Un período libre-cambista en la historia argentina : 1810-1829 : análisis jurídico y económico

Fil: Catterberg, Edgardo Raúl. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Ciencias Sociales. Buenos Aires, Argentin

Intergenerational Value Change and Transitions to Democracy: Toward the Consolidation of a Third Wave Generation?

The American literature has extensively studied the dynamics of early political socialization and its impact on intergenerational differences since the early 1950s (Mannheim, 1928; Jennings, Stoker and Stoker, 2004; Schuman, 2011). A key finding is that the emergence of new political generations requires salient historical events that strongly affect socialization in early political life. The comparative literature has also emphasized the relevance of early experiences in the formation of political attitudes, and mostly focused on historical events which transformed industrialized societies, identifying systematic differences in intergenerational values between pre-war and post-war cohorts (Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). However, the study of early political socialization in Third Wave nations and its impact on the political attitudes and behaviors of individuals born and raised under these new democratic regimes has been practically ignored (among the very few exceptions are Catterberg and Zuasnabar, 2010; Tessler, 2004, and Niemi, E. Catterberg et al., 1996). I argue that the Third Wave (3W) of democratization was a transformative experience that had a lasting impact on people’s political culture. Moreover, I argue that this impact did not necessarily imply stronger pro-democratic orientations nor did it help consolidate a “3W Generation”, since post-honeymoon effects constrained the development of pro-democratic orientations after regime change. To test these claims, I identify intergenerational differences among the 3W cohort and two older age groups after regime change in three critical dimensions of a democratic political culture: trust, tolerance and participation. I include established democracies as the control group, and compare trends in younger and established democracies among the same age groups. I use World Values Surveys (WVS) data from 1990 ?the year that most 3W democracies experienced regime change? and 2005-2007 ?the last wave that was available?. Finally, I test the generation effects hypothesis with regression analyses.The American literature has extensively studied the dynamics of early political socialization and its impact on intergenerational differences since the early 1950s (Mannheim, 1928; Jennings, Stoker and Stoker, 2004; Schuman, 2011). A key finding is that the emergence of new political generations requires salient historical events that strongly affect socialization in early political life. The comparative literature has also emphasized the relevance of early experiences in the formation of political attitudes, and mostly focused on historical events which transformed industrialized societies, identifying systematic differences in intergenerational values between pre-war and post-war cohorts (Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). However, the study of early political socialization in Third Wave nations and its impact on the political attitudes and behaviors of individuals born and raised under these new democratic regimes has been practically ignored (among the very few exceptions are Catterberg and Zuasnabar, 2010; Tessler, 2004, and Niemi, E. Catterberg et al., 1996). I argue that the Third Wave (3W) of democratization was a transformative experience that had a lasting impact on people’s political culture. Moreover, I argue that this impact did not necessarily imply stronger pro-democratic orientations nor did it help consolidate a “3W Generation”, since post-honeymoon effects constrained the development of pro-democratic orientations after regime change. To test these claims, I identify intergenerational differences among the 3W cohort and two older age groups after regime change in three critical dimensions of a democratic political culture: trust, tolerance and participation. I include established democracies as the control group, and compare trends in younger and established democracies among the same age groups. I use World Values Surveys (WVS) data from 1990 ?the year that most 3W democracies experienced regime change? and 2005-2007 ?the last wave that was available?. Finally, I test the generation effects hypothesis with regression analyses

Intergenerational Value Change and Transitions to Democracy: Toward the Consolidation of a Third Wave Generation?

The American literature has extensively studied the dynamics of early political socialization and its impact on intergenerational differences since the early 1950s (Mannheim, 1928; Jennings, Stoker and Stoker, 2004; Schuman, 2011). A key finding is that the emergence of new political generations requires salient historical events that strongly affect socialization in early political life. The comparative literature has also emphasized the relevance of early experiences in the formation of political attitudes, and mostly focused on historical events which transformed industrialized societies, identifying systematic differences in intergenerational values between pre-war and post-war cohorts (Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). However, the study of early political socialization in Third Wave nations and its impact on the political attitudes and behaviors of individuals born and raised under these new democratic regimes has been practically ignored (among the very few exceptions are Catterberg and Zuasnabar, 2010; Tessler, 2004, and Niemi, E. Catterberg et al., 1996). I argue that the Third Wave (3W) of democratization was a transformative experience that had a lasting impact on people’s political culture. Moreover, I argue that this impact did not necessarily imply stronger pro-democratic orientations nor did it help consolidate a “3W Generation”, since post-honeymoon effects constrained the development of pro-democratic orientations after regime change. To test these claims, I identify intergenerational differences among the 3W cohort and two older age groups after regime change in three critical dimensions of a democratic political culture: trust, tolerance and participation. I include established democracies as the control group, and compare trends in younger and established democracies among the same age groups. I use World Values Surveys (WVS) data from 1990 ?the year that most 3W democracies experienced regime change? and 2005-2007 ?the last wave that was available?. Finally, I test the generation effects hypothesis with regression analyses.The American literature has extensively studied the dynamics of early political socialization and its impact on intergenerational differences since the early 1950s (Mannheim, 1928; Jennings, Stoker and Stoker, 2004; Schuman, 2011). A key finding is that the emergence of new political generations requires salient historical events that strongly affect socialization in early political life. The comparative literature has also emphasized the relevance of early experiences in the formation of political attitudes, and mostly focused on historical events which transformed industrialized societies, identifying systematic differences in intergenerational values between pre-war and post-war cohorts (Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). However, the study of early political socialization in Third Wave nations and its impact on the political attitudes and behaviors of individuals born and raised under these new democratic regimes has been practically ignored (among the very few exceptions are Catterberg and Zuasnabar, 2010; Tessler, 2004, and Niemi, E. Catterberg et al., 1996). I argue that the Third Wave (3W) of democratization was a transformative experience that had a lasting impact on people’s political culture. Moreover, I argue that this impact did not necessarily imply stronger pro-democratic orientations nor did it help consolidate a “3W Generation”, since post-honeymoon effects constrained the development of pro-democratic orientations after regime change. To test these claims, I identify intergenerational differences among the 3W cohort and two older age groups after regime change in three critical dimensions of a democratic political culture: trust, tolerance and participation. I include established democracies as the control group, and compare trends in younger and established democracies among the same age groups. I use World Values Surveys (WVS) data from 1990 ?the year that most 3W democracies experienced regime change? and 2005-2007 ?the last wave that was available?. Finally, I test the generation effects hypothesis with regression analyses

Las nuevas alternativas y un “Gran Maestro” se reconocen

Ponencias presentadas en las Jornadas “Bicentenario: ayer y hoy de la Psicología Argentina”, realizadas el 19 de noviembre en la Universidad de Ciencias Empresariales y Sociales (Buenos Aires

Argentina: dispersión de la oposición y el auge de Cristina Fernández de Kirchner

A new political cycle characterized the 2010-2011 period in Argentina. The death of former president Néstor Kirchner was followed by the consolidation of Cristina Kirchner as a leader in her own right, leading to an overwhelming electoral victory in late 2011. Some changes, which occurred at the institutional level, have the potential to transform the political landscape in the long term. This paper reviews the political, economic and social development of Argentina during these two years in light of the trends observed in previous years and longer-term determinants. It reviews the main institutional and policy changes of these years, and highlights the legislative process, public opinion trends, and electoral results.Los años 2010 y 2011 marcaron un ciclo político en Argentina. Tras la muerte del ex presidente Néstor Kirchner sobrevino la consolidación de Cristina Fernández de Kirchner como líder de cuño propio, desembocando en una victoria electoral abrumadora a fines del 2011. Algunos cambios, operados a nivel institucional, podrían transformar el panorama político de largo plazo. Este trabajo repasa la coyuntura política, económica y social de Argentina durante estos dos años a la luz de las tendencias observadas en años anteriores y de determinantes de más largo plazo. Se repasan los principales cambios institucionales y de políticas públicas, datos del proceso legislativo, tendencias de la opinión pública y resultados electorales

Populist communication in the new media environment: a cross-regional comparative perspective

The changing terms of mediation place new demands, opportunities and risks on the performance of the political persona. Visibility has become a double-edged sword, leaving representatives vulnerable to exposure while new tools provide opportunities for emerging entrepreneurial actors. This double risk to elites’ mediated personas—exposure and challenge from entrepreneurs—renders their armour of authenticity dangerously fragile, which nourishes a public sense of being inefficaciously represented. It is this climate in which populism currently flourishes around the globe. Three primary criteria of mediated self-representation by politicians—visibility, authenticity and efficacy—form the focus of this paper: how do populists negotiate such demands in different democratic contexts, and wherein lies the symbiosis between populism and the new media environment suggested by the literature? To answer this, the paper compares two populist cases responding to different democratic contexts: UKIP, a right-wing party from an established democracy (UK), and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), a left-wing party from a transitional democracy (South Africa). The objects of study are disruptive performances by these parties, which are considered emblematic manifestations of populist ideology as they establish a Manichaean relationship between the elite and populist actors who embody the people. The paper introduces disruption as a multi-faceted and significant analytical concept to explain the populist behaviour and strategies that underlie populist parties’ responses to the demands for visibility, authenticity and efficacy that the new media environment places upon political representatives. Using mixed methods with an interpretive focus, the paper paints a rich picture of the contexts, meanings and means of construction of populist performances

First-Hand Experience and Second-Hand Information: Changing Trust across Three Levels of Government

Little is known about how different sources of information drive citizen trust in government. To address that gap this article compares disaster evacuees to observers, noting how trust differs as attention to media coverage increases. First-hand experience supplies information to update trust through biological and personal processes and performance assessments, while secondary sources provide information about other people's experiences, filtered through lenses that take an active role in crafting information. These two types of information have varying effects depending on the level of government being trusted. Using surveys administered a year after Hurricane Katrina, I find that Katrina evacuees have the highest trust in federal government, until they start paying attention to media coverage, and that attention to coverage has the most dramatic effect on these evacuees compared to all other groups. I also find that increasing attention to second-hand information corresponds with higher trust in local officials, and that this effect decreases as the level of government increases. It appears media coverage creates a comparison in the mind of hurricane evacuees, causing them to update their performance assessments based on comparing their own experience to that which they observe, thereby updating their political trust

Political trust and historical legacy: the effect of varieties of socialism

This paper, unlike the vast existing literature on political trust, focuses on trust in post-socialist countries, and more specifically on their emerging elites, rather than on their general populations. Studying emerging elites is important in the context of establishing democracy and the survival of democracy. We stipulate that political trust is significantly determined by historical legacy: type of socialist regime, accounting for path dependence and thus, for pre- socialist legacies. Utilizing individual-level data from an institutional survey, we find that distinguishing between different types of socialism is instrumental in explaining trust of emerging elites. Our findings have implications for policies aimed at fostering political trust in post-socialist countries and more importantly for discerning future patterns of political and social developments