Circulating β-endorphin, adrenocorticotrophic hormone and cortisol levels of stallions before and after short road transport: stress effect of different distances

<p>Abstract</p> <p>Background</p> <p>Since transport evokes physiological adjustments that include endocrine responses, the objective of this study was to examine the responses of circulating β-endorphin, adrenocorticotrophic hormone (ACTH) and cortisol levels to transport stress in stallions.</p> <p>Methods</p> <p>Forty-two healthy Thoroughbred and crossbred stallions were studied before and after road transport over distances of 100, 200 and 300 km. Blood samples were collected from the jugular vein: first in a single box immediately before loading (pre-samples), then immediately after transport and unloading on arrival at the breeding stations (post-samples).</p> <p>Results</p> <p>An increase in circulating β-endorphin levels after transport of 100 km (<it>P </it>< 0.01), compared to basal values was observed. Circulating ACTH levels showed significant increases after transport of 100 km (<it>P </it>< 0.001) and 200 km (<it>P </it>< 0.001). Circulating cortisol levels showed significant increases after road transport over distances of 100, 200 and 300 km (<it>P </it>< 0.001). An effect of transport on β-endorphin, ACTH and cortisol variations was therefore evident for the different distances studied. No significant differences (<it>P </it>> 0.05) between horses of different ages and different breeds were observed for β-endorphin, ACTH and cortisol levels.</p> <p>Conclusion</p> <p>The results obtained for short term transportation of stallions showed a very strong reaction of the adrenocortical system. The lack of response of β-endorphin after transport of 200–300 km and of ACTH after transport of 300 km seems to suggest a soothing effect of negative feedback of ACTH and cortisol levels.</p

Does the external monitoring effect of financial analysts deter corporate fraud in China?

We examine whether analyst coverage influence corporate fraud in China. The fraud triangle specifies three main factors, i.e. opportunity, incentive, and rationalization. On the one hand, analysts may reduce the fraud opportunity factor through external monitoring to discourage managerial misconduct, which can moderate agency problems. On the other hand, analysts may increase the fraud incentive factor by pressuring managers to achieve short-term performance targets, which can exacerbate agency problem. In either case, the potential influence of analysts on the fraud rationalization factor may be more pronounced among firms that are more dependent on the capital market for corporate finance. Using a sample of Chinese listed firms, we show a negative association between corporate fraud propensity and analyst coverage, and that this effect is more pronounced among non-state-owned enterprises (NSOEs), which are more reliant on the stock market for external funding. These findings suggest that analyst coverage contributes to corporate fraud deterrence in emerging economies characterized by weak investor protection. The main policy implication is that further development of analyst profession in emerging economies may benefit investors and strengthen business ethics

CEO accountability for corporate fraud:Evidence from the Split Share Structure Reform in China

We use institutional-related theories and a unique natural experiment that enables an exogenous test of the influence of controlling shareholders on managerial accountability to corporate fraud. In China, prior to the Split Share Structure Reform (SSSR), state shareholders held restricted shares that could not be traded. This restriction mitigated state-owned enterprise controlling shareholders’ incentives to monitor managers. The data examined show the SSSR strengthens incentives of state-owned enterprise controlling shareholders to replace fraudulent management. Our findings support the view that economic incentives are important to promote corporate governance and deter fraud

Illegal acts and the auditor

The extent to which auditing standards merely consolidate existing practice, as compared with the extent to which they are innovative and raise standards, is a matter of debate. This paper provides evidence on this issue in respect of the UK auditing standard SAS 120 concerned with the auditor's responsibilities for client illegal acts. Six case examples of illegal acts were developed and these formed the basis for interviews with forty-three practising auditors. It was found that auditors' assessments of their ability under current practice to discover specific illegal acts are significantly below their perceptions as to the need for these acts to be discovered. This indicates that auditors believe that their responsibilities in this area of the audit are not being adequately discharged. It was also found that auditor consensus appears to be an important consideration in the shaping of the standard and this is consistent with viewing auditing standards as consolidations of professional practice. However, it was also found that levels of consensus did vary and tended to be less in the case of less familiar illegal acts or those less proximate to the financial statements