of a quantum cryptographic system. This has been shown to happen for quantum key distribution (QKD). Here we apply experience from implementation security of QKD to several other quantum cryptographic primitives. We survey quantum digital signatures, quantum secret sharing, source-independent quantum random number generation, quantum secure direct communication, and blind quantum computing. We propose how the eavesdropper could in principle exploit the loopholes to violate assumptions in these protocols, breaking their security properties. Applicable countermeasures are also discussed. It is important to consider potential implementation security issues early in protocol design, to shorten the path to future applications.Comment: 13 pages, 8 figure

Controlling single-photon detector ID210 with bright light

We experimentally demonstrate that a single-photon detector ID210 commercially available from ID Quantique is vulnerable to blinding and can be fully controlled by bright illumination. In quantum key distribution, this vulnerability can be exploited by an eavesdropper to perform a faked-state attack giving her full knowledge of the key without being noticed. We consider the attack on standard BB84 protocol and a subcarrier-wave scheme, and outline a possible countermeasure.Comment: 6 pages, 5 figure

Testing random-detector-efficiency countermeasure in a commercial system reveals a breakable unrealistic assumption

In the last decade, efforts have been made to reconcile theoretical security with realistic imperfect implementations of quantum key distribution (QKD). Implementable countermeasures are proposed to patch the discovered loopholes. However, certain countermeasures are not as robust as would be expected. In this paper, we present a concrete example of ID Quantique's random-detector-efficiency countermeasure against detector blinding attacks. As a third-party tester, we have found that the first industrial implementation of this countermeasure is effective against the original blinding attack, but not immune to a modified blinding attack. Then, we implement and test a later full version of this countermeasure containing a security proof [C. C. W. Lim et al., IEEE Journal of Selected Topics in Quantum Electronics, 21, 6601305 (2015)]. We find that it is still vulnerable against the modified blinding attack, because an assumption about hardware characteristics on which the proof relies fails in practice.Comment: 12 pages, 12 figure

Insecurity of detector-device-independent quantum key distribution

Detector-device-independent quantum key distribution (ddiQKD) held the promise of being robust to detector side-channels, a major security loophole in QKD implementations. In contrast to what has been claimed, however, we demonstrate that the security of ddiQKD is not based on post-selected entanglement, and we introduce various eavesdropping strategies that show that ddiQKD is in fact insecure against detector side-channel attacks as well as against other attacks that exploit device's imperfections of the receiver. Our attacks are valid even when the QKD apparatuses are built by the legitimate users of the system themselves, and thus free of malicious modifications, which is a key assumption in ddiQKD.Comment: 7 pages, 5 figures, 1 tabl

A novel epigenetic AML1-ETO/THAP10/miR-383 mini-circuitry contributes to t(8;21) leukaemogenesis

DNA methylation patterns are frequently deregulated in t(8;21) acute myeloid leukaemia (AML), but little is known of the mechanisms by which specific gene sets become aberrantly methylated. Here, we found that the promoter DNA methylation signature of t(8;21)(+) AML blasts differs from that of t(8;21)(-) AMLs. This study demonstrated that a novel hypermethylated zinc finger-containing protein, THAP10, is a target gene and can be epigenetically suppressed by AML1-ETO at the transcriptional level in t(8;21) AML. Our findings also show that THAP10 is a bona fide target of miR-383 that can be epigenetically activated by the AML1-ETO recruiting co-activator p300. In this study, we demonstrated that epigenetic suppression of THAP10 is the mechanistic link between AML1-ETO fusion proteins and tyrosine kinase cascades. In addition, we showed that THAP10 is a nuclear protein that inhibits myeloid proliferation and promotes differentiation both in vitro and in vivo Altogether, our results revealed an unexpected and important epigenetic mini-circuit of AML1-ETO/THAP10/miR-383 in t(8;21) AML, in which epigenetic suppression of THAP10 predicts a poor clinical outcome and represents a novel therapeutic target