Leila S. Talani, The Arab Spring in the Global Political Economy

Book Revie

Leila S. Talani, The Arab Spring in the Global Political Economy

Book Revie

The uncertain (re)politicisation of fiscal relations in Europe: a shift in EMU's modes of governance

Europe's numerous fiscal crises – 2003 Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) crisis, its subsequent 2005 reforms, and the recent sovereign debt woes – draw attention to a shift in the management of EMU; namely the inclusion of more uncertainty-based governance. Understood as modalities of government, risk, and uncertainty make the production of this fiscal-monetary space intelligible as a recognised form of knowledge and object of government. Whereas the Pact was devised as the anchor for EMU, it has come to symbolise its weakness. This article argues that the result is an antagonistic relationship between the programmatic and operational dimensions of fiscal governance; otherwise seen as a dialectic between the two competing domains of expertise/law and politics. Starting with the 2005 SGP reforms, and exacerbated by the credit crisis, uncertainty has been mobilised to justify alternative forms of managing fiscal conduct linked to new strategies of calculation and issues of responsibility. Bound to variegated notions of ‘fiscal normality’, I contend that the 2005 reforms signal the (re)politicisation of the budgetary framework and the reconfiguration of the politics of limits. Rather than marginalising informal judgment, the government through uncertainty places a greater emphasis on creative entrepreneurialism in fostering compliance in ways risk does not

German Ordoliberalism and the future of the EU

Far from enabling France to enhance its power over European monetary policy, the Euro hasserved to consolidate the Federal Republic of Germany’s primacy in Europe. We argue thatGerman policies that have underwritten this primacy are determined not primarily by theordoliberal ideas of German state managers, but rather because these ideas correspond to therequirements of Germany’s neo-mercantilist export model and the interests of its most powerfulsocio-economic actors. Germany’s material/corporate interests—and its particular domestic andregional predicament—create enormous obstacles to the abandonment of ordoliberalism and theadoption of the more expansive fiscal policies that most observers believe are necessary tosustain the Eurozone

The United Kingdoms Eurosceptic political economy

This article explores how a political economy approach can explicate recent events in the United Kingdom’s relation to the European Union. The proposition is that neither critical nor comparative approaches do justice to the extent to which British elites have sought to differentiate the UK from the EU. The UK is here understood as a Eurosceptic political economy, constructed in opposition to European integration and, in particular, Economic and Monetary. The article explores how we have witnessed a hardening of this Eurosceptic political economy in the context of the Eurozone crisis. The most distinctive feature of which, as seen in the referendum campaign, is the extent to which the economic case for withdrawal has been established as part of the mainstream of British political debate

Beyond ‘geo-economics’: advanced unevenness and the anatomy of German austerity

This article aims to shed new light on Germany’s domineering role in the eurocrisis. I argue that the realist-inspired depiction of Germany as a ‘geo-economic power’, locked into zero-sum competition with its European partners, is built around an empty core: unable to theorise how anarchy shapes the calculus of states where security competition has receded, it cannot explain why German state managers have insisted on an austerity response to the crisis despite its significant risks and costs even for Germany itself. To unlock this puzzle, this article outlines a version of uneven and combined development (UCD) that is better able to capture the international pressures and opportunities faced by policy elites in advanced capitalist states that no longer encounter one another as direct security rivals. Applied to Germany, this lens reveals a twofold unevenness in the historical structures and growth cycles of capitalist economies that shape its contradictory choice for austerity. In the long run, the reorientation of the export-dependent German economy from Europe towards Asian and Latin American late industrialisers renders the structural adjustment of the eurozone an opportunity—from the cost-saving view of German manufacturers producing in the European home market for export abroad, as well as for German state officials keen to sustain a crumbling class compromise centred on Germany’s world market success. In the short term, however, its exposed position between the divergent post-crisis trajectories of the US and Europe accelerates pressures for austerity beyond what German state and corporate elites would otherwise consider feasible

Ukraine, Europe, and the re-routing of Globalization

The dominant Western narrative—now virtually obligatory within its media and foreign policy establishments—asserts that Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 was unprovoked, deriving from domestic political imperatives and messianic imperial nostalgia. Yet, while these factors must be included within a comprehensive causal argument, a deeper and more satisfactory explanation for the invasion situates the predicament of the Russian ruling class—and thus government—within the context of the systematic, decades-long project of NATO expansion and a series of specific provocative actions and decisions taken by Kyiv and Washington in the second half of 2021. The United States has consistently opposed integration between Russia and Western Europe. The key parameter of U.S. neo-imperial strategy in Europe-Asia remains embedded in Cold War geo-politics, namely that U.S. hegemony in Eurasia rests on the exclusion of Russia from European affairs and the prevention of a geo-economic axis between Berlin, Moscow and Beijing. However, even as the war may result in a final settling of accounts in the U.S.-Russia relationship and beyond, it has also thrown into increasingly sharp relief the growing conflict of class interests and complex geopolitical asymmetries and contradictions in the transatlantic relationship

‘Axis of evil or access to diesel?: spaces of new imperialism and the Iraq war’

The invasion of Iraq in 2003 was waged by the so-called ‘Coalition of the Willing’. This paper will examine how the war was a space in the ongoing geographical extension of global capitalism linked to U.S. foreign policy. Was it simply the decision by a unitary, hegemonic actor in the inter-state system overriding concerns by other states? Was it an imperialist move to secure the ‘global oil spigot’? Alternatively, did the use of military force reflect the interests and emergence of a transnational state apparatus? In this paper, we argue that the U.S. needs to be conceptualised as a specific form of state, within which and through which national and transnational capital operate to establish the interests of a national fraction of an Atlantic ruling class. It is these processes of class struggle and their relation to wider struggles over spaces of imperialism, which need to be at the centre of analysis

Porcine Reproductive and Respiratory Syndrome Virus: Origin Hypothesis

Porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome is a serious swine disease that appeared suddenly in the midwestern United States and central Europe approximately 14 years ago; the disease has now spread worldwide. In North America and Europe, the syndrome is caused by two genotypes of porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome virus (PRRSV), an arterivirus whose genomes diverge by approximately 40%. My hypothesis, which explains the origin and evolution of the two distinct PRRSV genotypes, is that a mutant of a closely related arterivirus of mice (lactate dehydrogenase-elevating virus) infected wild boars in central Europe. These wild boars functioned as intermediate hosts and spread the virus to North Carolina in imported, infected European wild boars in 1912; the virus then evolved independently on the two continents in the prevalent wild hog populations for approximately 70 years until independently entering the domestic pig population