Against a priori knowledge of non-trivial truths.

Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy. University of KwaZulu-Natal, Howard College 2014.This is a thesis in support of the conceptual yoking of analytic truth to a priori knowledge. My approach is a semantic one; the primary subject matter throughout the thesis is linguistic objects, such as propositions or sentences. I evaluate arguments, and also forward my own, about how such linguistic objects’ truth is determined, how their meaning is fixed and how we, respectively, know the conditions under which their truth and meaning are obtained. The strategy is to make explicit what is distinctive about analytic truths. The objective is to show that truths, known a priori, are trivial in a highly circumscribed way. My arguments are premised on a language-relative account of analytic truth. The language relative account which underwrites much of what I do has two central tenets: 1. Conventionalism about truth and, 2. Non-factualism about meaning. I argue that one decisive way of establishing conventionalism and non-factualism is to prioritise epistemological questions. Once it is established that some truths are not known empirically an account of truth must follow which precludes factual truths being known non-empirically. The function of Part 1 is, chiefly, to render Carnap’s language-relative account of analytic truth. I do not offer arguments in support of Carnap at this stage, but throughout Parts 2 and 3, by looking at more current literature on a priori knowledge and analytic truth, it becomes quickly evident that I take Carnap to be correct, and why. In order to illustrate the extent to which Carnap’s account is conventionalist and non-factualist I pose his arguments against those of his predecessors, Kant and Frege. Part 1 is a lightly retrospective background to the concepts of ‘analytic’ and ‘a priori’. The strategy therein is more mercenary than exegetical: I select the parts from Kant and Frege most relevant to Carnap’s eventual reaction to them. Hereby I give the reasons why Carnap foregoes a factual and objective basis for logical truth. The upshot of this is an account of analytic truth (i.e. logical truth, to him) which ensures its trivial nature. In opposition to accounts of a priori knowledge, which describe it as knowledge gained from rational apprehension, I argue that it is either knowledge from logical deduction or knowledge of stipulations. I therefore reject, in Part 2, three epistemologies for knowing linguistic conventions (e.g. implicit definitions): 1. intuition, 2. inferential a priori knowledge and, 3. a posteriori knowledge. At base, all three epistemologies are rejected because they are incompatible with conventionalism and non-factualism. I argue this point by signalling that such accounts of knowledge yield unsubstantiated second-order claims and/or they render the relevant linguistic conventions epistemically arrogant. For a convention to be arrogant it must be stipulated to be true. The stipulation is then considered arrogant when its meaning cannot be fixed, and its truth cannot be determined without empirical ‘work’. Once a working explication of ‘a priori’ has been given, partially in Part 1 (as inferential) and then in Part 2 (as non-inferential) I look, in Part 3, at an apriorist account of analytic truth, which, I argue, renders analytic truth non-trivial. The particular subject matter here is the implicit definitions of logical terms. The opposition’s argument holds that logical truths are known a priori (this is part of their identification criteria) and that their meaning is factually based. From here it follows that analytic truth, being determined by factually based meaning, is also factual. I oppose these arguments by exposing the internal inconsistencies; that implicit definition is premised on the arbitrary stipulation of truth which is inconsistent with saying that there are facts which determine the same truth. In doing so, I endorse the standard irrealist position about implicit definition and analytic truth (along with the “early friends of implicit definition” such as Wittgenstein and Carnap). What is it that I am trying to get at by doing all of the abovementioned? Here is a very abstracted explanation. The unmitigated realism of the rationalists of old, e.g. Plato, Descartes, Kant, have stoically borne the brunt of the allegation of yielding ‘synthetic a priori’ claims. The anti-rationalist phase of this accusation I am most interested in is that forwarded by the semantically driven empiricism of the early 20th century. It is here that the charge of the ‘synthetic a priori’ really takes hold. Since then new methods and accusatory terms are employed by, chiefly, non-realist positions. I plan to give these proper attention in due course. However, it seems to me that the reframing of the debate in these new terms has also created the illusion that current philosophical realism, whether naturalistic realism, realism in science, realism in logic and mathematics, is somehow not guilty of the same epistemological and semantic charges levelled against Plato, Descartes and Kant. It is of interest to me that in, particularly, current analytic philosophy (given its rationale) realism in many areas seems to escape the accusation of yielding synthetic priori claims. Yet yielding synthetic a priori claims is something which realism so easily falls prey to. Perhaps this is a function of the fact that the phrase, ‘synthetic a priori’, used as an allegation, is now outmoded. This thesis is nothing other than an indictment of metaphysics, or speculative philosophy (this being the crime), brought against a specific selection of realist arguments. I, therefore, ask of my reader to see my explicit, and perhaps outmoded, charge of the ‘synthetic a priori’ levelled against respective theorists as an attempt to draw a direct comparison with the speculative metaphysics so many analytic philosophers now love to hate. I think the phrase ‘synthetic a priori’ still does a lot of work in this regard, precisely because so many current theorists wrongly think they are immune to this charge. Consequently, I shall say much about what is not permitted. Such is, I suppose, the nature of arguing ‘against’ something. I’ll argue that it is not permitted to be a factualist about logical principles and say that they are known a priori. I’ll argue that it is not permitted to say linguistic conventions are a posteriori, when there is a complete failure in locating such a posteriori conventions. Both such philosophical claims are candidates for the synthetic a priori, for unmitigated rationalism. But on the positive side, we now have these two assets: Firstly, I do not ask us to abandon any of the linguistic practises discussed; merely to adopt the correct attitude towards them. For instance, where we use the laws of logic, let us remember that there are no known/knowable facts about logic. These laws are therefore, to the best of our knowledge, conventions not dissimilar to the rules of a game. And, secondly, once we pass sentence on knowing, a priori, anything but trivial truths we shall have at our disposal the sharpest of philosophical tools. A tool which can only proffer a better brand of empiricism

Knowing linguistic conventions

A linguistic convention is a principle or norm that has been adopted by a person or linguistic community about how to use, and therefore what the meaning is of, a specific term. Examples of such norms or principles are those expressed by propositions that express the laws of logic or those that express implicit definitions. Arguments about the epistemic status of linguistic conventions, very broadly, fall into two camps: the one holds that the basis of linguistic conventions is objective and that, therefore, such conventions are genuinely truth-bearing. Knowledge of such conventions is therefore knowledge of the objective truth of such conventions. This camp might be labelled ‘realist’. The other holds that there is no known basis to linguistic conventions and that conventions are, to the best of our knowledge, not objective, but invented. Their truth is stipulated by the relevant speaker or linguistic community. Such truth is, consequently, trivial and knowledge of such conventions simply knowledge of the stipulation. This camp might be labelled ‘anti-realist’. These are three standard accounts of the epistemic status of linguistic conventions, which all play into the first camp: knowledge by intuition, inferential a priori knowledge and a posteriori knowledge. I give reasons why these accounts should be rejected. I then argue that linguistic conventions, if conceived of as trivial truths, are knowable non-inferentially a priori. Such an epistemic account provides support for the second camp. In this regard, I marshal support from some recent work by Wright and Hal

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Seawater Mg:Ca and Sr:Ca ratios are biogeochemical parameters reflecting the Earth–ocean–atmosphere dynamic exchange of elements. The ratios’ dependence on the environment and organisms' biology facilitates their application in marine sciences. Here, we present a measured single-laboratory dataset, combined with previous data, to test the assumption of limited seawater Mg:Ca and Sr:Ca variability across marine environments globally. High variability was found in open-ocean upwelling and polar regions, shelves/neritic and river-influenced areas, where seawater Mg:Ca and Sr:Ca ratios range from ∼4.40 to 6.40 mmol:mol and ∼6.95 to 9.80 mmol:mol, respectively. Open-ocean seawater Mg:Ca is semiconservative (∼4.90 to 5.30 mol:mol), while Sr:Ca is more variable and nonconservative (∼7.70 to 8.80 mmol:mol); both ratios are nonconservative in coastal seas. Further, the Ca, Mg, and Sr elemental fluxes are connected to large total alkalinity deviations from International Association for the Physical Sciences of the Oceans (IAPSO) standard values. Because there is significant modern seawater Mg:Ca and Sr:Ca ratios variability across marine environments we cannot absolutely assume that fossil archives using taxa-specific proxies reflect true global seawater chemistry but rather taxa- and process-specific ecosystem variations, reflecting regional conditions. This variability could reconcile secular seawater Mg:Ca and Sr:Ca ratio reconstructions using different taxa and techniques by assuming an error of 1 to 1.50 mol:mol, and 1 to 1.90 mmol:mol, respectively. The modern ratios’ variability is similar to the reconstructed rise over 20 Ma (Neogene Period), nurturing the question of seminonconservative behavior of Ca, Mg, and Sr over modern Earth geological history with an overlooked environmental effect

Correction for Lebrato et al., Global variability in seawater Mg:Ca and Sr:Ca ratios in the modern ocean

4 pages, 5 figures.-- Correction Global variability in seawater Mg:Ca and Sr:Ca ratios in the modern ocean; Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the USA 117(36): 22281-22292 (2020); doi: 10.1073/pnas.1918943117; http://hdl.handle.net/10261/221953The authors wish to note the following: “This study’s seawater Sr:Ca values were systematically low as a consequence of normalization to another published low value for the International Association for the Physical Sciences of the Oceans (IAPSO) (1). IAPSO has been used at the Ocean Drilling Program, Texas A&M University (ODP-TAMU) (http://www-odp.tamu.edu/), and is still being used as the primary standard for elemental composition of seawater/interstitial water. Consequently, our seawater value of Sr:Ca = 8.28 mmol:mol was systematically low by approx. 3.70%, if we accept seawater Sr:Ca 8.60 mmol:mol as the recommended value for IAPSO North Atlantic surface water salinity standard. The uncertainty budget should be expanded including the uncertainty of IAPSO composition. The largest contribution to expanded uncertainty of our data comes from the uncertainty of the IAPSO reference composition, which is 3.29% using all published values. This will result in 3.30% (1 SD) expanded uncertainty for seawater Sr:Ca (and 0.5%, for seawater Mg:Ca) of the entire data set with respect to accuracy. We have corrected all seawater Sr:Ca values with a factor of 1.0243 in all our tables (e.g., SI Appendix, Table S1 averages) and in the figures (Fig. 4, Fig. 5), where a ratio was used. Note that the seawater Sr:Ca % changes are small, thus changes are hardly noticeable on large displays (e.g., Figures), but they can be seen in the tables and averages/SD calculations. Seawater Sr:Ca ratios are also corrected in the main text where relevantPeer reviewe