Richard Bellamy

The author replies to five questions about his approach to political philosophy and his views about its prospects for the future

Still in Deficit: Rights, Regulation, and Democracy in the European Union

Critics of the EU's democratic deficit standardly attribute the problem to either sociocultural reasons, principally the lack of a demos and public sphere, or institutional factors, notably the lack of electoral accountability because of the limited ability of the European Parliament to legislate and control the executive powers of the Commission and the Council of Ministers. Recently two groups of theorists have argued neither deficit need prove problematic. The first group adopts a rights-based view of democracy and claims that a European consensus on rights, as represented by the Charter of Fundamental European Rights, can offer the basis of citizen allegiance to EU wide democracy, thereby overcoming the demos deficit. The second group adopts a public-interest view of democracy and argues that so long as delegated authorities enact policies that are ‘for’ the people, then the absence of institutional forms that facilitate democracy ‘by’ the people are likewise unnecessary—indeed, in certain areas they may be positively harmful. This article argues that both views are normatively and empirically flawed. This is because there is no consensus on rights or the public interest apart from the majority view of a demos secured through parliamentary institutions. To the extent that these remain absent at the EU level, a democratic deficit continues to exist

Cuspidal representations of rational Cherednik algebras at t=0

We study those finite dimensional quotients of the rational Cherednik algebra at t=0 that are supported at a point of the centre. It is shown that each such quotient is Morita equivalent to a certain cuspidal quotient of a rational Cherednik algebra associated to a parabolic subgroup of W

Four models of European citizenship

This paper identifies two ideal types of citizenship - the cosmopolitan and the communitarian, that correspond to the transnational and sub/national levels of the European Union respectively, and examines four different ways in which they might be combined

Which constitution for what kind of Europe?

Discussion of the pros and cons of an EU constitution tends to focus upon two issues. On the one hand, proponents and opponents of reform seek to legitimate the EU as a 'regime', or form of governance. For example, strengthening the powers of the European Parliament is hoped to improve democratic accountability, while incorporating the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU is suggested as a way of enhancing legal integrity and the rule of law. On the other hand, debate centres on the EU's status as a 'polity', and the degree to which a Constitution might allow a clear demarcation of what is the EU's area of competence and what remains the domain of domestic governments and legal systems. These two issues are inter-related. Yet, neither politicians nor many academics explicitly address the connections between them. Some focus on 'regime' considerations and seek, almost as an after thought, to tailor them to their preferred view of the EU polity. Others, especially Eurosceptics, treat the very discussion of the EU as having a regime, as an undesirable move in the direction of acknowledging it as a polity. In this piece I wish to suggest that both approaches are misguided. Regime and polity interact, with the latter constraining (without determining) the former. I shall explore the three dominant models of constitutionalism to be found within European political discourse: a rights-based model, a popular sovereignty model and a common law model that employs elements of each. Whilst the first two are the most frequently employed by proponents of constitutional reform, I shall suggest that it is the third that best represents the actually existing EU constitution. Moreover, it has been the key to the successful integration of Europe hitherto precisely because it has allowed both the 'regime', and 'polity', dimensions of the EU to develop in tandem

The democratic legitimacy of international human rights conventions: Political constitutionalism and the European convention on human rights

International Human Rights Courts (IHRCts), such as the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), have come under increasing criticism as being incompatible with domestic judicial and legislative mechanisms for upholding rights. These domestic instruments are said to possess greater democratic legitimacy than international instruments do or could do. Within the UK this critique has led some prominent judges and politicians to propose withdrawing from the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Legal cosmopolitans respond by denying the validity of this democratic critique. By contrast this article argues that such criticisms are defensible from a political constitutionalist perspective but that International Human Rights Conventions (IHRCs) can nevertheless be understood in ways that meet them. To do so, IHRC must be conceived as legislated for and controlled by an international association of democratic states, which authorizes IHRCts and holds them accountable, limiting them to 'weak review'. The resulting model of IHRC is that of a 'two level' political constitution. The ECHR is shown to largely accord with this model, which is argued to be both more plausible and desirable than a legal cosmopolitan model that sidelines democracy and advocates 'strong' review

Researcher studies nervous system development

Ashley Purdy, who recently finished a master’s degree in biology at VCU and is now pursuing her Ph.D., is studying nerve cells in zebrafish in hopes of unlocking secrets about the human nervous system. The research could shed light on how neurodevelopmental disorders like multiple sclerosis or epilepsy occur

The Māori language: selected events 1800-2014

This chronology outlines key events and dates since the early 19th century relating to the Māori language. Of particular focus are events in the New Zealand Parliament