Yardstick Competition in German Municipalities

Does increasing transparency improve fiscal policy behavior of local governments? One way this could take place is via Yardstick Competition between incumbents of neighboring municipalities. This paper contributes to the literature by introducing a simple model which employs probabilistic voting to show the effect of Yardstick Competition on the amount of political rents diverted from the tax revenue. Since additional rents lower the probability of being reelected, the incumbent will reduce equilibrium rents if voters use information on fiscal performance in similar municipalities to evaluate the incumbent's quality. I test this hypothesis on a panel dataset of municipal budget and electoral data in the german state of Northrine-Westphalia. I show evidence for Yardstick Competition in the local business and property tax rates.Kann zunehmende Transparenz im kommunalen Budgetprozess die fiskalpolitische Disziplin der politischen Entscheidungsträger verbessern? In dieser Arbeit wird ein positiver Modellrahmen entwickelt, anhand dessen die Wirkungsweise von steigen - der Transparenz auf das Entscheidungsverhalten von Kommunalpolitikern durch den Yardstick Competition Effekt dargestellt werden kann. Politiker reduzieren die Veruntreuung finanzieller Mittel, wenn ihr Verhalten von den Wählern relativ zur Leistung von Politikern in benachbarten Kommunen bewertet wird. Unter Anwendung von Methoden der räumlichen Ökonometrie auf kommunale Haushalts- und Wahldaten der Jahre 1989 bis 2004 wird gezeigt, dass die räumliche Korrelation in den Gewerbe- und Grundsteuerhebesätzen in Nordrhein-Westfalen auf die Existenz von Yardstick Competition zurückzuführen ist

Tax Mimicking in the Short- and the Long-Run: Evidence from German Reunification

This paper uses the quasi-experiment of Germany's reunification to identify local tax mimicking by municipalities in Eastern-Germany. After reunification, East-German municipalities were allowed to independently set, for the first time in decades, local business and property tax rates. I explore whether the tax rates chosen by East-German border municipalities were influenced by the tax rates of adjacent West-German municipalities. To obtain causal estimates, I rely on instrumental variables regressions within the spatial lag framework, using West-German border municipalities' tax rates in 1989 as instruments for their post-reunification tax rates. The results suggest that East-German municipalities mimicked business tax rates immediately after reunification, but not in later years. I find no evidence of mimicking for property taxes. These results indicate that mimicking is not an important determinant of local tax policy

Identifying Local Tax Mimicking: Administrative Borders and a Policy Reform

This paper exploits an exogenous reform of the local fiscal equalization scheme in the German State of North Rhine-Westphalia to identify tax mimicking by municipalities in the neighboring state of Lower Saxony. The spatial lag regressions provide no evidence for the existence of strategic interactions in municipal business and property taxes. In contrast, traditional spatial lag regressions that rely on variation in neighbors' demographic, political, or economic characteristics for identification provide strong evidence for strategic interactions. This pattern of results indicates that most of the extant literature overestimates the importance of local tax mimicking

Selection Bias and Peer Effects in Team Sports: the Effect of Age Grouping on Earnings of German Soccer Players

This article analyzes how age grouping in youth competitions and soccer education programs affects wage formation at the professional level. A simple theoretical model shows that professional players born late after the cutoff date are expected to earn systematically higher wages than their early-born peers. Two discriminating factors are responsible for this: a systematic bias in the talent detection system and peer effects in the production process of human (sports) capital. The authors demonstrate the existence of such an effect among (native) German professional soccer players. Estimating an earnings function for players in the 1997-1998 and 1998-1999 seasons, the authors find clear evidence of a month-of-birth-related wage bias. Players born late after the cutoff date earn systematically higher wages, though this effect is not discernible in all positions; it is strongest for goalkeepers and defenders but not evident for forwards

Determinants tax innovation: the case of environmental taxes in Flemish muncipalities

The setting of new taxes is a notably visible act that has potential political costs. This paper explores the setting of new environmental taxes across the 308 Flemish municipalities over the period 1991–1999. We find that first adoptions of a green tax are much less likely to occur during election years but are more likely if ones' peers/neighbours (defined both geographically and ideologically) already have the tax. In addition, whilst left-wing governments are more likely to set new taxes and coalitions are more likely to set the tax than single-party governments, the greater the fragmentation of the municipal government, the lower is the likelihood that a new tax will be set