Should the decisions of institutional review boards be consistent?

In response to increasing concerns regarding inconsistency in the decision-making of institutional review boards (IRBs), we introduce the decision-maker's dilemma, which arises when complex, normative decisions must be made regularly. Those faced with such decisions can either develop a process of algorithmic decision-making, in which consistency is ensured but many morally relevant factors are excluded from the process, or embrace discretionary decision-making, which makes space for morally relevant factors to shape decisions but leads to decisions that are inconsistent. Based on an exploration of similarities between systems of criminal sentencing and of research ethics review, we argue for a discretionary system of decision-making, even though it leads to more inconsistency than does an algorithmic system. We conclude with a discussion of some safeguards that could improve consistency while still making space for discretion to enter IRBs' decision-making processes

Not gods but animals : human dignity and vulnerable subjecthood

Drawing on earlier work on the conceptual structure of dignity, this paper will suggest a particular type of connectedness between vulnerability and human dignity; namely, that the ‘‘organizing idea’’ of human dignity is the idea of a particular sort of ethical response to universal human vulnerability. It is common ground among many, if not all, approaches to ethics that vulnerability requires us to respond ethically. Here, I argue that human dignity is distinctive among ethical values in that it values us because of, rather than in spite of, or regardless of, our universal vulnerability. The term ‘‘dignity’’ is used synonymously with ‘‘human dignity’’ here, since an investigation of the dignity of non-human entities forms no part of the present examination

Proportionality in sentencing: the need to factor in community experience, not public opinion

This is the first book to address the question of what role public opinion should play in the way criminal offenders are punished.Should public opinion determine—or even influence—sentencing policy and practice? Should the punishment of criminal offenders reflect what the public regards as appropriate? These deceptively simple questions conceal complex theoretical and methodological challenges to the administration of punishment.In the West, politicians have often answered these questions in the affirmative; penal reforms have been justified with direct reference to the attitudes of the public. This is why the contention that politicians should bridge the gap between the public and criminal justice practice has widespread resonance. Criminal law scholars, for their part, have often been more reluctant to accept public input in penal practice, and some have even held that the idea of consulting public opinion constitutes a populist approach to punishment.The purpose of this book is to examine the moral significance of public opinion for penal theory and practice. For the first time in a single volume the editors, Jesper Ryberg and Julian V. Roberts, have assembled a number of respected criminologists, philosphers, and legal theorists to address the various aspects of why and how public opinion should be reflected in the way the criminal justice system deals with criminals. The chapters address the myriad complexities surrounding this issue by first weighing the justifications for incorporating public views into punishment practices and then considering the various ways this might be achieved through juries, prosecutors, restoratifve justice programs, and other means