No. 25: Complex Movements, Confused Responses: Labour Migration in South Africa

The end of apartheid undermined the rationale for apartheid-era immigration. Immigration from Europe (which had been declining in the 1980s) dwindled to almost nothing as the new government dissociated itself from the racist immigration policies of the apartheid era. At the same time, downsizing and mine closures in the 1990s led to a dramatic decline in employment opportunities for African migrants in the mining industry. Tens of thousands of local and foreign migrants were retrenched. Although the industry has recovered somewhat, and continues to employ some foreign workers, the overall numbers of temporary migrant workers remain far below the levels of the 1970s and 1980s. The end of apartheid also brought new forms of labour migration to and from South Africa including a marked growth in irregular labour migration from neighbouring countries and the rest of Africa and a major brain drain of skilled professionals, primarily to OECD countries. Since 2000, there have been two further changes. First, the volume of migration from Zimbabwe has grown dramatically as a result of that country\u27s political and economic crisis. Secondly, South Africa adopted a new skills-based labour migration policy. The first section of this paper briefly reviews the post-apartheid decline in permanent immigration and legal temporary labour migration to South Africa. The next section examines some of the new migration trends that have become increasingly important over the last two decades. Finally, the paper examines the current institutional context established by the 2002 Immigration Act. In conclusion, the paper discusses the attractiveness of South Africa for African migrants and the main challenges that face the country in the coming years concerning international migration

No. 01: Hungry Cities of the Global South

The recent inclusion of an urban Sustainable Development Goal in the Post-2015 UN Development Agenda represents an important acknowledgement of the reality of global urbanization and the many social, economic, infrastructural and political challenges posed by the human transition to a predominantly urban world. However, while the SDG provides goals for housing, transportation, land use, cultural heritage and disaster risk prevention, food is not mentioned at all. This discussion paper aims to correct this unfortunate omission by reviewing the current evidence on the challenges of feeding rapidly-growing cities in the Global South. The paper first documents the magnitude of the urban transition and the variety of indicators that have been deployed to measure the extent of food insecurity amongst urban populations. It then looks at the way in which urban food systems are being transformed by the advent of supermarkets (the so-called “supermarket revolution”) and the growth of the informal food economy. The final section of the paper examines the relationship between formal and informal food retail and asks whether the one is undermining the other or whether they co-exist in an uneasy, though symbiotic, relationship. Against this backdrop, the secondary purpose of the paper is to lay out a research agenda which will guide the Hungry Cities Partnership as it attempts to give greater global prominence to the critical but neglected issue of urban food systems and food insecurity

No. 63: Dystopia and Disengagement: Diaspora Attitudes Towards South Africa

In 2008, South African Brandon Huntley was given refugee status in Canada by the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB). The unprecedented decision, based on Huntley’s claim that as a white South African he was the victim of racial persecution in South Africa, caused a firestorm. Interest in the case was particularly intense in South Africa itself where the decision was derided in the media and the South African government lodged a formal protest with the Canadian government. Over 140 high-profile South African academics also filed a petition protesting the decision with the Canadian High Commission in Pretoria. Within weeks, the Canadian Minister of Citizenship and Immigration had lodged an appeal against the IRB decision with the Federal Court of Appeal. Some have claimed that the decision of the Canadian Government to seek to overturn the decision of the IRB was motivated by a desire to appease South Africa. This is highly unlikely. Rather, the Canadian government was concerned about the precedent-setting nature of the case and that it could set the stage for a flood of applications from similarly unskilled white South Africans seeking a route into Canada. In late 2010, Justice James Russell of the Federal Court of Appeal issued an extended judgment upholding the Canadian government’s appeal and sending the Huntley case back to the IRB for reconsideration. The Supreme Court of Canada declined to hear an appeal of this judgment in mid-2012, so the case will be got back to the IRB. Huntley’s lawyers are confident of a second success at the IRB, indicating that the attention given to his case will make him a marked man if he is returned to South Africa. However, Justice Russell provided a systematic and painstaking demolition of virtually every element of the original IRB decision and it seems highly unlikely that Huntley will ever be able to prove that he qualifies for refugee protection status in Canada. The case may still drag on for several more years, however, as Huntley would be entitled to institute a second round of appeals in the courts if his claim is rejected this time. In constructing a narrative to convince IRB judge William Davis that he qualified for protection under the UN Refugee Convention, Huntley and his lawyers attempted to show that he had been the victim of a series of racially-motivated personal assaults and that the state had failed in its duty to protect. None of these supposed attacks were ever reported to the police which proved rather awkward for his case. However, this was explained away with the circular argument that since the police did nothing when whites were attacked, there was no point in reporting the assaults. Huntley’s recounting of his experiences make interesting reading but they were not, in fact, central to the Davis decision. Here we focus on what Davis called the “lifeline” of the Huntley decision: that is, the case made by Huntley’s lawyer, Russell Kaplan and his sister Lara Kaplan, that all whites in South Africa are being systematically targeted because of the colour of their skin. Justice Russell rejected this argument, and the selective evidence presented by the Kaplans, in its entirety. He designated their portrayal of the situation in South Africa the “Kaplan view.” The core elements of the Kaplan view included assertions that all Black South Africans hated white South Africans; that the country was experiencing “reverse apartheid; that black South Africans have “no regard” for the lives of white South Africans; that most violent crimes are committed by black against white South Africans; that the police will do nothing about the crimes committed against white South Africans; that white South Africans are undergoing a form of racial genocide; and that there is systematic discrimination against whites in the workplace. Justice Russell concluded that the Kaplan view was rooted in the personal experience of violent crime by the Kaplan family itself in South Africa. This paper argues that to attribute the Kaplan view purely to the negative personal experiences of the Kaplan family in South Africa is to take too narrow an interpretation. The central elements of the Kaplan view are not unique to the Kaplan family but are produced and reproduced by the white South African diaspora in Canada more generally. The evidence for this assertion comes from a survey of 1,485 South African immigrants in Canada conducted by SAMP in 2010, some 80% of whom had left South Africa after 1990. Between 1991 and 2006, just over 19,000 South Africans moved to Canada, a migration that shows few signs of letting up. Most South African immigrants to Canada are white, highly skilled and educated with many professionals in their ranks. They enter Canada as permanent residents in the economic class. South Africans in Canada are high income earners. For example, 26% of the survey respondents earn more than $200,000 a year and 43$100,000 (compared with only 6% of the overall Canadian population.) The survey respondents reported visiting South Africa relatively often (only 18% had never been back since arriving in Canada) although only 20% return at least once a year. The rest make episodic visits and the vast majority of all visits are connected with family issues and events. Most have family in South Africa to visit. Half of the respondents (54%) have taken out Canadian citizenship and another 30% are permanent residents. South Africans in Canada are neither large nor frequent remitters. Forty-two percent had never remitted funds to South Africa and only 13% do so on a monthly basis. Patterns of asset holding in South Africa show systematic disinvestment over time. Allied to this pattern of disinvestment are low levels of interest in return migration to South Africa. The survey also collected information about the attitudes and perceptions of this group towards their country of origin. The dystopian views advanced by the Kaplan view in the Huntley case fit comfortably within a broader narrative about South Africa by white South Africans in Canada. A considerable number of survey respondents portrayed South Africa as an extremely violent society in which whites live in a constant state of fear and anxiety. Many argued that whites were targeted not because they own a disproportionate share of the wealth in a highly unequal society, but simply because of their colour. The idea that the white population is under siege because of their skin colour extends well beyond personal knowledge of incidents of crime and violence. The theme of racial targeting was driven home by the frequent use of terms such as “apartheid in reverse” and “reverse discrimination.” Attacks on white farmers feature prominently in the narratives and are used as a platform for broader commentary on the supposed brutality of Africa and all Africans. Personal and hearsay stories of violent crime were laced with vituperative accounts of the callous and indifferent response of the police and the government. Another recurrent complaint was how affirmative action discriminated against whites. There is no sympathy for or understanding of the reasons for these policies nor of how they personally might have benefited educationally and economically from the racist policies of the apartheid government. Instead, they represent themselves, and whites in general, as victims. In many cases, the sense of outrage spills over into overtly racist diatribes about Africa and Africans. To rationalise their departure, disengagement and decision never to return to South Africa, this post-apartheid diaspora draws on the same narrative reservoir of images as the lawyers in the Huntley case. It is therefore inadequate to conclude that the Huntley case was simply a rather egregious but exceptional miscarriage of justice. Huntley is, in many ways, emblematic of a more general and troubling discourse about South Africa that circulates amongst white South Africans in Canada

Migration, Urbanization and Food Security in Cities of the Global South: 26–27 November 2012, Cape Town, South Africa

The disjuncture between food security, migration and urbanization must be overcome. It is an institutional as well as a thematic disconnect on a global scale. Food security is primarily about access to food, not agricultural production. In an increasingly urban world, the locus of food and nutrition security will no longer be rural areas and the global perspective needs to shift appropriately. Hunger is a political as well as economic problem and requires state intervention. Increasing demand for food needs to be met in ecologically sustainable ways while ensuring that the poor have adequate access to food. Migration should be considered a normal process rather than a response to livelihood failure in rural areas. More research is needed on the impact of migrants’ remittances on food security. Urbanization is about much more than the rural poor moving to cities in search of work. In fact, urbanization and migration have the potential to reduce poverty and inequality. Policies that address urban food security need to appreciate the complex relationship between household food security and a range of variables such as income, gender and household size. Climate change is causing increased migration, especially to cities, and bringing about a complex shift in food distribution patterns that includes staple foods being sent to remote rural areas

No. 56: Right to the Classroom: Educational Barriers for Zimbabweans in South Africa

This report examines the obstacles to access by Zimbabwean children and students to schools and tertiary institutions in South Africa. There is a common assumption in South Africa that these children and students have no right to an educa­tion in South Africa. In fact, this view contravenes various international human rights conventions to which South Africa is a signatory. At the regional level, it is inconsistent with the SADC Education Protocol. At the national level, it violates the South African Constitution as well as legislation and stated government policies concerning the access of all children in the country to education. The question addressed in this report is whether school boards and principals follow popular sentiment or whether they honour international, regional and national obligations. The report focuses specifically on the case of Zimbabwean migrant children and students, following persistent reports that they are regularly denied access to the South African education system. The report shows that school boards and principals are caught between contradictory instructions from the Departments of Education and Home Affairs. The former, acting in a way that is consistent with the Bill of Rights, directs that schools should not deny education to any child, regardless of their national origin or legal status in the country. The Department of Home Affairs, on the other hand, follows the directives of the 2002 Immigration Act which places schools in the position of having to enforce immigration policy. This contradiction certainly needs to be resolved and there is only one way this could be done: by amending the immigration legislation and regulations to make it clear that it is not the duty of schools to deny an education to some children or to report them to the authorities. Levels of xenophobia are extremely high in South African society. Xenophobic attitudes culminated in widespread xenophobic violence in 2008 that left over 60 people dead and tens of thousands displaced from their communities. Among their number were many children. Migrant children were therefore directly exposed to the violence and venom of xenophobic mobs. Many more would have witnessed these disturbing scenes in the media. The other question addressed in this report is whether xenophobia permeates the school system as well. In other words, once the obstacles to school access are overcome, what kind of reception do migrant children receive from South African teachers and pupils. Some isolated case studies have suggested that non-South African children are not made to feel welcome in South African schools and that the xenophobic attitudes of parents are reproduced by their children. This study affords the opportunity to revisit this question and to ask how Zimbabwean children are treated by their fellow learners and by teachers in the classroom and playground. The report is based on research in six communities in Cape Town and Johannesburg conducted in September 2010 and examines the experiences of Zimbabwean migrant parents, children and students who seek to gain admission to public schools and tertiary institutions in South Africa. The report first examines the constitutional and legal rights of foreign migrants to an education in South Africa. The next section reviews the findings of previous studies that suggest that migrant children and students face significant difficulties and prejudice in South Africa. The ensuing sections of the report present and discuss our research findings on the current experiences of Zimbabwean migrants with the South African educational system. Finally, the report makes recommendations on how the situation can be improved

No. 30: Regionalizing Xenophobia? Citizen Attitudes to Immgration and Refugee Policy in Southern Africa

The negative attitudes of South Africans towards non-citizens, migrants and refugees have been documented in several recent studies. Xenophobia has been officially recognized as a major problem by the state and steps have been taken by government and the South African Human Rights Commission to “roll back xenophobia.” Since anti-immigrant intolerance is a global phenomenon, should South Africans be singled out in this regard? This paper seeks to contextualize the South African situation by comparing the attitudes of South Africans with citizens from several other countries in the SADC; namely, Botswana, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland and Zimbabwe. In practical policy terms, xenophobia undermines social cohesion, peaceful co-existence, good governance and human rights observance. In addition, SADC is a region composed of 14 states committed to greater integration and cooperation. To encourage or allow citizens of one member state to think and act in xenophobic ways about citizens of another, is ultimately extremely destructive of regional cooperation and harmony. This study therefore aims to show (for the states studied) which are the “rogue states” in which citizens have not yet come to terms with a basic requirement of regional cooperation: tolerance and acceptance of people from neighbouring SADC countries. This, in turn, should help identify those governments who have an actual or potential problem on their hands and which therefore need to take the task of “rolling back xenophobia” far more seriously than they do at present. The paper is based on a SAMP Project implemented in 2001-2 called the National Immigration Policy Survey (NIPS). The survey, of a representative sample of urban residents, was implemented simultaneously in 5 SADC states. A comparable data set was extracted from a 1999 SAMP survey in South Africa. The survey was designed to measure citizen knowledge of migration, attitudes towards non-citizens, and immigration and refugee policy preferences. The survey found that citizens across the region consistently tend to exaggerate the numbers of non-citizens in their countries, to view the migration of people within the region as a “problem” rather than an opportunity, and to scapegoat non-citizens. The intensity of these feelings varies significantly from country to country. The harshest sentiments are expressed by the citizens of South Africa, Namibia and, to a lesser extent, Botswana. The citizens of Swaziland, Mozambique and Zimbabwe are considerably more relaxed about the presence of noncitizens in their countries. Negative attitudes in the anti-foreign “troika” (South Africa, Namibia, Botswana) are so pervasive and widespread that it is actually impossible to identify any kind of “xenophobe profile.” In other words, the poor and the rich, the employed and the unemployed, the male and the female, the black and the white, the conservative and the radical, all express remarkably similar attitudes. This poses a significant problem of explanation because it runs counter to the more general belief that certain groups in a population (usually those who are or who perceive themselves to be threatened by outsiders) are more prone to xenophobic attitudes than others. It also provides a massive public education challenge not only of knowing where to begin but deciding who to target. Within countries where there is greater tolerance, a more classic pattern pertains. That is, those with the most to lose from the presence of non-citizens – the unskilled and the unemployed – exhibit much more negative attitudes than other groups. One of the more interesting results is the apparent absence of any sense of solidarity with other countries in the SADC. Given the longevity of the SADC as a formal institution, this is a significant finding. The absence of any real sense of “regional consciousness” (of participation in a regional grouping whose interests are greater than the sum of its parts) has very direct implications for migration issues. Citizens of these SADC countries make very little distinction between migrants from other SADC countries and those from elsewhere in Africa and even Europe and North America. Where attitudes are negative, they are uniformly negative; where positive, uniformly positive. An urgent challenge confronting the SADC and migration-related initiatives such as the Migration Dialogue in Southern Africa (MIDSA) is therefore to develop strategies to build a new regional consciousness amongst citizens and policy-makers. Most citizens would prefer national governments to “get tough” with migrants and refugees. There is widespread suspicion that refugees are not genuine and there is significant fear that migrants are an economic threat. Perhaps the most significant and consistent finding is the fear – certainly not confined to Southern Africa – that migrants steal rather than create jobs. Although the majority of people in all countries see immigrants as a threat to jobs, very few have personal knowledge or experience of such an occurrence. Over 60% of respondents in South Africa, Namibia, Zimbabwe and Mozambique have never heard of anyone being denied a job because it went to a foreigner; in Swaziland and Botswana the percentage drops to 34% and 50%, respectively. Even fewer people know from their own experience of someone being denied a job because it went to a foreigner. Almost 90% of respondents in all six countries have no personal experience of being denied a job because it went to a foreigner. When migration is viewed as a “threat” (as it clearly is amongst significant portions of the population and amongst virtually everyone in some countries) it is not unusual for citizens to prefer harsh policy measures. Rather shocking is the degree of support for border electrification. But citizens also want to see armies at the borders, tough internal enforcement and curtailment of basic rights. There is clearly a massive job of education confronting government if policy-makers are to turn around the obsession with control and exclusion and encourage a countervailing sense of the potential positive aspects of migration and immigration. Here, the NIPS survey is particularly relevant. It shows that across the region, citizens are prepared to accept and welcome non-citizens if their economic impact is demonstrably positive. Hence, skillsand investor-friendly immigration policies would not be a difficult sell to citizens. Since such policies are inevitable if countries are to be and remain globally competitive, it is important that policy and opinion-makers begin to build a broad public consensus on this issue. There is nothing more off-putting to a new immigrant who wants to put their skills to work in and for a new country to find that they are the object of scorn and vilification simply because of their accent or the colour of their skin

No. 58: The Disengagement of the South African Medical Diaspora

Conventional wisdom holds that the ‘brain drain’ of health professionals from Africa is deeply damaging to the continent. Recently, a group of North American and European neo-liberal economists has challenged this conventional wisdom, variously arguing that the negative impacts are highly exaggerated and the compensating benefits many. The benefits include various forms of “diaspora engagement” in which those who have left then engage through sending remittances, direct investment, knowledge and skills transfer, return migration and involvement in diaspora associations. A previous SAMP study of Zimbabwean physicians outside the country provided clear evidence for the “diaspora engagement” hypothesis (see No 56 in this series). This paper examines the case of South African physicians who have left South Africa. South Africa provides an ideal case for examining the conflicting viewpoints on the health brain drain given the significant loss of physicians the country has experienced over the past two decades. A 2000 global survey of the location of physicians found that as many as 7,363 South African-trained doctors (or 21% of the total number in practice) were living and practising abroad. In 2005, the OECD estimated that more than 13,000 South African trained physicians were working in OECD countries, of whom 7,718 were in the United Kingdom, 2,215 in the United States, 1,877 in Canada and 1,022 in New Zealand. More recent data from Canada indicates that there were 2,193 South African physicians in that country in 2009. The research reported in this paper consists of a survey of 415 South African doctors in Canada conducted in 2009-10 (representing almost 20% of the total number working in Canada.) More than half of the survey respondents (58%) had acquired Canadian citizenship since leaving South Africa. Of the rest, around one quarter (26%) were permanent residents in Canada and only 16% were on work permits. At the same time, 70% still hold South African citizenship. This raised the possibility that they want to retain their South African citizenship because they feel a strong affinity with South Africa. Nearly 90% agreed with the statement that “being from South Africa is an important part of how I view myself” and 81% with the statement that “I feel strong ties with people from South Africa.” The vast majority (over 80%) buy or make South African foods, listen to South African music and want their children to know about South Africa. Some 80% regularly consult South African newspapers online. As many as 60% want their children to learn a South African language. Forty percent say that their best friends in Canada are South Africans. Family links with South Africa also remain strong. As many as 81% have siblings still living in South Africa and 71% still have parents there. About 95% of the respondents had visited South Africa since migrating to Canada. More than 75% visit South Africa at least every 2-3 years, with 28% visiting once a year. However, despite all this evidence of a persistent South African identity and the maintenance of strong links with the country, the vast majority (80%) disagreed with the statement that they had “an important role to play in the development of South Africa.” Only 16% said they are likely to send money for development projects in South Africa, 15% said they would participate in educational and other exchanges with South Africa, while 13% would participate in fundraising projects in South Africa. Only 10% said they would invest in a business in South Africa and just 8% might work for a period of time in South Africa. By most standards, the physicians surveyed were high income earners. As many as two-thirds earn above CAN$200,000 (ZAR 1.6 million) per annum and fewer than 5$100,000 (ZAR 800,000) annually. In general, remitting is often positively correlated with income: the more a migrant earns the greater the amount that they tend to remit. However, despite their high earnings South African physicians in Canada are not significant remitters: Only half (52%) had sent money to South Africa in the previous year and only 19% can be considered regular remitters who send money to South Africa at least once a month. A considerable number do not remit regularly (21% do so less than once a year) and 28% have never sent remittances to South Africa. Less than a third (27%) had sent more than CAN$5,000 (ZAR40,000) to South Africa. The median amount sent by remitters was only CAN$4,250 (ZAR 33,000) per annum, which falls to only CAN$1,000 (ZAR8,000) per annum for the whole sample. Such small amounts are unlikely to yield significant development outcomes in the country of origin or compensate the country for the loss of skills incurred in the brain drain. The majority of the remitters (82$1,000 (ZAR8,000) annually. The mean value of goods sent by the physicians was CAN$340 (ZAR2,430) annually. In other words, the amounts remitted by South African physicians are small in comparison to their incomes and remitting is infrequent. The South African physicians differ markedly in their remitting behaviour from physicians from other African countries and from African diasporas in general. Further evidence of the disengagement of the South African physician diaspora is provided by patterns of property ownership and other investments in South Africa. As many as 57% of the physicians maintain an active bank account in South Africa but these are funds ostensibly for use during their visits. Only 25% have substantial savings in their bank accounts. At the same time 17% own property, 35% have investments and 27% have a house in South Africa. However, these are generally acquired before leaving. Only 5% had bought a house or property in South Africa and only 4% had invested in a South African business in the year prior to the survey. The vast majority of those still holding these assets in South Africa are recent (post 2000) immigrants to Canada. There is a consistent pattern of decline in South African asset ownership over time as the physicians sell their property, close their bank accounts and disinvest. In order to gauge the potential for return migration, the respondents were asked whether they had considered returning to South Africa. About 36% have never considered the possibility of returning while 21% had given it hardly any thought. About 43% indicated that they have considered returning to South Africa. However, only 7% said they are likely to return within the next two years and another 10% within the next five years. Few had taken any concrete steps to return. Less than 2% had applied for a job in South Africa in the previous year. While this group of South African professionals are proud to think of themselves as South African and take a relatively keen interest in events in that country, they are disengaged from any serious diasporic interest in and commitment (beyond contact with and some limited support for family members who remain). Almost without exception, they paint a very negative picture of life in South Africa and they do not see any role for themselves in helping address South Africa’s deep social and economic inequalities and needs. Neo-liberal economists and proponents of diaspora engagement will find little to support their arguments in the views of this particular component of the South African diaspora

No. 23: Labour Migration Trends and Policies in Southern Africa

Since 1990, there have been major changes to longstanding patterns of intra-regional labour migration within the Southern African Development Community (SADC). At the same time, new channels of migration to and from the region have opened. Labour migration is now more voluminous, dynamic and complex than it has ever been. This presents policy-makers with considerable opportunities and challenges. In order to understand the exact nature of these challenges, it is important to have a good grasp of current labour migration characteristics and trends. Unfortunately, reliable, accurate and comprehensive data on labour migration is not available. The quality and currency of data varies considerably from country to country. A regional labour migration observatory would make the future writing of an overview of migration trends a much easier task. The primary objectives of this overview of labour migration trends and policy implications is fourfold: (a) to review recent characteristics and trends in labour migration within and from the SADC region. Official statistics as well as recent survey data are drawn on to generate an overall picture of current characteristics and trends in the region; (b) to highlight some of the critical and urgent issues pertaining to labour migration in the region; (c) to discuss the main features of labour migration strategies and policies and legislative and regulatory frameworks in countries covered by the Southern African Development Community (SADC); and (d) to review the prospects for the freer circulation of migrant labour in the Southern African region. This brief focuses primarily on the period since 1990 and restructuring of labour migration in the wake of the collapse of apartheid, new global migration forces, the end of the wars in Mozambique and Angola and the current economic and political situation in Zimbabwe. Although the brief provides an overview of the region as a whole, the report concentrates on the major labour migration channels in the region (from countries such as Lesotho, Swaziland, Malawi, Mozambique and Zimbabwe to South Africa). The report also considers the nature and implications of new migrant movements to and from SADC

No. 10: The Hungry Cities Food Purchases Matrix: A Measure of Urban Household Food Security and Food System Interactions

Recent theoretical work has suggested that urban food security is the result of food system interactions. This work highlights the challenge of assessing household-level food insecurity and relating it to the broader food system. One priority is to develop food security metrics that incorporate household interactions with the food system retail environment. The Hungry Cities Food Purchases Matrix (HCFPM) is one such metric that has been developed for situating household food sourcing behaviour within the urban food system. The matrix has been successfully administered in a number of cities in the Global South by the Hungry Cities Partnership. This paper discusses the administration of the HCFPM in a 2014 household survey of Maputo in Mozambique and illustrates how it can provide unique insights into the interactions between households and the broader food system. The HCFPM therefore paves the way for a new frontier in urban food system research in cities of the Global South