Overview of Labor Enforcement Issues in Free Trade Agreements

[Excerpt] Since 1993, the Administration has negotiated and Congress has approved 10 Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) that contain labor provisions with different degrees of enforceability. Three more (with Colombia, Peru, and South Korea) await congressional consideration. This report identifies two types of enforcement issues: (1) those that relate to the FTA provisions themselves, including their definitions and their enforceability, and (2) those that relate to executive branch responsibilities, such as resource availability and determining dispute settlement case priorities. This report will be updated as events warrant

Free Trade Agreements with Singapore and Chile: Labor Issues

This report discusses the United States free trade agreements with Singapore and Chile that include labor provisions

Over- and under-investment according to different benchmarks

In a two-stage oligopoly, with investment in the first stage and quantity or price competition in the second stage, there is a kind of Folk Theorem: We find (i) over-investment if the goods are substitutes and competition is in strategic substitutes, (ii) under-investment if we have either complements instead of substitutes or strategic complements instead of strategic substitutes, and (iii) again over-investment if both attributes change. The existing literature, however, lacks a proof of this theorem and, in particular, it lacks a systematic comparison of the different benchmarks for over-and under-investment. A "naive" benchmark is the efficient investment with respect to the subgame perfect (closed loop) equilibrium quantities. Alternative benchmarks (which are more often proposed) are the open loop equilibrium investment or the welfare maximizing investment. The chosen benchmark is critical because the Folk Theorem applies (under certain conventional conditions) only for the naïve benchmark. The other two benchmarks require additional assumptions or the distinction of subcases. --Oligopoly,technology choice,efficiency,under-investment,overinvestment

Sobolev quasi periodic solutions of multidimensional wave equations with a multiplicative potential

We prove the existence of quasi-periodic solutions for wave equations with a multiplicative potential on T^d, d \geq 1, and finitely differentiable nonlinearities, quasi-periodically forced in time. The only external parameter is the length of the frequency vector. The solutions have Sobolev regularity both in time and space. The proof is based on a Nash-Moser iterative scheme as in [5]. The key tame estimates for the inverse linearized operators are obtained by a multiscale inductive argument, which is more difficult than for NLS due to the dispersion relation of the wave equation. We prove the "separation properties" of the small divisors assuming weaker non-resonance conditions than in [11]

On the Allocative Efficiency of Ownership Unbundling

We analyze vertical structures where a regulated network operator serves n network users, and the network users compete in quantities for customers. We distinguish two cases: (i) none of the network users are related to the network operator (ownership unbundling), (ii) one of the network users is partially integrated with the operator and the others are disintegrated (legal unbundling). We seek to understand when ownership unbundling leads to lower customer prices, and formalize necessary conditions. In general, legal unbundling implies a less effective regulation, but it reduces the degree of market distortion caused by the difference between marginal costs and average costs (= regulated prices of network usage). We find that the necessary condition is not satisfied for realistic values of the relevant parameters, i.e. legal unbundling leads to lower costumer prices than ownership unbundling in most relevant markets. --Unbundling,vertical integration,Cournot competition