Competition, consumerism, and the "Other". A philosophical investigation into the ethics of economic competition

This paper presents a philosophical discussion of the ethical foundations of economic competition, based in large part on Emmanuel Levinas's theory of exteriority and of responsibility for the "Other". The claim is that competition, notwithstanding its positive effects in terms of efficiency and innovativeness, ontologically neglects the "other-ness" of individuals. The fundamental factor in the neglect is the "consumerist" orientation of competitive capitalism through which even small price differences can cause large shifts in demand, so that many firms are choicelessly dependant on competitors' behavior. This analysis based on Levinas significantly deepens Frank Knight's seventy year-old ethical critique of competition.Competition; Consumer economics; Ethics; Philosophy of economics

What Is Neoclassical Economics? The three axioms responsible for its theoretical oeuvre, practical irrelevance and, thus, discursive power

This paper offers a precise definition of neoclassical economics based on three axioms which lie at the latters foundations. This definition is all inclusive in that it applies as much to the neoclassical economic models of the late 19th century as it does to todays more flexible and inclusive models. The paper argues that these axioms, simultaneously, (a) provide the foundation for neoclassicisms discursive success within the social sciences and (b) are the deep cause of its theoretical failure. Moreover, (a) and (b) reinforce one another as neoclassicisms discursive power (which is largely due to the hidden nature of its three foundational axioms) makes it even less likely that it will con-duct an open, pluralist debate on its theoretical foundations (i.e. the three axioms which underpin it).Neoclassical economics, Methodological individualism, Methodological instrumentalism, Methodological equilibration.

Can competition ever be fair ? Challenging the standard prejudice

In this paper, we challenge the usual argument which says that competition is a fair mechanism because it ranks individuals according to their relative preferences between effort and leisure. This argument, we claim, is very insuficient as a justification of fairness in competiton, and we show that it does not stand up to scrutiny once various dynamic aspects of competition are taken into account. Once the sequential unfolding of competition is taken into account, competition turns out to be unfair even if the usual fairness argument is upheld. We distinguish between two notions of fairness, which we call U-fairness,where "U” stands for the "usual” fairness notion, and S-fairness, where "S” stands for the "sequential” aspect of competition. The sequential unfairness of competition, we argue, comprises two usually neglected aspects connected with losses of freedom : first of all, there is an "eclipse” of preferences in the sense that even perfectly calculating competitors do not carry out a trade-off between effort and ranking; and second, competitive dynamics leads to single-mindedness because the constraints on the competitors’ choices always operate in the sense of increased competitiveness and, therefore, in the direction of an increased effort requirements. We argue (1) that competition is S-unfar even if it is U-fair, (2) that as S-unfairness increases, the ethical relevance of U-fairness itself vanishes, so that (3) by focusing as they usually do on U-fairness alone, economists neglect much deeper aspects of unfairness.

Tick Sweats

Ticks are obligatory ectoparasites of many vertebrate hosts including human. Osmoregulatory functions of ticks are crucial for the survival, especially, in the off-host ticks in arid area. We found that injection of water in the body cavity of tick immediately triggers excretion of solution through the exoskeletal cuticles, like sweating. This response occurred in a bilateral asymmetric manner; the injection on left side of the body induced the sweating on only the left half, while the injection into right side did not induce sweat. The sweating response was reduced in the injections of high osmolar Naci (1 M). This is the first description of sweating physiology in maintenance of water homeostasis in the Lone star tick

Could homo oeconomicus become a revolutionary ? On the need to teach and practice a different economics

This paper investigates the standard economic paradigm as to the possibility for the agents to become revolutionaries, i.e., to develop the desire and effective action to overturn the prevailing social order. We take our cue from Amartya Sen’s remark that the Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics might be part of ‘a revolutionary’s handbook’. In analyzing the meaning of Sen’s assertion, we uncover the deep-lying difficulties which the standard paradigm, characterized by a vision of individuals as self-enclosed ‘monads’ and of social order as monadological coordiantion, has in even making sense of the notion of revolution. We are thus led to the intermediary conclusion that the neoclassical paradigm is structurally unable to see the agents as (even only potential) revolutionaries. In the course of our demonstration, we show that economics needs to be conceived not primarily as a ‘teaching about’, the economic system and the agents ’actions, but as a ‘resource for’ the agents within the model itself to reflect on the directions they want to give to social change. We endow the economic agents themselves (and not just the theorist who looks at them ‘from above’) with a significant capacity to educate themselves in order to form a judgment about what kind of economy they want to act in. In other words, asking whether the economic agents might in some cases become revolutionaries leads us to militate for the need to fully endogenize economics as a component of the economic model itself.Revolution;agency;economic models;epistemology of economics;critical theory

Envisioning the Ecological Future: Three Perspectives off the Beaten Track

With few truly hopeful visions currently emerging from mainstream academia or from established science concerning humanity’s collective environmental outlook, it might be necessary to go off the beaten track in order to see how we can maintain a sense of hope while realistically preparing for the gradual erosion of the world as we know it, therefore also leaving some psychological and emotional room for a sense of the tragic. This essay considers three lesser-known but, in our eyes, important contemporary perspectives on the ecological future: Ernest Callenbach’s “ecotopia,” John Michael Greer’s “catabolic descent” and William deBuys’s “hospice for Earth”—all three of which aim to challenge the currently still dominant focus on the binary of “progress or apocalypse” that flows from modern thought. We critically examine these visions and argue that, when combined, they offer an approach to the ecological future that is both more realistic and more inspiring. In essence, Callenbach’s ecotopian vision still has significant traction—and an almost “erotic” appeal—today, but needs to be adapted to contemporary ecological realities through Greer’s and deBuys’s insights into decline, grief and the tragic