A comparison of structural productivity levels in the major industrialised countries

Hourly labour productivity levels in a number of European countries are thought to be very close to, or possibly even higher than the level ‘observed’ in the United States. At the same time, however, there are big differentials between hours worked and/or employment rates in these countries and in the United States. Frequent mention is also made of the theory of diminishing returns to hours worked and the employment rate. The object of the analysis proposed here is to adjust the ‘observed’ levels of hourly productivity for the effect of the differentials (with the United States) in the hours worked and/or employment rates of several categories of the population of working age in order to calculate ‘structural’ hourly productivity. The results obtained confirm the diminishing returns to hours worked and the employment rate (especially where young and elderly people are concerned). The level of ‘structural’ hourly productivity appears to be highest in the United States, suggesting that the differential between per capita GDP in the European countries and in the United States is attributable to hours worked and employment rates being at lower levels, and also to lower ‘structural’ hourly productivity.Productivity; Employment rates; Working time; ICTs; Well-being

Trends in "structural" productivity levels in the major industrialized countries.

Estimating returns to hours worked and the employment rate provides us with an original interpretation of changes in US productivity and other industrialized countries' catch-up with US productivity levels over recent decades.Productivity ; Employment rate ; Working time ; Technical frontier.

MUTUAL INSURANCE WITH ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION: THE CASE OF ADVERSE SELECTION

This paper examines the impact of risk heterogeneity and asymmetric information on mutual risk-sharing agreements. It displays the optimal incentive compatible sharing rule in a simple two-agent model with two levels of risk. When individual risk is public information, equal sharing of wealth is not achievable when risk heterogeneity is too large or when risk aversion is too low. However the mutualization principle still holds as agents only bear aggregate risk. This result no longer holds when risk is private information. Moreover, the asymmetry of information (i) makes equal sharing unsustainable when both individuals are low risk types (ii) induces some exchanges when agents have the same level of initial wealth and (iii) induces changes in the direction of transfer with respect to the complete information benchmark in some states of nature when risk types are independent and absolute risk aversion is decreasing and convex.Mutual agreements; Asymmetric information; Mechanism Design

Capital reserve policy, regulation and credibility in insurance

The aim of this paper is to analyze the need for capital and default regulation in insurance. Proponents of deregulation argue that these requirements are useless as insurers would hold enough capital as soon as the insured are fully informed about their default probability. Adding to the purpose the relationship between an insurer and her security holders (that is the issuance and dividend policy) we show that the second best capital reserve decided by the security holders is suboptimal whenever the return on cash inside the firm is smaller than outside. Because of limited commitment on recapitalization, disclosure of information may not be enough. Given these characteristics, State commitment to recapitalize could be an alternative regulation policy.insurance, capital reserve, regulation, recapitalization

Evolving Informal Risk-Sharing Cooperatives and Other-Regarding Preferences

In this paper we present a model of formation and destruction of informal cooperatives in a population of agents who perform a risky activity and who are heterogeneous in terms of success in their actions. Although some agents have high-risk and others low-risk, our model displays a dynamics with cooperatives in which agents share equally their income with a certain stability. We are interested in studying at the same time the existence of cooperatives, their ability to integrate a large proportion of agents and the degree of segregation of these cooperatives. Three factors can explain the existence, stability and lack of segregation. First, we show that the classical explanation in economics holds within the framework of our model: when agents are risk averse, high success agents can share with low success agents so that to stabilize the value of their income - the higher the risk aversion, the more stable the cooperatives and the lower the segregation. Learning can explain in a small proportion the existence of cooperatives: we designed agents so that they have to learn whether they are high or low-risk, and while they are learning, they tend to create cooperatives that can last. Eventually we worked on the integration of other-regarding preferences in the model, with two different definitions. As expected, the influence of other-regarding preferences is to increase stability and decrease segregation, and the two models of rationality react differently to the type of network in which the agents are immersed. This paper, mainly exploratory, presents our model and shows the influence of the definition of network as well as all other factors presented before. In that sense, although we have mainly done a rough exploration of its relevant parameters for the moment, it exposes different insights that can be gained by its study