Do Community Characteristics Determine Environmental Outcomes? Evidence from the Toxics Release Inventory

This research uses neighborhood characteristics (at the zipcode level) to explain changes in toxic releases between 1990 and 1993. It combines the Toxics Release Inventory data with demographic data from the 1990 US Census. We first analyze the location of manufacturing facilities in a particular neighborhood using a sample selection model, and then attribute changes in the level of emissions between 1990 and 1993 to the demographic and socio-economic characteristics of the neighborhood in 1990. The results indicate that variables likely to affect the propensity for communities to engage in political action significantly influence environmental performance. Economic characteristics of neighborhoods (such as income levels and unemployment) also affect changes in releases. Release changes in the Southeastern US exhibit a pattern consistent with racial injustice.

Apparatus including a plurality of spaced transformers for locating short circuits in cables

A cable fault locator is described for sensing faults such as short circuits in power cables. The apparatus includes a plurality of current transformers strategically located along a cable. Trigger circuits are connected to each of the current transformers for placing a resistor in series with a resistive element responsive to an abnormally high current flowing through that portion of the cable. By measuring the voltage drop across the resistive element, the location of the fault can be determined

A Market with Frictions in the Matching Process: An Experimental Study

We construct a laboratory market with the structure of the theoretical model of Burdett, Shi, and Wright (2001). The model is a simple and natural way to represent a market in which there is a friction in the matching process between buyers and sellers. Sellers first simultaneously post prices at which they are willing to sell their single unit of a good. Buyers then simultaneously choose a seller from whom to attempt to purchase a unit. If more than one buyer chooses the same seller, the good is randomly sold to one of the buyers. If a seller is not chosen by any buyer, his unit is not sold. Our experimental results show a broad consistency with the model of Burdett et al. and less support for an alternative model, which is analogous to the model of Montgomery (1991), and which has different assumptions on the strategic interaction between sellers. The main departures that we observe from the Burdett et al. model are that (a) price dispersion exists and is slow to decay, (b) prices exceed the equilibrium level when there are only two sellers, and (c) buyers’ purchase probabilities are insufficiently responsive to price differences when there are two sellers.

Emissions Variability in Tradable Permit Markets with Imperfect Enforcement and Banking

Unexpected variation in emissions can have a substantial impact on the prices and efficiency of tradable emission permit markets. In this paper we report results from a laboratory experiment in which subjects participate in an emissions trading market in the presence of emissions uncertainty. Subjects face exogenous, random positive or negative shocks to their emission levels after they make production and emission control plans. In some sessions we allow subjects to bank their unused permits for future use. In all sessions, subjects can trade in a reconciliation period to buy or sell extra permits following the shock realization. Subjects then report their emissions to the regulatory authority and they are placed in different inspection groups depending on their compliance history. The design of our experiment allows us to identify important interactions between emission shocks, banking, compliance and enforcement. We find that the relationship between emission shocks and price changes is significantly stronger without banking, so banking helps smooth out the price variability arising from the imperfect control of emissions. This greater price stability comes at a cost, however, since noncompliance and emissions are significantly greater when banking is allowed.Emissions Trading, Correlated Shocks, Banking, Laboratory Experiments.

COMMUNICATION AND COORDINATION IN THE LABORATORY COLLECTIVE RESISTANCE GAME

This paper presents a laboratory collective resistance (CR) game to study how different forms of non-binding communication among responders can help coordinate their collective resistance against a leader who transgresses against them. Contrary to the predictions of analysis based on purely self-regarding preferences, we find that non-binding communication about intended resistance increases the incidence of no transgression even in the one-shot laboratory CR game. In particular, we find that the incidence of no transgression increases from 7 percent with no communication up to 25-37 percent depending on whether communication occurs before or after the leader’s transgression decision. Responders’ messages are different when the leaders can observe them, and the leaders use the observed messages to target specific responders for transgression.Communication, Cheap Talk, Collective Resistance, Laboratory Experiment, Social Preferences

What Can Laboratory Experiments Teach Us About Emissions Permit Market Design?

The laboratory provides a test bed to inform many design choices for emissions permit markets. Experiments are sometimes strongly motivated and structured by specific theoretical models and predictions, but in other cases the experiment itself can be the model of the market and regulatory environment. We review specific experimental applications that address design issues for permit auction rules, permit expiration dates and banking, liability rules, and regulatory enforcement.cap-and-trade, auctions, liability, regulation, compliance, banking, Environmental Economics and Policy, Institutional and Behavioral Economics,

Communication and Coordination in the Laboratory Collective Resistance Game

This paper presents a laboratory collective resistance (CR) game to study how different forms of non-binding communication among responders can help coordinate their collective resistance against a leader who transgresses against them. Contrary to the predictions of analysis based on purely self-regarding preferences, we find that non-binding communication about intended resistance increases the incidence of no transgression even in the one-shot laboratory CR game. In particular, we find that the incidence of no transgression increases from 7 percent with no communication up to 25-37 percent depending on whether communication occurs before or after the leader’s transgression decision. Responders’ messages are different when the leaders can observe them, and the leaders use the observed messages to target specific responders for transgression.Communication ; Cheap Talk ; Collective Resistance ; Laboratory Experiment ; Social Preferences

Moral Hazard and Peer Monitoring in a Laboratory Microfinance Experiment

Most problems with formal sector credit lending to the poor in developing countries can be attributed to the lack of information and inadequate collateral. One common feature of successful credit mechanisms is group-lending, where the loan is advanced to an individual if he/she is a part of a group and members of the borrowing group can monitor each other. Since group members have better information about each other compared to lenders, peer monitoring is often less expensive than lender monitoring. Theoretically this leads to greater monitoring and greater rates of loan repayments. This paper reports the results from a laboratory experiment of group lending in the presence of moral hazard and (costly) peer monitoring. We compare peer monitoring treatments when credit is provided to members of the group sequentially and simultaneously, and individual lending with lender monitoring. The results depend on the relative cost of monitoring by the peer vis-à-vis the lender. In the more typical case where the cost of peer monitoring is lower than the cost of lender monitoring, our results suggest that peer monitoring results in higher loan frequencies, higher monitoring and higher repayment rates compared to lender monitoring. In the absence of monitoring cost differences, performance is mostly similar across group and individual lending schemes, although loan frequencies and monitoring rates are sometimes modestly greater with group lending. Within group lending, although the dynamic incentives provided by sequential leading generate the greatest equilibrium surplus, simultaneous group leading provides equivalent empirical performance.Group Lending, Monitoring, Moral Hazard, Laboratory Experiment, Loans, Development

Social Impact Bonds: A Research Anthology

Social impact bonds (SIBs) are pay-for-success arrangements that can be used to address a variety of public health issues, ranging from asthma to infant mortality. SIBs are used as financing mechanisms to raise upfront funding from private investors for social and public health preventative interventions. They function by leveraging the anticipated savings of prevention as a source for potential financial rewards for the intervention’s investors. In a SIB arrangement, rewards are due if and only if the intervention succeeds in reaching predetermined benchmarks, thereby shifting the financial burden of success to the investors. Since the world’s first SIB launched in 2010, SIBs have been discussed as a way to raise funds for public health initiatives. The following articles and resources were collected through April 2014 using online databases and resources, including WestlawNext™ for legal publications. No material created before 2010 (the year the world’s first SIB started) was collected. The results were narrowed to those resources included here on the basis of their relevance to public health, law, and policy in states, tribes, localities, and territories. Articles were also selected to account for the different perspectives, roles, and responsibilities of parties involved in SIBs, existing and potential applications of SIBs, and issues raised by SIBs. Given that SIBs are new instruments that are still being studied and explored, this anthology should not be considered to be exhaustive.Office for State, Tribal, Local and Territorial Support, Centers for Disease Control and Preventio

Conversations About Race and Perceptions of Racial Discrimination Among Emerging Adults

Conversations About Race and Perceptions of Racial Discrimination Among Emerging Adults Alanna Cason, Depts. of Psychology and Criminal Justice, Angel Whitfield, Maria Cisneros, Dept. of Psychology Graduate Student, Arlenis Santana, Dept. of Psychology Graduate Student, & Eryn DeLaney, Dept. of Psychology Graduate Student, with Dr. Chelsea D. Williams, Dr. Tricia Smith, Dr. Amy Adkins, and Dr. Danielle Dick College students of color have positive race-related experiences (e.g.., positive conversations), as well as negative race-related experiences (e.g., racial discrimination and negative experiences about race; Spencer 2006). Limited work has focused on conversations students have about race, although the U.S. has become more diverse especially in college settings (Martinez-Acosta & Favero, 2018). To address these gaps, the current study focused on bidirectional relations between students’ conversations about race and how they are related to discrimination experiences among 95 college-age students of color. We hypothesized that (1) more negative conversations about race (and less positive conversations) would increase students’ perceptions of racial discrimination, and (2) the more students experienced discrimination, they would have more negative conversations (less positive conversations) about race. Two linear regression analyses were conducted. The first analysis indicated that negative conversations about race (B = .38, phttps://scholarscompass.vcu.edu/uresposters/1303/thumbnail.jp