Fragmented Authority from Ancien Régime to Modernity: a Quantitative Analysis

This paper performs a systematic analysis that examines institutional fragmentation in terms of customs tariffs within states west of the Rhine from 1700 to 1815 and between states east of the Rhine from 1815 to 1871. Internal customs zones are measured in two ways: physical size and urban population. Both methods use 175 sample cities as described by De Vries (1984) in England, France, the Netherlands, and Spain as the basic unit of account. The results indicate that customs zones west of the Rhine were small prior to the French Revolution but grew dramatically from 1789 onwards. They thus provide definitive evidence of divided authority in Ancien Régime Europe. The measurement of external customs zones uses 117 sample cities in the German and Italian territories. The findings indicate a remarkable degree of institutional consolidation between states east of the Rhine over the 1800s

potential immune modulatory action of mesenchymal stem cell derived extracellular vesicles in type 1 diabetes

Several preclinical studies have shown potential immunemodulatory properties of mesenchymal stem cells (MSC) in type 1 diabetes leading to phase I/II clinical trials. Immune-modulatory properties of MSC have been mainly ascribed to their secretome. The extracellular vesicles (EV) have emerged as paracrine mediators of MSC actions. In fact, MSC-derived EV have been shown to carry proteins and nucleic acids capable to mimic the effect of originating cells. In the present short review we discuss evidences for contribution of EV to the immune-modulatory properties of MSC and mechanisms involved. In particular, EV were shown to inhibit T cell response to the glutamic acid decarboxylase (GAD) islet auto-antigen by inducing a shift of lymphocytes from Th1 to Th2 phenotype

Fiscal Centralization, Limited Government, and Public Revenues in Europe, 1650-1913

Old Regime polities typically suffered from fiscal fragmentation and absolutist rule. By the start of World War I, however, many such countries had centralized institutions and limited government. This article uses a new panel data set to perform a statistical analysis of political regimes and public revenues in Europe from 1650 to 1913. Panel regressions indicate that centralized and limited regimes were associated with significantly higher revenues than fragmented and absolutist ones. Structural break tests also suggest close relationships between major turning points in revenue series and political transformations