Not So Human, After All?

If asked to explain why the Golds’ treatment of other colors in Red Rising is wrong, it is tempting to say something like “they are all human beings, and it is wrong to treat humans in this way!” In this essay, I’ll argue that this simple answer is considerably complicated by the fact that the different colors might not be members of the same biological species, and it is in fact unclear whether any of them are the same species as current humans. Explaining why exactly this is so will lead us to an exploration the long-running debate in biology and philosophy over what exactly it means for two organisms to be “members of the same species.” I’ll begin by discussing the biological essentialism of Aristotle and his followers, who held that an individual organism’s species was determined by essence. One can easily imagine that the Golds might find this attractive, since it would suggest that their “superior” mental and physical capacities made them a different (and probably “higher”) species of humanity than the other colors. Unfortunately for Aristotle, this turns out to be inconsistent with Charles Darwin’s account of evolution by natural selection. This development has led many modern biologists and philosophers of biology to conceptualize species not as an abstract “form” that serves to classify organisms, but rather as a concrete collection of organisms relatively close to each other in space and time. In contrast to biological essentialism, this view of “species as concrete individual” might seem to support the Reds’ claim to the “same species” as the Gold, since they are both part of the same overarching society. Next, I’ll consider how we might tell where one species “ends” and another one “begins.” As it turns out, biologists have many ways of answering his question, each of which makes different judgments about the species of Red Rising’s characters. So, for example, the “Biological Species Concept” bases judgements about species membership on the ability to produce fertile offspring. This concept is far from perfect, however, for reasons that Red Rising makes clear: it doesn’t deal clearly with cases where reproduction is possible but very difficult (a Red and a Gold having a child) or for organisms that do not reproduce sexually (such as Pinks). I’ll then explore a few prominent alternatives to BSC, including both genetically and ecologically based species concepts, and consider their consequences for the society of Red Rising. I’ll conclude by advocating for a “pluralism” about species membership, and will suggest that the people of Red Rising (as well as in the real world) should beware of basing arguments for moral or political equality on the all-too-slippery notion of “shared humanity.” Instead, they should focus on the qualities that make the lives of the individuals (regardless of their species) worth caring about, such as their shared desires to avoid suffering and to lead fulfilling, meaningful lives

The Medical Ethics of Miracle Max

Miracle Max, it seems, is the only remaining miracle worker in all of Florin. Among other things, this means that he (unlike anyone else) can resurrect the recently dead, at least in certain circumstances. Max’s peculiar talents come with significant perks (for example, he can basically set his own prices!), but they also raise a number of ethical dilemmas that range from the merely amusing to the truly perplexing: How much about Max’s “methods” does he need to reveal to his patients? Is it really OK for Max to lie about Valerie’s being a witch, even though she really isn’t? Just how much of the “truth” does Max have to tell his patients? Let’s suppose that Humperdinck had offered Max his old job back. Would it have been OK for Max to accept this offer? What about if Humperdinck wanted him to do experiments at “the Zoo”? Is Max obligated to offer his services to everyone who needs them, such as the (mostly) dead Westley and friends? Or is he free to pick and choose? In this chapter, I’ll consider how these questions might be addressed using concepts of medical ethics. As it turns out, Max’s dilemmas are not too different from the sorts of dilemmas that many medical professionals encounter in their daily lives, and exploring how Max could (or should) respond to them can help us figure out what we can do here in the “real” world

The Problem of Evil in Virtual Worlds

In its original form, Nozick’s experience machine serves as a potent counterexample to a simplistic form of hedonism. The pleasurable life offered by the experience machine, its seems safe to say, lacks the requisite depth that many of us find necessary to lead a genuinely worthwhile life. Among other things, the experience machine offers no opportunities to establish meaningful relationships, or to engage in long-term artistic, intellectual, or political projects that survive one’s death. This intuitive objection finds some support in recent research regarding the psychological effects of phenomena such as video games or social media use. After a brief discussion of these problems, I will consider a variation of the experience machine in which many of these deficits are remedied. In particular, I’ll explore the consequences of a creating a virtual world populated with strongly intelligent AIs with whom users could interact, and that could be engineered to survive the user’s death. The presence of these agents would allow for the cultivation of morally significant relationships, and the world’s long-term persistence would help ground possibilities for a meaningful, purposeful life in a way that Nozick’s original experience machine could not. While the creation of such a world is obviously beyond the scope of current technology, it represents a natural extension of the existing virtual worlds provided by current video games, and it provides a plausible “ideal case” toward which future virtual worlds will move. While this improved experience machine would seem to represent progress over Nozick’s original, I will argue that it raises a number of new problems stemming from the fact that that the world was created to provide a maximally satisfying and meaningful life for the intended user. This, in turn, raises problems analogous in some ways to the problem(s) of evil faced by theists. In particular, I will suggest that it is precisely those features that would make a world most attractive to potential users—the fact that the AIs are genuinely moral agents whose well-being the user can significantly impact—that render its creation morally problematic, since they require that the AIs inhabiting the world be subject to unnecessary suffering. I will survey the main lines of response to the traditional problem of evil, and will argue that they are irrelevant to this modified case. I will close by considering by consider what constraints on the future creation of virtual worlds, if any, might serve to allay the concerns identified in the previous discussion. I will argue that, insofar as the creation of such worlds would allow us to meet morally valuable purposes that could not be easily met otherwise, we would be unwise to prohibit it altogether. However, if our processes of creation are to be justified, they must take account of the interests of the moral agents that would come to exist as the result of our world creation

Evolution and Neuroethics in the Hyperion Cantos

In this article, I use science-fiction scenarios drawn from Dan Simmons’ “Hyperion Cantos” (Hyperion, The Fall of Hyperion, Endymion, The Rise of Endymion) to explore a cluster of issues related to the evolutionary history and neural bases of human moral cognition, and the moral desirability of improving our ability to make moral decisions by techniques of neuroengineering. I begin by sketching a picture of what recent research can teach us about the character of human moral psychology, with a particular emphasis on highlighting the importance of our evolutionary background as social mammals. I then consider how the moral psychology of intelligent machines might differ from our own, and argue that the differences would depend on the extent to which their evolutionary background resembled our own. I offer two very different case studies—the “Technocore AIs” that have evolved from early, parasitic computer programs, and the mysterious “Shrike,” who travels backward through time. I close by looking at the character of Aenea, a messianic figure that is a joint descendant of humans and machines. I argue that while the sort of “moral enhancement” she represents is far beyond the scope of either contemporary neuroscience or artificial intelligence research, it nevertheless represents a worthwhile goal

You Can't Choose Your Family: Impartial Morality and Personal Obligations in Alias

In this essay, I critically examine the ways in which the characters of Alias attempt to balance their impartial moral obligations (e.g. duties toward humanity) and their personal obligations (e.g. duties toward one's children). I specifically examine three areas of conflict: (1) choices between saving loved ones and maximizing consequences, (2) choices to maintain or sever relationships with characters who are vicious or immoral, and (3) choices to seek or not seek revenge on the behalf of loved ones. I conclude that Sydney's and Jack's moral choices show that one can and should privilege loved ones to some extent, but that this privilege has limits

How to Write a Philosophy Paper

This is a guide to writing philosophy papers aimed at introductory students prepared by the philosophy faculty at Rochester Community and Technical College. It includes sections on reading philosophy and writing philosophy, as well as an explanation of common grading criteria for essays in philosophy

The “Four Principles” at 40: What is Their Role in Introductory Bioethics Classes?

This is the text of a paper (along with appendixes) delivered at the 2019 annual meeting of the Minnesota Philosophical Society on Oct 26 in Cambridge, MN. Beauchamp and Childress’s “Four Principles” (or “Principlism”) approach to bioethics has become something of a standard not only in bioethics classrooms and journals, but also within medicine itself. In this teaching-focused workshop, I’ll be doing the following: (1) Introducing the basics of the “Four Principles” approach, with a special focus on its relation to the common morality and the importance to weighing and balancing of competing norms. (2) Comparing and contrasting this to other potential approaches, such as those provided by virtue ethics, act utilitarianism, casuistry, and competing versions of principles-based ethics. (3) Considering the ways in which the principles-based approach can best be implemented for lower-level, introductory bioethics classes, where the average student may have little background knowledge in either philosophy or medicine. I’ll be presenting sample activities, case studies, and lesson plans. There will be considerable time reserved for discussion at the end, so that participants can exchange ideas relating to the teaching of both bioethics and other varieties of applied ethics

A Little More Logical: Reasoning Well About Science, Ethics, Religion, and the Rest of Life

"A Little More Logical" is the perfect guide for anyone looking to improve their critical thinking and logical reasoning skills. With chapters on everything from logic basics to fallacies of weak induction to moral reasoning, this book covers all the essential concepts you need to become a more logical thinker. You'll learn about influential figures in the field of logic, such as Rudolph Carnap, Betrrand Russell, and Ada Lovelace, and how to apply your newfound knowledge to real-world situations. Whether you're looking to engage in debates with others, make better decisions in your personal and professional life, or simply want to improve your overall critical thinking skills, "A Little More Logical" has you covered. So why wait? Start learning and become a little more logical today! "A Little More Logical" differs from typical logical textbooks in a number of ways. One key difference is its emphasis on engaging and relatable examples and case studies. Rather than simply presenting dry definitions and concepts, the book uses fables, stories, and real-world situations to illustrate key ideas and make them more relatable for readers. Another unique aspect of "A Little More Logical" is its inclusion of "Minds that Mattered" sections, which highlight the contributions and insights of influential figures in the field of logic and critical thinking. These sections provide readers with a deeper understanding of the history and development of logical principles and offer valuable context for the concepts being discussed. Additionally, "A Little More Logical" covers a wide range of topics beyond the basics of logic and argument evaluation. Chapters on moral reasoning, probability and inductive logic, scientific reasoning, conspiracy theories, statistical reasoning, and the history of formal logic offer a more comprehensive and well-rounded understanding of logic and critical thinking. Overall, "A Little More Logical" stands out as a dynamic and engaging resource for anyone looking to improve their logical reasoning abilities. Its relatable examples, historical context, and broad coverage make it a valuable resource for anyone interested in mastering the principles of logic. This is a free, Creative-Commons-licensed book

Two Concepts of Law of Nature

I argue that there are at least two concepts of law of nature worthy of philosophical interest: strong law and weak law. Strong laws are the laws investigated by fundamental physics, while weak laws feature prominently in the “special sciences” and in a variety of non-scientific contexts. In the first section, I clarify my methodology, which has to do with arguing about concepts. In the next section, I offer a detailed description of strong laws, which I claim satisfy four criteria: (1) If it is a strong law that L then it also true that L; (2) strong laws would continue to be true, were the world to be different in some physically possible way; (3) strong laws do not depend on context or human interest; (4) strong laws feature in scientific explanations but cannot be scientifically explained. I then spell out some philosophical consequences: (1) is incompatible with Cartwright’s contention that “laws lie” (2) with Lewis’s “best-system” account of laws, and (3) with contextualism about laws. In the final section, I argue that weak laws are distinguished by (approximately) meeting some but not all of these criteria. I provide a preliminary account of the scientific value of weak laws, and argue that they cannot plausibly be understood as ceteris paribus laws

The Wrong Thinking in Conspiracy Theories

Political conspiracy theories—e.g., unsupported beliefs about the nefarious machinations of one’s cunning, powerful, and evil opponents—are adopted enthusiastically by a great many people of widely varying political orientations. In many cases, these theories posit that there exists a small group of individuals who have intentionally but secretly acted to cause economic problems, political strife, and even natural disasters. This group is often held to exist “in the shadows,” either because its membership is unknown, or because “the real nature” of its members’ allegiances, motives, and methods has been concealed from the public at large. Paradigmatic examples of these political conspiracy theories include anti-Semitic beliefs of the sort associated with The Protocols of the Elder of Zion, the “Red Scare” of the 1950s, claims about the “New World Order,” and many others. Why do these theories attract so many adherents? In this essay, I’ll attempt to spread some light on this issue by applying Kahneman and Tversky’s highly influential work on reasoning under uncertainty. I’ll proceed by first providing a brief introduction to Kahneman and Tversky’s work on reasoning under uncertainty, and the way in which this relates to standard economic and philosophic accounts of rational behavior, as well as philosophical ideas about the role of intuition. Next, I’ll move onto some specific interconnected aspects of this work that are relevant to understanding conspiracy theories, including errors involving probabilistic reasoning (“Prospect Theory”), those involving the inappropriate use of heuristics, and those related to the “framing” of certain outcomes as losses from a baseline. This essay will conclude by making two related points. First, some of the most important reasoning errors committed by adherents of conspiracy theories are errors that many of us regularly commit. Given that self-awareness of these errors provides only minimal protection from committing them, this suggests that many of use may be more vulnerable to conspiratorial reasoning than we may like to believe. Second, in the light of this danger, I will outline a few steps that might be taken to help inoculate ourselves against the appeal of these theories, and to help respond to the conspiratorial arguments of others