Азотная установка для контроля монтажа оптических солнечных отражателей методом захолаживания

It is widely acknowledged that the prefrontal cortex (PFC) plays a major role for goal-directed behaviour. In this context it is usually necessary to coordinate environmental information and internally represented intentions. Such goal-directed “endogenous control processes” can be investigated with the task-switching paradigm in which participants are required to alternate between different tasks. In the present study, we aimed at investigating different degrees of endogenous control by introducing two cue types with varying directness of the cue-task association. The “transition cues” informed the participants about repeating or switching the task but not about the task identity. Contrary to that, the “task cues” were directly associated with the upcoming task set. Since the transition cues are not directly associated with the task set they should require a higher demand of endogenous control than the task cues. The comparison of both cue types revealed frontolateral as well as frontomedian activations for the transition cue. We assume that the frontolateral activation reflects the coordination of information within working memory (WM) and the frontomedian cortex reflects the higher demand for endogenous control. Furthermore, regions of interest (ROIs) analyses indicate an important role for anterior regions along the left inferior frontal sulcus and frontomedian wall. This is suggested to reflect a functional gradient in anterior–posterior direction which is linked to the relative degree of required endogenous control

Under pressure: Response urgency modulates striatal and insula activity during decision-making under risk

When deciding whether to bet in situations that involve potential monetary loss or gain (mixed gambles), a subjective sense of pressure can influence the evaluation of the expected utility associated with each choice option. Here, we explored how gambling decisions, their psychophysiological and neural counterparts are modulated by an induced sense of urgency to respond. Urgency influenced decision times and evoked heart rate responses, interacting with the expected value of each gamble. Using functional MRI, we observed that this interaction was associated with changes in the activity of the striatum, a critical region for both reward and choice selection, and within the insula, a region implicated as the substrate of affective feelings arising from interoceptive signals which influence motivational behavior. Our findings bridge current psychophysiological and neurobiological models of value representation and action-programming, identifying the striatum and insular cortex as the key substrates of decision-making under risk and urgency

Defecting or not defecting: how to "read" human behavior during cooperative games by EEG measurements

Understanding the neural mechanisms responsible for human social interactions is difficult, since the brain activities of two or more individuals have to be examined simultaneously and correlated with the observed social patterns. We introduce the concept of hyper-brain network, a connectivity pattern representing at once the information flow among the cortical regions of a single brain as well as the relations among the areas of two distinct brains. Graph analysis of hyper-brain networks constructed from the EEG scanning of 26 couples of individuals playing the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma reveals the possibility to predict non-cooperative interactions during the decision-making phase. The hyper-brain networks of two-defector couples have significantly less inter-brain links and overall higher modularity - i.e. the tendency to form two separate subgraphs - than couples playing cooperative or tit-for-tat strategies. The decision to defect can be "read" in advance by evaluating the changes of connectivity pattern in the hyper-brain network

Neural correlates of evidence accumulation during value-based decisions revealed via simultaneous EEG-fMRI

Current computational accounts posit that, in simple binary choices, humans accumulate evidence in favour of the different alternatives before committing to a decision. Neural correlates of this accumulating activity have been found during perceptual decisions in parietal and prefrontal cortex; however the source of such activity in value-based choices remains unknown. Here we use simultaneous EEG–fMRI and computational modelling to identify EEG signals reflecting an accumulation process and demonstrate that the within- and across-trial variability in these signals explains fMRI responses in posterior-medial frontal cortex. Consistent with its role in integrating the evidence prior to reaching a decision, this region also exhibits task-dependent coupling with the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and the striatum, brain areas known to encode the subjective value of the decision alternatives. These results further endorse the proposition of an evidence accumulation process during value-based decisions in humans and implicate the posterior-medial frontal cortex in this process

When the Choice Is Ours: Context and Agency Modulate the Neural Bases of Decision-Making

The option to choose between several courses of action is often associated with the feeling of being in control. Yet, in certain situations, one may prefer to decline such agency and instead leave the choice to others. In the present functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study, we provide evidence that the neural processes involved in decision-making are modulated not only by who controls our choice options (agency), but also by whether we have a say in who is in control (context). The fMRI results are noteworthy in that they reveal specific contributions of the anterior frontomedian cortex (viz. BA 10) and the rostral cingulate zone (RCZ) in decision-making processes. The RCZ is engaged when conditions clearly present us with the most choice options. BA 10 is engaged in particular when the choice is completely ours, as well as when it is completely up to others to choose for us which in turn gives rise to an attribution of control to oneself or someone else, respectively. After all, it does not only matter whether we have any options to choose from, but also who decides on that

Diffusion versus linear ballistic accumulation: different models but the same conclusions about psychological processes?

Quantitative models for response time and accuracy are increasingly used as tools to draw conclusions about psychological processes. Here we investigate the extent to which these substantive conclusions depend on whether researchers use the Ratcliff diffusion model or the Linear Ballistic Accumulator model. Simulations show that the models agree on the effects of changes in the rate of information accumulation and changes in non-decision time, but that they disagree on the effects of changes in response caution. In fits to empirical data, however, the models tend to agree closely on the effects of an experimental manipulation of response caution. We discuss the implications of these conflicting results, concluding that real manipulations of caution map closely, but not perfectly to response caution in either model. Importantly, we conclude that inferences about psychological processes made from real data are unlikely to depend on the model that is used

Testing theories of post-error slowing

People tend to slow down after they make an error. This phenomenon, generally referred to as post-error slowing, has been hypothesized to reflect perceptual distraction, time wasted on irrelevant processes, an a priori bias against the response made in error, increased variability in a priori bias, or an increase in response caution. Although the response caution interpretation has dominated the empirical literature, little research has attempted to test this interpretation in the context of a formal process model. Here, we used the drift diffusion model to isolate and identify the psychological processes responsible for post-error slowing. In a very large lexical decision data set, we found that post-error slowing was associated with an increase in response caution and—to a lesser extent—a change in response bias. In the present data set, we found no evidence that post-error slowing is caused by perceptual distraction or time wasted on irrelevant processes. These results support a response-monitoring account of post-error slowing

Paradoxical Evidence Integration in Rapid Decision Processes

Decisions about noisy stimuli require evidence integration over time. Traditionally, evidence integration and decision making are described as a one-stage process: a decision is made when evidence for the presence of a stimulus crosses a threshold. Here, we show that one-stage models cannot explain psychophysical experiments on feature fusion, where two visual stimuli are presented in rapid succession. Paradoxically, the second stimulus biases decisions more strongly than the first one, contrary to predictions of one-stage models and intuition. We present a two-stage model where sensory information is integrated and buffered before it is fed into a drift diffusion process. The model is tested in a series of psychophysical experiments and explains both accuracy and reaction time distributions