Bureaucrats in Parliament: Theory and Evidence on its Determinants in Germany

This paper addresses the personal linkages between the public administration and the legislature that emerge because public servants pursue a political mandate. There are concerns that the strong representation of bureaucrats in many Western parliaments compromises the constitutionally proposed political neutrality of the public service and generates a con ict of interest. We present a cost-benet calculus and analyze specic legal provisions for the German Laender to understand the selection of public servants into parliaments. Based on a novel data set, we nd that incompatibility rules decrease and abeyance compensation increases the fraction of public servants in Laender parliaments.Political selection, parliamentary election, public servants, incompatibility

GPs' preferences: What price fee-for-service?

In mixed health care systems a crucial condition for the success of Managed Care (MC) plans is to win over a su±cient number of general practitioners (GPs) acting as gatekeepers. This contribution reports on GPs' willingness-to-accept (WTA) or compensation asked, respectively, for changing from conventional fee-for-service to MC practice. Some 175 Swiss GPs participated in discrete choice experiments which permit to put a money value on their status quo bias. Regardless of whether effects coding or dummy coding is used to measure status quo bias, Swiss GPs require at least 16 percent of their current average income to give up fee-for-service in favor of MC practice.general practitioners, willingness-to-pay, preferences, market experiments, managed care, effects coding, status quo bias

Selection of Public Servants into Politics

Countries differ substantially in how they deal with politicians� that come from the public sector. Most constitutions include� incompatibility and� ineligibility rules� due� to� concerns about conflicts� of interest� and the politicization of the public� service.�� We study� how these rules affect� the attractiveness of parliamentary mandates� for public� servants and� thus� the selection into� politics. We compile� a� novel� dataset that� captures the� fraction� of public servants in 71 national� legislatures as well as the respective (in)compatibility regimes. On average, there� are� 7 percentage points� fewer public� servants in parliaments where� a strict regime� is in force.�� Supplementary evidence� shows� that� the� fraction� of public� servants� in parliament is positively correlated with government� consumption� as well as the absence� of corruption.Political selection, public servants, incompatibility, political representation, corruption, government consumption

Variation in Escape Behavior of Red and Green Clones of the Pea Aphid

Many insect species have evolved a number of antipredator tactics among which the animal can choose when attacked by a natural enemy. While it is known that individuals may differ in how the antipredator tactics are employed, quantitative studies are rare. In the pea aphid, it has been suggested that different clones differ in their propensity to escape from a predator and that this propensity is linked to the body color of the aphid. We tested clonal variation in the escape behavior in red and green clones of the pea aphid. In three experiments the responses of clones to artificial stimuli and a natural predator were quantified. The results indicate that (1) clones differ considerably in their propensity to show escape behavior, (2) red clones are more likely to drop off the host plant when subjected to an artificial stimulus than green clones are, and (3) the patterns of clonal variation in the escape behavior were not consistent through all three experiments, as clones did not differ in their behavior when attacked by a real predator. The differences in the responses of a clone toward different stimuli supposed to mimic predator attack suggest that extrapolating from laboratory experiments to a field situation may be difficul

What Drives Public Health Care Expenditure Growth? Evidence from Swiss Cantons, 1970-2012

A better understanding of the determinants of public health care expenditures is key to designing effective health policies. We integrate supply and demand-side determinants, factors from political economy and health policy reforms into an empirical analysis of the highly decentralized Swiss health care system. We compile a novel data set of the cantonal health care expenditure in Switzerland spanning the period 1970 - 2012. Using dynamic panel estimation methods, we find that per capita income, the unemployment rate and the share of foreigners are positively related to public health care expenditure growth. With regard to political economy aspects, public health care expenditures increase with the share of women elected to parliament. However, institutional restrictions for politicians, such as fiscal rules and mandatory fiscal referenda, do not appear to limit public health care expenditure growth

Selection of Public Servants into Politics

Countries differ substantially in how they deal with politicians that come from the public sector. Most constitutions include incompatibility and ineligibility rules due to concerns about conflicts of interest and the politicization of the public service. We study how these rules affect the attractiveness of parliamentary mandates for public servants and thus the selection into politics. We compile a novel dataset that captures the fraction of public servants in 71 national legislatures as well as the respective (in)compatibility regimes. On average, there are 7 percentage points fewer public servants in parliaments where a strict regime is in force. Supplementary evidence shows that the fraction of public servants in parliament is positively correlated with government consumption as well as the absence of corruption

Do Institutions Affect Citizens' Selection into Politics?

Traditional political economy has paid primary attention to the structuring of the principal-agent relationship between citizens and politicians and the role of competition and institutions in disciplining political agents. However, as the electoral control of politicians and the credibility of policy commitments are limited, this perspective needs to be complemented with an economics of political selection that takes into account the quality of those elected to political office. We review the emerging literature which investigates institutional conditions that impact the selection of politicians. We discuss pay in politics, electoral rules, institutions enhancing transparency in politics, and institutions which govern dual office holding in different branches of government. We argue that further comparative analyses are essential in order to gain an improved understanding of the impact that institutions have on political outcomes, not only via the channel of accountability, but also via the channel of selection