Monitoring Subcontracting in a Suppliers' Hierarchy

In this paper we study the delegation of a production process in a three-tier hierarchy. The principal contracts directly only with the supplier that produces the ?rst input leaving him in charge of the contract for the production of the second input. We allow the principal to costlessly monitor the communication between the agents at the subcontracting stage in an attempt to save on informa- tional rents and improve productive e¢ ciency. We show that, if the contractor is free to choose the type of subcontract, he must be given additional incen- tives to acquire information about the subcontractor which will then be object of the monitoring. The monitoring is therefore much less e¤ective then when the principal can force the contractor into choosing her preferred subcontract.Adverse Selection, Hierarchies, Delegation, Monitoring.

EQUILIBRIUM PRINCIPAL-AGENT CONTRACTS Competition and R&D Incentives

We analyze competition between firms engaged in R&D activities in the choice of incentive contracts for managers with hidden productivities. The equilibrium screening contracts require extra effort/investment from the most productive managers compared to the first best contracts: under additional assumptions on the hazard rate of the distribution of types we obtain no- distortion in the middle rather than at the top. Moreover, the equilibrium contracts are characterized by effort differentials between (any) two types that are always increasing with the number of firms, suggesting a positive re- lation between competition and high-powered incentives. An inverted-U curve between competition and absolute investments can emerge for the most pro- ductive managers, especially when entry is endogenous. These results persist when contracts are not observable, when they include quantity precommit- ments, and when products are imperfect substitutes.Principal-agent contracts, asymmetric information, endogenous market structures

Oligopolistic Screening and Two-way Distortion

We analyze the choice of incentive contracts by oligopolistic firms that compete on the product market. Managers have private information and in the first stage they exert cost reducing effort. In equilibrium the standard "no distortion at the top" property disappears and two way distortions are optimal. We extend our analysis to other informational, contractual and competitive settings.Oligopoly, screening, two way distortion, incentives, RD investment

Tensions in the practice of Marian Devotion between Clergy, Laity, and the Vatican: The maintenance of Catholic Social Structure in Gozo, Malta

In Gozo, Malta, tensions exist within the ritual system of Catholic Marian Devotion, observed through a disconnect between how laity practice Marian Devotion rituals and how the Vatican defines the practice of Marian Devotion. The local clergy, as intermediaries between the laity and the Vatican, negotiate between these groups to ensure the system's stability. In Gozo, this negotiation plays out through festa celebrations, devotional art, the dedication of ex-votos, and gendered distinctions. The clergy in Gozo mediate between the laity and the Vatican by tacitly accepting the laity's unsanctioned devotion practices while not actively participating, maintaining the balance of the social system of Catholic Marian Devotion in which they all operate.No embargoAcademic Major: Anthropological Science

Nonperturbatively Improved Hadron Spectroscopy Near the Continuum Limit

We report the results of our quenched lattice simulations of the Wilson action with a nonperturbatively determined clover term at beta=6.2 and compare them with those of the standard Wilson action at the same beta value.Comment: 3 pages, including 3 figures; talk given at LATTICE9