The Core of a Coalitional Production Economy Without Ordered Preferences

It is shown that the core of a coalitional production economy with a balanced technology (Bohm [1974]) is nonempty, even if the consumers have preferences which are intransitive, provided the preferences are convex and continuous. Since such preferences cannot be represented by utility functions, this result does not follow from the nonemptiness of the core of a characteristic function game. Rather, the approach is closer to that of Ichiishi's [1981] social coalitional equilibrium

On Equilibria of Excess Demand Correspondences

A new lemma on the existence of maximal elements of binary relations is proved and applied to a revealed preference relation on price vectors. The resulting maximal elements are equilibrium prices. This technique allows one to generalize results of Aliprantis and Brown [1982], Neuefeind [1980], and Geistdoerfer-Florenzano [1982]

Noncooperative Games, Abstract Economies, and Walrasian Equilibria

The introduction of an additional player to serve as coordinator in an N-person abstract economy leads in a natural way to an N+1-person noncooperative game. Sufficient conditions on the abstract economy are considered which lead to the existence of equilibrium in the resulting game and hence for the abstract economy

Spacecraft-spacecraft very long baseline interferometry. Part 1: Error modeling and observable accuracy

In Part 1 of this two-part article, an error budget is presented for Earth-based delta differential one-way range (delta DOR) measurements between two spacecraft. Such observations, made between a planetary orbiter (or lander) and another spacecraft approaching that planet, would provide a powerful target-relative angular tracking data type for approach navigation. Accuracies of better than 5 nrad should be possible for a pair of spacecraft with 8.4-GHz downlinks, incorporating 40-MHz DOR tone spacings, while accuracies approaching 1 nrad will be possible if the spacecraft incorporate 32-GHz downlinks with DOR tone spacing on the order of 250 MHz; these accuracies will be available for the last few weeks or months of planetary approach for typical Earth-Mars trajectories. Operational advantages of this data type are discussed, and ground system requirements needed to enable spacecraft-spacecraft delta DOR observations are outlined. This tracking technique could be demonstrated during the final approach phase of the Mars '94 mission, using Mars Observer as the in-orbit reference spacecraft, if the Russian spacecraft includes an 8.4-GHz downlink incorporating DOR tones. Part 2 of this article will present an analysis of predicted targeting accuracy for this scenario

Reduced Form Auctions Revisited

This note uses Farkas’s Lemma to prove new results on the implementability of general, asymmetric auctions, and to provide simpler proofs of known results for symmetric auctions. The tradeoff is that type spaces are taken to be finite

Dutch Book Arguments and Subjective Probability

[No abstract

Preferences Over Solutions to the Bargaining Problem

There are several solutions to the Nash bargaining problem in the literature. Since various authors have expressed preferences for one solution over another, we find it useful to study preferences over solutions in their own right. We identify a set of appealing axioms on such preferences that lead to unanimity in the choice of solution, which turns out to be the solution of Nash

Social Welfare Functions for Economic Environments with and without the Pareto Principle

Social welfare functions for private goods economies with classical preferences are considered. It is shown that every social welfare function satisfying a weak nonimposition condition and the independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom is of one of the following forms. It is either null or the class of decisive coalitions is an ultrafilter or the class of anti-decisive coalitions is an ultrafilter

More on Harsanyi's Utilitarian Cardinal Welfare Theorem

If individuals and society both obey the expected utility hypothesis and social alternatives are uncertain, then the social utility must be a linear combination of the individual utilities, provided the society is indifferent when all its members are. This result was first proven by Harsanyi [4] who made implicit assumptions in the proof not actually needed for the result (see [5]). This note presents a straightforward proof of Harsanyi's theorem based on a separating hyperplane argument

An Impossibility Theorem for Spatial Models

This paper examines the implications for social welfare functions of restricting the domain of individual preferences lo type-one preferences. Type-one preferences assume that each person has a most preferred alternative in a euclidean space and that alternatives are ranked according to their euclidean distance from this point. The result is that if we impose Arrow's conditions of collective rationality, IIA, and the Pareto principle on the social welfare function, then it must be dictatorial. This result may not seem surprising, but it stands in marked contrast to the problem considered by Gibbard and Saiterthwaite of finding a social-choice function. With unrestricted domain, under the Gibbard-Satterthwaite hypotheses, choices must be dictatorial. With type-one preferences this result has been previously shown not to be true. This finding identifies a significant difference between the Arrow and the Gibbard-Satterwaite hypothesis