International researcher mobility and knowledge transfer in the social sciences and humanities

This article explores knowledge outcomes of international researcher mobility in the social sciences and humanities. Looking in particular at international experiences of longer durations in the careers of European PhD graduates, it proposes a threefold analytical typology for understanding the links between the modes, durations, and outcomes of this mobility in terms of the exchange of codified knowledge; the sharing of more tacit knowledge practices; and the development of a cosmopolitan identity. The findings suggest that, under the right conditions, there can be an important and transformative value to longer stays, which can lead to enduring outcomes in terms of knowledge production and innovation and the spatially distributed networks that sustain it

Editorial: Structuring doctoral education

The number of doctoral candidates is increasing worldwide..

Empirical Analysis of National Income and So2 Emissions in Selected European Countries

Data on GDP per capita and sulfur emissions for twelve European countries were analyzed to determine the relationship between emissions and income in these countries. As a whole, the relationship between sulfur emissions and per capita income is a fourth order polynomial and not a quadratic one as found in most studies. When countries were examined individually, seven out of the twelve countries depicted the same relationship. Looking closely at the regulations restricting sulfur emissions in the UK, the impact of all regulations supported the inverted U-shaped Kuznets curve. Individually, however, it is found that only two regulations have statistically significant impacts: Smoke Abatement Act in 1926 (reduced the amount of sulfur associated with a given level of GDP); and Clean Air Act in 1956 (increased the amount of sulfur emissions associated with a given level of GDP)

Non-Parametric Identification and Estimation of Multi-Unit, Sequential, Oral, Ascending-Price Auctions With Asymmetric Bidders

Within the independent private-values paradigm, we derive the data-generating process of the winning bid for the last unit sold at multi-unit sequential English auctions when bidder valuations are draws from different distributions; i.e., in the presence of asymmetries. When the identity of the winner as well as the number of units won by each bidder in previous stages of the auction are observed, we demonstrate nonparametric identification and then propose two estimation strategies, one based on the empirical distribution function of winning bids for the last unit sold and the other based on approximation methods using orthogonal polynomials. We apply our methods to daily data from fish auctions held in Grenå, Denmark. For single-unit supply, we use our estimates to compare the revenues a seller could expect to earn were a Dutch auction employed instead

Investment in Tourism Market: A Dynamic Model of Differentiated Oligopoly

We present a theoretical model in tourism economics, assuming that the market for tourism is an oligopoly with differentiated products. Destinations (i.e., countries, regions, sites or even firms) can invest in order to improve their carrying capacity that can be interpreted as the stock of physical, natural or cultural resources. Tourism flows yield current revenues, but they are usually detrimental for the cultural or natural resource stock over time. We find the solution of the dynamic model, and in particular we find the open-loop Nash equilibrium of the game among the destinations, under alternative settings, depending on whether the arrivals are exogenous or endogenous, and depending on whether the degree of differentiation among destinations is exogenous or endogenous. The model is rather general, and it can provide answers to different specific questions, like the choice between mass- vs. elite-tourism development strategies; the effect of the number of competing products upon profits; the optimal degree of product differentiation

Participation in and Compliance with Public Voluntary Environmental Programs: An Evolutionary Approach

The joint evolution of participating and complying firms in a public VA, along with the evolution of the pollution stock is examined. Replicator dynamics modeling participation and compliance are combined with pollution stock dynamics. Fast-slow selection dynamics are used to capture the fact that decisions to participate in and further comply with the public VA evolve in different time scales. Evolutionary stable (ES) equilibria depend on the structure of the legislation and auditing probability. Partial participation and partial compliance can be ES equilibria, with possible multiplicities, in addition to the monomorphic equilibria of full (non) compliance. Convergence to these equilibria could be monotonic or oscillating. Full participation and compliance can be attained if the regulator is pre-committed to certain legislation and inspection probabilities, or by appropriate choices of the legislatively set emission level and the non-compliance fine

International Cooperation to Resolve International Pollution Problems

This article provides a non-technical overview of important results of the game theoretical literature on the formation and stability of international environmental agreements (IEAs) on transboundary pollution control. It starts out by sketching features of first and second best solutions to the problem of transboundary pollution. It then argues that most actual IEAs can be considered at best as third best solutions. Therefore, three questions are raised: 1) Why is there a difference between actual IEAs and first and second best solutions? 2) Which factors determine this difference? 3) Which measures can help to narrow this difference? This article attempts to answer these questions after giving an informal introduction to coalition models

Order Flow and the Formation of Dealer Bids: An Analysis of Information and Strategic Behavior in the Government of Canada Securities Auctions

Using data on Government of Canada securities auctions, this paper shows that in countries where direct access to primary issuance is restricted to government securities dealers, Order-flow" information is a key source of private information for these security dealers. Order-flow information is revealed to a security dealer through his interactions with customers, who can place bids in the auctions only through the security dealer. Since each dealer interacts with a different set of customers, they, in effect, see different portions of the market demand and supply curves, leading to differing private inferences of where the equilibrium price might