Mechanism of User Participation in Co-creation Community: A Network Evolutionary Game Method

Active participation closely associates with the sustainable operation of co-creation communities. Different from recent studies on the promotion of sustainable operation by identifying the internal and external motivations of user participation, this paper aims to analyze the mechanism regarding how different motivations affect the decision of user participation from group-level perspective. To better understand the mechanism, internal and external motivations are, respectively, captured by return-cost analysis and user interactive network. Afterwards, a network evolutionary game model was formulated to analyze the dynamic strategy selection (e.g., active participation and passive participation) of all users. In addition, the stable equilibrium and evolutionary path of strategies are analyzed through computational experiments. Results indicate the following: (a) Rewards have an influence on the promotion of active participation. However, with the continued growth of rewards, this promotion does not make sense sustainably. (b) The promotional effect of information noise on the selection of active participation can be found when passive participation is the dominant strategy. However, the inhibitory effect can be seen in populations that mainly adopt active participation. (c) The scale-free feature of user interactive network inhibits the selection of active participation when active participation is the dominant strategy in populations. Results found here is beneficial for managers to implement the specified policies and thus to achieve the sustainability of co-creation community

Mechanism of User Participation in Co-creation Community: A Network Evolutionary Game Method

Active participation closely associates with the sustainable operation of co-creation communities. Different from recent studies on the promotion of sustainable operation by identifying the internal and external motivations of user participation, this paper aims to analyze the mechanism regarding how different motivations affect the decision of user participation from group-level perspective. To better understand the mechanism, internal and external motivations are, respectively, captured by return-cost analysis and user interactive network. Afterwards, a network evolutionary game model was formulated to analyze the dynamic strategy selection (e.g., active participation and passive participation) of all users. In addition, the stable equilibrium and evolutionary path of strategies are analyzed through computational experiments. Results indicate the following: (a) Rewards have an influence on the promotion of active participation. However, with the continued growth of rewards, this promotion does not make sense sustainably. (b) The promotional effect of information noise on the selection of active participation can be found when passive participation is the dominant strategy. However, the inhibitory effect can be seen in populations that mainly adopt active participation. (c) The scale-free feature of user interactive network inhibits the selection of active participation when active participation is the dominant strategy in populations. Results found here is beneficial for managers to implement the specified policies and thus to achieve the sustainability of co-creation community.</jats:p

Multi-Objective Optimization Model of Emergency Organization Allocation for Sustainable Disaster Supply Chain

To mitigate or reduce various losses and improve efficiency of disaster response, the focus of this paper is to design optimized strategies of emergency organization allocation regarding sustainability. Firstly, an integrated framework including several elements such as emergency organization, task, decision-agents, environment and their relations is developed from a systematic perspective. Then, this problem is formulated as a novel multi-objective 0–1 integer programming model to minimize total weighted completion times, total carbon emissions and total emergency costs. Next, branch and bound approach and handling strategies for multiple objectives are designed to solve this model. Finally, a case study from the Wenchuan earthquake is presented to illustrate the proposed model and solution strategies. Computational results demonstrate their significant potential advantages on allocating emergency organization from the perspectives of best practice, objective functions, preferences of decision-agents, and problem size

A fuzzy bi-level optimization model for multi-period post-disaster relief distribution in sustainable humanitarian supply chains

In the aftermath of large-scale natural disasters, supply shortage and inequitable distribution cause various losses, hindering humanitarian supply chains? performance. The optimal decisions are difficult due to the complexity arising from the multi-period post-disaster consideration, uncertainty of supplies, hierarchal decision levels and conflicting objectives in sustainable humanitarian supply chains (SHSCs). This paper formulates the problem as a fuzzy tri-objective bi-level integer programming model to minimize the unmet demand rate, potential environmental risks, emergency costs on the upper level of decision hierarchy and maximize survivors? perceived satisfaction on the lower level of decision hierarchy. A hybrid global criterion method is devised to incorporate a primal-dual algorithm, expected value and branch-and-bound approach in solving the model. A case study using data from the Wenchuan earthquake is presented to evaluate the proposed model. Study results indicate that the hybrid global criterion method guides an optimal strategy for such a complex problem within a reasonable computational time. More attention should be attached to the environmental and economic sustainability aspects in SHSCs after golden rescue stage. The proposed bi-level optimization model has the advantages of reducing the total unmet demand rate, total potential environmental risks and total emergency costs. If the decision-agents with higher authorities act as the leaders with dominant power in SHSCs, the optimal decisions, respectively taking hierarchical and horizontal relationships into account would result in equal performance.Funding Agencies|National Natural Science Foundation of ChinaNational Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC) [71904021]; Social Science Planning Project of Chongqing [2019QNGL27]; Chunhui Plan of the Ministry of Education of the Peoples Republic of China [CQ2019001]; Natural Science Foundation of Chongqing, ChinaNatural Science Foundation of Chongqing [cstc2020jcyj-msxmX0164]; Project of Science and Technology Research Program of Chongqing Municipal Education Commission of China [KJQN201900830]; Key Project of Special Research regarding Response to Major Public Health Emergency of Chongqing Technology and Business University [ctbuyqzx01]; China Scholarship CouncilChina Scholarship Council [202008500051]; Scientific Research Startup Foundation for Introduction of Advanced Talents of Chongqing Technology and Business University [1955011]; Research Project of Chongqing Technology and Business University [1951025]; MOE Layout Foundation of Humanities and Social Sciences [20YJA630079]; International Science and Technology Innovation Cooperation Project of Sichuan Provice [20GJHZ0039]</p

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Three-Player for Low-Carbon Production Capacity Sharing

In the era of the sharing economy, the rise of production capacity sharing has changed traditional manufacturing modes and broken the balance of original production systems. In addition to that environmental-friendly manufacturing enterprises are of great significance with regard to production capacity sharing and sustainable development of the ecology environment. To investigate the decision-making behaviors of the participants involved in low-carbon production capacity sharing, an evolutionary game model taking into account the platforms, manufacturing enterprises with idle production capacity, and those with demanding production capacity is constructed. Then, both evolutionary game theory and Lyapunov stability theorem are used to analyze the asymptotic stability of the equilibrium and evolutionary stability strategies of the system. Besides, the economic and managerial significance of the evolutionary stability strategy is given. Finally, the influence of low-carbon production capacity of enterprises on the stability of the dynamic system is discussed, such as the cost effect of low-carbon production capacity, the effect of transaction cost, and so on. Results indicate that they can provide theoretical reference for decision-making with respect to the platforms, manufacturing enterprises, and sustainable development of the dynamic system

Channel Selection and Pricing Decisions Considering Three Charging Modes of Production Capacity Sharing Platform: A Sustainable Operations Perspective

In the context of sharing economy, a manufacturer can source from two alternative channels: sharing and traditional, when facing production capacity constraints and sustainably conscious consumers. The aim of the paper is to analyze channel selection and pricing strategies of the manufacturer for achieving sustainable operations, to investigate the operations of the platform regarding charging modes, access requirements, and commission rates in different stages of development, and to discuss the interaction among all stakeholders for sustainability in the whole system. The game-theoretic approach is adopted. The results provide references for decisions of the manufacturer and surplus production capacity supplier to join in the sharing, as well as corresponding optimal pricing strategies, which guides platforms to keep a balance between profitability and attracting participants by relatively low access requirements and commission rates. Moreover, developing platforms prefer to charge suppliers and set low access requirements while relatively developed platforms tend to charge bilateral sides or manufacturers and set high access requirements. Charging the manufacturer encourages the bilateral participation of the platform most. In addition, as charging mode changes, the trend of changes in consumer surplus and social welfare is the same as that in the market share of products from the sharing channel.</jats:p