The engineers that time forgot

You and I, dear reader of IEEE Microwave Magazine, are set to become more valuable day by day. Let me see if I can paint a picture of why

The Diffusion of Regulatory Oversight

The idea of cost-benefit analysis has been spreading internationally for centuries — at least since an American named Benjamin Franklin wrote a letter in 1772 to his British friend, Joseph Priestley, recommending that Priestley weigh the pros and cons of a difficult decision in what Franklin dubbed a “moral or prudential algebra” (Franklin 1772) (more on this letter below). Several recent studies show that the use of benefit-cost analysis (BCA), for both public projects and public regulation of private activities, is now unfolding in countries on every habitable continent around the world (Livermore and Revesz 2013; Quah and Toh 2012; De Francesco 2012; Livermore 2011; Cordova-Novion and Jacobzone 2011). This global diffusion of BCA is intermingled with the global diffusion of regulatory capitalism, in which privatized market actors are supervised by expert regulatory agencies (Levi-Faur 2005; Simmons et al. 2008), and with the international spread of ex ante regulatory precautions to anticipate and prevent risks despite uncertainty (Wiener et al. 2011)

A Smoothed P-Value Test When There is a Nuisance Parameter under the Alternative

We present a new test when there is a nuisance parameter under the alternative hypothesis. The test exploits the p-value occupation time [PVOT], the measure of the subset of a nuisance parameter on which a p-value test rejects the null hypothesis. Key contributions are: (i) An asymptotic critical value upper bound for our test is the significance level, making inference easy. Conversely, test statistic functionals need a bootstrap or simulation step which can still lead to size and power distortions, and bootstrapped or simulated critical values are not asymptotically valid under weak or non-identification. (ii) We only require the test statistic to have a known or bootstrappable limit distribution, hence we do not require root(n)-Gaussian asymptotics, and weak or non-identification is allowed. Finally, (iii) a test based on the sup-p-value may be conservative and in some cases have nearly trivial power, while the PVOT naturally controls for this by smoothing over the nuisance parameter space. We give examples and related controlled experiments concerning PVOT tests of: omitted nonlinearity; GARCH effects; and a one time structural break. Across cases, the PVOT test variously matches, dominates or strongly dominates standard tests based on the supremum p-value, or supremum or average test statistic (with wild bootstrapped p-value

Policy Design for International Greenhouse Gas Control

In this heart-searching, process based thesis, I want to find out who I am in the field of Architecture. Trough my urge to create, I am discovering and searching by making and producing objects by hand to feel and be present with the materiality, construction and art of architecture. My production of objects are divided in three parts based on scale, context and time, giving me a richer understanding about my will, intent and qualities.   "Two truths approach each other, one comes from within, one coming from the outside and where they meet there is a chance to see yourself” Tomas Tranströmer, Preludium II I detta hjärtsökande, processbaserade Xjobb, vill jag ta reda på vem jag är inom området arkitektur. Genom min lust att skapa, upptäcker och söker jag genom att göra och producera objekt för hand för att känna och vara närvarande med materialiteten, konstruktionen och konsten i arkitekturen. Min produktion av objekt är uppdelad i tre delar baserad på skala, kontext och tid, vilket ger mig en rikare förståelse om min vilja, avsikt och kvaliteter.   “Två sanningar närmar sig varann, en kommer inifrån, en kommer utifrån och där de möts har man en chans att få se sig själv”     To­mas Tran­strö­mer, Pre­lu­dium I

A letter to the editor

The goal of this letter is to point out that the fastest way to weaken any society and its business model, including the IEEE and its reader-pays stance, is to lose your professional integrity

Climate Change Policy, and Policy Change in China

Solving the climate change problem by limiting global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions will necessitate action by the world’s two largest emitters, the United States and China. Neither has so far committed to quantitative emissions limits. Some argue that China cannot be engaged on the basis of its national interest in climate policy, on the ground that China’s national net benefits of limiting greenhouse gas emissions would be negative, as a result of significant GHG abatement costs and potential net gains to China from a warmer world. This premise has led some observers to advocate other approaches to engaging China, such as appeal to moral obligation. This Article argues that appeal to national net benefits is still the best approach to engage China. First, appealing to China’s asserted moral obligation to limit its GHG emissions may be ineffective or even counterproductive. Even if climate change is a moral issue for American leaders, framing the issue that way may not be persuasive to Chinese leaders. Second, the concern that China’s national net benefits of climate policy are negative is based on older forecasts of costs and benefits. More recent climate science, of which the Chinese leadership is aware, indicates higher damages to China from climate change and thus greater net benefits to China from climate policy. Third, the public health co-benefits of reducing other air pollutants along with GHGs may make GHG emissions limits look more attractive to China. Fourth, the distribution of climate impacts within China may be as important as the net aggregate: climate change may exacerbate political and social stresses within China, which the leadership may seek to avoid in order to maintain political stability. Fifth, the costs of abatement may decline as innovation in China accelerates. Sixth, as China becomes a great power in world politics, and as climate change affects China’s allies, leadership on climate policy may look more favorable to China’s elites. Seventh, the design of the international climate treaty regime itself can offer positive incentives to China. Taken together, these factors point to a potential and even ongoing shift in Chinese climate policy. They illustrate how the international law and politics of climate change depend on domestic politics and institutions. And they suggest that the United States, if it too takes effective action, can make the case for enlightened pragmatism as a basis to engage China in a cooperative global climate policy regime

Reconstructing Climate Policy: Beyond Kyoto

In their comprehensive analysis of the Kyoto Protocol and climate policy, Richard B. Stewart and Jonathan B. Wiener examine the current impasse in climate policy and the potential steps nations can take to reduce greenhouse gases. They summarize the current state of information regarding the extent of global warming that would be caused by increasing uncontrolled greenhouse gas emissions. They explain why participation by all major greenhouse gas-emitting countries is essential to curb future greenhouse gas emissions and also note the significant obstacles to obtaining such participation. Stewart and Wiener argue it is in the national interest of the United States to participate in such a regime, provided that it is well designed. They discuss the elements of sound climate regulatory design, including maximum use of economic incentives, the comprehensive approach, and other flexibility mechanisms; participation by all major emitting countries, including developing countries; regulatory targets based on longer-term emissions pathways set to maximize net social benefits; and effective arrangements to ensure compliance with regulatory obligations by nations and sources. After evaluating the successes and failures of the Kyoto Protocol in light of those elements, the authors propose a series of U.S. initiatives at the international and domestic levels, with the aim of engaging the United States and major developing country emitters such as China in the global greenhouse gas regulatory effort and correcting the remaining defects in the design of the Kyoto Protocol. Although several alternatives to the current Kyoto Protocol regime have been proposed, Stewart and Wiener argue that the best approach for surmounting the current global climate policy impasse is a new strategy that would lead, sooner or later, to simultaneous accession by the United States and China (and other major developing country emitters) to a modified and improved version of the Kyoto Protocol agreement

Reconstructing Climate Policy: Beyond Kyoto

In their comprehensive analysis of the Kyoto Protocol and climate policy, Richard B. Stewart and Jonathan B. Wiener examine the current impasse in climate policy and the potential steps nations can take to reduce greenhouse gases. They summarize the current state of information regarding the extent of global warming that would be caused by increasing uncontrolled greenhouse gas emissions. They explain why participation by all major greenhouse gas-emitting countries is essential to curb future greenhouse gas emissions and also note the significant obstacles to obtaining such participation. Stewart and Wiener argue it is in the national interest of the United States to participate in such a regime, provided that it is well designed. They discuss the elements of sound climate regulatory design, including maximum use of economic incentives, the comprehensive approach, and other flexibility mechanisms; participation by all major emitting countries, including developing countries; regulatory targets based on longer-term emissions pathways set to maximize net social benefits; and effective arrangements to ensure compliance with regulatory obligations by nations and sources. After evaluating the successes and failures of the Kyoto Protocol in light of those elements, the authors propose a series of U.S. initiatives at the international and domestic levels, with the aim of engaging the United States and major developing country emitters such as China in the global greenhouse gas regulatory effort and correcting the remaining defects in the design of the Kyoto Protocol. Although several alternatives to the current Kyoto Protocol regime have been proposed, Stewart and Wiener argue that the best approach for surmounting the current global climate policy impasse is a new strategy that would lead, sooner or later, to simultaneous accession by the United States and China (and other major developing country emitters) to a modified and improved version of the Kyoto Protocol agreement