Partial delegation in a model of currency crisis

Stressing the inßuence of expected devaluation on currency crises, this paper shows that, in a Þxed exchange-rate system with an escape clause, partial delegation of exchange-rate policy to an inßation-averse central banker reduces the probability of crisis

How to avoid self-fulfilling crises

Obstfeld (1994) shows that, for the same level of economic fundamentals, it may be optimal for a government either to devalue or to maintain the peg. Multiple equilibria occur: it is the phenomenon of self-fulfilling crisis. To avoid this kind of crisis, this article offers a new proposal: a partial delegation of exchange rate policy to a more inflation-averse central banker. It shows that if the government continues to decide whether to maintain the peg while the central banker chooses the magnitude of any realignment, lower inflationary expectations will lead to the existence of only one equilibrium.

The Perverse Response of Interest Rates

We argue that an increase in aggregate demand can lead to a reduction in the interest rate. This apparently perverse optimal response of interest rates can occur when the Phillips curve is non-linear. In that case, an increase in aggregate demand tends to increase inflation and output but also to change the weight on inflation in the optimal monetary policy rule. Although the first two effects tend to increase interest rates, the latter effect can imply lower interest rates. If this effect dominates, interest rates can fall

How To Avoid Self-fulfilling Crises

Obstfeld (1994) shows that a currency crisis can be explained by the occurrence of multiple equi- libria (2 interior equilibria). For the same level of economic fundamentals, it may be optimal for the government either to devalue or to maintain the peg. The decision depends on the inßationary expectations of economic agents: it is the phenomenon of self-fulÞlling crisis. In order to avoid this kind of crisis, this article offers a new proposal: a partial delegation of exchange rate policy to a more inßation-averse central banker. It shows that if the government continues to decide whether to main- tain the peg while the central banker chooses the magnitude of any realignment, lower inßationary expectations will lead to the existence of only one equilibrium. The probability of crisis will then be considerably reduced and a currency crisis will occur only if negative shocks substantially damage the level of economic fundamentals

Are currency crises self-fulfilling? The case of Argentina

This paper analyzes the 2002 Argentine crisis using the Jeanne and Masson (2000) model with sunspots. Testing this model empirically through a Markov-switching model suggests that self-sulfilling prophecies is a reasonable explanation for the devaluation of the peso

Non-linear and non-symmetric exchange-rate adjustment: new evidence from medium and high inflation countries

This paper analyses a model of non-linear exchange rate adjustment that extends the literature by allowing asymmetric responses to over- and under-valuations. Applying the model to Greece and Turkey, we find that adjustment is asymmetric and that exchange rates depend on the sign as well as the magnitude of deviations, being more responsive to over-valuations than under-valuations. Our findings support and extend the argument that non-linear models of exchange rate adjustment can help to overcome anomalies in exchange rate behaviour. They also suggest that exchange rate adjustment is non-linear in economies where fundamentals models work well

Optimal non-linear monetary policy rules

We propose a simply yet flexible framework for the analysis of optimal monetary policy rules that produces the type of non-linear responses derived in the literature as special cases. Perhaps more importantly, our framework suggests a richer set of nonlinear responses than have been considered yet and thus may prompt further work in this area

Targets, Zones and Asymmetries: A Flexible Nonlinear model of Recent UK Monetary Policy

We estimate a flexible model of the behaviour of UK monetary policymakers in the era of inflation targeting based on a new representation of policymaker’s preferences. This enables us to address a range of issues that are beyond the scope of the existing literature. We find a complex relationship between interest rates and inflation: interest rates are passive when inflation is close to the target but there is an increasingly vigorous response as inflation deviates further from the target. We also find that the response to the output gap is linear and find no evidence of a nonlinear Phillips curve