Adaptive simulation using mode identification

Adaptive simulation using modal clustering and method of potential function

Communication and optimal hierarchical networks

We study a general and simple model for communication processes. In the model, agents in a network (in particular, an organization) interchange information packets following simple rules that take into account the limited capability of the agents to deal with packets and the cost associated to the existence of open communication channels. Due to the limitation in the capability, the network collapses under certain conditions. We focus on when the collapse occurs for hierarchical networks and also on the influence of the flatness or steepness of the structure. We find that the need for hierarchy is related to the existence of costly connections.Comment: 7 pages, 2 figures. NATO ARW on Econophysic

Distinguishing the opponents in the prisoner dilemma in well-mixed populations

Here we study the effects of adopting different strategies against different opponent instead of adopting the same strategy against all of them in the prisoner dilemma structured in well-mixed populations. We consider an evolutionary process in which strategies that provide reproductive success are imitated and players replace one of their worst interactions by the new one. We set individuals in a well-mixed population so that network reciprocity effect is excluded and we analyze both synchronous and asynchronous updates. As a consequence of the replacement rule, we show that mutual cooperation is never destroyed and the initial fraction of mutual cooperation is a lower bound for the level of cooperation. We show by simulation and mean-field analysis that for synchronous update cooperation dominates while for asynchronous update only cooperations associated to the initial mutual cooperations are maintained. As a side effect of the replacement rule, an "implicit punishment" mechanism comes up in a way that exploitations are always neutralized providing evolutionary stability for cooperation

Statistical Dynamics of Religions and Adherents

Religiosity is one of the most important sociological aspects of populations. All religions may evolve in their beliefs and adapt to the society developments. A religion is a social variable, like a language or wealth, to be studied like any other organizational parameter. Several questions can be raised, as considered in this study: e.g. (i) from a ``macroscopic'' point of view : How many religions exist at a given time? (ii) from a ``microscopic'' view point: How many adherents belong to one religion? Does the number of adherents increase or not, and how? No need to say that if quantitative answers and mathematical laws are found, agent based models can be imagined to describe such non-equilibrium processes. It is found that empirical laws can be deduced and related to preferential attachment processes, like on evolving network; we propose two different algorithmic models reproducing as well the data. Moreover, a population growth-death equation is shown to be a plausible modeling of evolution dynamics in a continuous time framework. Differences with language dynamic competition is emphasized.Comment: submitted to EP

Freezing and Slow Evolution in a Constrained Opinion Dynamics Model

We study opinion formation in a population that consists of leftists, centrists, and rightist. In an interaction between neighboring agents, a centrist and a leftist can become both centrists or leftists (and similarly for a centrist and a rightist). In contrast, leftists and rightists do not affect each other. The initial density of centrists rho_0 controls the evolution. With probability rho_0 the system reaches a centrist consensus, while with probability 1-rho_0 a frozen population of leftists and rightists results. In one dimension, we determine this frozen state and the opinion dynamics by mapping the system onto a spin-1 Ising model with zero-temperature Glauber kinetics. In the frozen state, the length distribution of single-opinion domains has an algebraic small-size tail x^{-2(1-psi)} and the average domain size grows as L^{2*psi}, where L is the system length. The approach to this frozen state is governed by a t^{-psi} long-time tail with psi-->2*rho_0/pi as rho_0-->0.Comment: 4 pages, 6 figures, 2-column revtex4 format, for submission to J. Phys. A. Revision contains lots of stylistic changes and 1 new result; the main conclusions are the sam

Impact of aging on the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game

Aging is always present, tailoring our interactions with others and postulating a finite lifespan during which we are able to exercise them. We consider the prisoner's dilemma game on a square lattice, and examine how quenched age distributions and different aging protocols influence the evolution of cooperation when taking the life experience and knowledge accumulation into account as time passes. In agreement with previous studies, we find that a quenched assignment of age to players, introducing heterogeneity to the game, substantially promotes cooperative behavior. Introduction of aging and subsequent death as a coevolutionary process may act detrimental on cooperation but enhances it efficiently if the offspring of individuals that have successfully passed their strategy is considered newborn. We study resulting age distributions of players, and show that the heterogeneity is vital yet insufficient for explaining the observed differences in cooperator abundance on the spatial grid. The unexpected increment of cooperation levels can be explained by a dynamical effect that has a highly selective impact on the propagation of cooperator and defector states.Comment: 7 two-column pages, 5 figures; accepted for publication in Physical Review

Prisoner's Dilemma cellular automata revisited: evolution of cooperation under environmental pressure

We propose an extension of the evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma cellular automata, introduced by Nowak and May \cite{nm92}, in which the pressure of the environment is taken into account. This is implemented by requiring that individuals need to collect a minimum score $U_{min}$, representing indispensable resources (nutrients, energy, money, etc.) to prosper in this environment. So the agents, instead of evolving just by adopting the behaviour of the most successful neighbour (who got $U^{msn}$), also take into account if $U^{msn}$ is above or below the threshold $U_{min}$. If $U^{msn}<U_{min}$ an individual has a probability of adopting the opposite behaviour from the one used by its most successful neighbour. This modification allows the evolution of cooperation for payoffs for which defection was the rule (as it happens, for example, when the sucker's payoff is much worse than the punishment for mutual defection). We also analyse a more sophisticated version of this model in which the selective rule is supplemented with a "win-stay, lose-shift" criterion. The cluster structure is analyzed and, for this more complex version we found power-law scaling for a restricted region in the parameter space.Comment: 15 pages, 8 figures; added figures and revised tex

The Semiclassical Limit for SU(2)SU(2) and SO(3)SO(3) Gauge Theory on the Torus

We prove that for $SU(2)$ and $SO(3)$ quantum gauge theory on a torus, holonomy expectation values with respect to the Yang-Mills measure d\mu_T(\o) =N_T^{-1}e^{-S_{YM}(\o)/T}[{\cal D}\o] converge, as $T\downarrow 0$, to integrals with respect to a symplectic volume measure $\mu_0$ on the moduli space of flat connections on the bundle. These moduli spaces and the symplectic structures are described explicitly.Comment: 18 page

Invariants from classical field theory

We introduce a method that generates invariant functions from perturbative classical field theories depending on external parameters. Applying our methods to several field theories such as abelian BF, Chern-Simons and 2-dimensional Yang-Mills theory, we obtain, respectively, the linking number for embedded submanifolds in compact varieties, the Gauss' and the second Milnor's invariant for links in S^3, and invariants under area-preserving diffeomorphisms for configurations of immersed planar curves.Comment: 20 pages, 1 figure, to appear in J. Math. Phy