La mente extendida

Where does the mind stop and the rest of the world begin? The question invites two standard replies. some accept the intuitive demarcations of skin and skull, and say that what is outside the body is outsider the mind. Others are impressed by the arguments of Putnam and Burge that the truth-conditions of our thoughts “just ain’t in the head”,[* and hold that this externalism about meaning carries over into an externalism about mind. We propose to pursue a third position. We will advocate an externalism about mind, but one that is in no way grounded in the debatable role of truth-conditions and referente in fixing the contents of our mental states. rather, we advocate an active externalism, based on the active role of the environment in driving cognitive processes..¿Dónde acaba la mente y dónde empieza el resto del mundo?. La pregunta invita a dos respuestas típicas. Algunas personas aceptan las demarcaciones de la piel, y el cráneo, y afirman que lo que se halla fuera del cuerpo está también fuera de la mente. Otros sin embargo se inclinan por el argumento de que los significados de las palabras “simplemente no están en la cabeza” y sostienen este externalismo del significado, extendiéndolo a toda la mente. Nosotros queremos proponer una tercera posición. Abogamos por un tipo diferente de externalismo: un externalismo activo, basado en el papel activo que el entorno tiene en la consecución de los procesos cognitivosOú commence la pensée et oú le reste du monde? la question nous invite à deux réponses communes. Quelques uns acceptent les démarcations intuitives de la peau et le crâne, en affirmant que ce que on voit dehors du corps est aussi dehors de la pensée. Des autres sont frappés par les arguments de hillary Putnam et de Burge sur les conditions de vérité de notres pensées, que ne “sont pas dans la tête”, et soutiennent que cet externalisme du sens implique l’externalisme de la pensée. Nous proposons une troisième position, à faveur du externalisme de la pensée, mais pas fondé sur la discussion des conditions de vérité et de la rëference dans la fixation des états mentaux. Au fait nous proposons un externalisme actif, fondé dans le rôle actif du environnement dans la direction des procès cognitifs

Artificial Brains and Hybrid Minds

The paper develops two related thought experiments exploring variations on an ‘animat’ theme. Animats are hybrid devices with both artificial and biological components. Traditionally, ‘components’ have been construed in concrete terms, as physical parts or constituent material structures. Many fascinating issues arise within this context of hybrid physical organization. However, within the context of functional/computational theories of mentality, demarcations based purely on material structure are unduly narrow. It is abstract functional structure which does the key work in characterizing the respective ‘components’ of thinking systems, while the ‘stuff’ of material implementation is of secondary importance. Thus the paper extends the received animat paradigm, and investigates some intriguing consequences of expanding the conception of bio-machine hybrids to include abstract functional and semantic structure. In particular, the thought experiments consider cases of mind-machine merger where there is no physical Brain-Machine Interface: indeed, the material human body and brain have been removed from the picture altogether. The first experiment illustrates some intrinsic theoretical difficulties in attempting to replicate the human mind in an alternative material medium, while the second reveals some deep conceptual problems in attempting to create a form of truly Artificial General Intelligence

Mary's Powers of Imagination

One common response to the knowledge argument is the ability hypothesis. Proponents of the ability hypothesis accept that Mary learns what seeing red is like when she exits her black-and-white room, but they deny that the kind of knowledge she gains is propositional in nature. Rather, she acquires a cluster of abilities that she previously lacked, in particular, the abilities to recognize, remember, and imagine the color red. For proponents of the ability hypothesis, knowing what an experience is like simply consists in the possession of these abilities. Criticisms of the ability hypothesis tend to focus on this last claim. Such critics tend to accept that Mary gains these abilities when she leaves the room, but they deny that such abilities constitute knowledge of what an experience is like. To my mind, however, this critical strategy grants too much. Focusing specifically on imaginative ability, I argue that Mary does not gain this ability when she leaves the room for she already had the ability to imagine red while she was inside it. Moreover, despite what some have thought, the ability hypothesis cannot be easily rescued by recasting it in terms of a more restrictive imaginative ability. My purpose here is not to take sides in the debate about physicalism, i.e., my criticism of the ability hypothesis is not offered in an attempt to defend the anti-physicalist conclusion of the knowledge argument. Rather, my purpose is to redeem the imagination from the misleading picture of it that discussion of the knowledge argument has fostered

Grounding, Analysis, and Russellian Monism

Few these days dispute that the knowledge argument demonstrates an epistemic gap between the physical facts and the facts about experience. It is much more contentious whether that epistemic gap can be used to demonstrate a metaphysical gap of a kind that is inconsistent with physicalism. In this paper I will explore two attempts to block the inference from an epistemic gap to a metaphysical gap – the first from the phenomenal concept strategy, the second from Russellian monism – and suggest how the proponent of the knowledge argument might respond to each of these challenges. In doing so, I will draw on recent discussions of grounding and essence in the metaphysics literature

Relationship-centered care and diversity, equity, inclusion, and belonging in action

Nursing practice focused on health equity, social justice, and DEIB (diversity, equity, inclusion, and belonging) provides a lens through which nurses can support the advancement and achievement of optimal health for everyone. This article discusses the importance and strategies for incorporating DEIB into nursing education

Busting out: predictive brains, embodied minds, and the puzzle of the evidentiary veil

Biological brains are increasingly cast as ‘prediction machines’: evolved organs whose core operating principle is to learn about the world by trying to predict their own patterns of sensory stimulation. This, some argue, should lead us to embrace a brain‐bound ‘neurocentric’ vision of the mind. The mind, such views suggest, consists entirely in the skull‐bound activity of the predictive brain. In this paper I reject the inference from predictive brains to skull‐bound minds. Predictive brains, I hope to show, can be apt participants in larger cognitive circuits. The path is thus cleared for a new synthesis in which predictive brains act as entry‐points for ‘extended minds’, and embodiment and action contribute constitutively to knowing contact with the world

The Social Licence for Research:Why care.data Ran Into Trouble

In this article we draw on the concept of a social licence to explain public concern at the introduction of care.data, a recent English initiative designed to extract data from primary care medical records for commissioning and other purposes, including research. The concept of a social licence describes how the expectations of society regarding some activities may go beyond compliance with the requirements of formal regulation; those who do not fulfil the conditions for the social licence (even if formally compliant) may experience ongoing challenge and contestation. Previous work suggests that people's cooperation with specific research studies depends on their perceptions that their participation is voluntary and is governed by values of reciprocity, non-exploitation and service of the public good. When these conditions are not seen to obtain, threats to the social licence for research may emerge. We propose that care.data failed to adequately secure a social licence because of: (i) defects in the warrants of trust provided for care.data, (ii) the implied rupture in the traditional role, expectations and duties of general practitioners, and (iii) uncertainty about the status of care.data as a public good. The concept of a social licence may be useful in explaining the specifics of care.data, and also in reinforcing the more general lesson for policy-makers that legal authority does not necessarily command social legitimacy

Exploring the challenge of health research priority setting in partnership: reflections on the methodology used by the James Lind Alliance Pressure Ulcer Priority Setting Partnership

Background: Studies identifying a mismatch between the priorities of academics and clinicians and those of people with direct experience of a health condition pose a challenge to the assumption that professional researchers can represent the interests of patients and the public in setting priorities for health research. The James Lind Alliance (JLA) brings patients, carers and clinicians together in Priority Setting Partnerships (PSPs) to identify and prioritise shared uncertainties about the effects of treatment. There is no formal evaluation yet to examine the different approaches used by individual PSPs and the impact these methods have on the quality of the partnership and subsequent outputs. There is no gold standard method for health research topic identification and priority setting and reporting on public involvement in this area is predominantly descriptive rather than evaluative. Methods and Findings: The JLA Pressure Ulcer PSP (JLAPUP) was developed and worked between 2009 and 2013 to identify and prioritise the top 10 ‘uncertainties’, or ‘unanswered questions’, about the effects of pressure ulcer interventions. JLAPUP identified a mismatch between the nature and quality of RCTs in pressure ulcer prevention and treatment and the kind of research evidence desired by patients or service users, carers and health professionals. Results and methods have been reported fully elsewhere. The consultative and deliberative methods used to establish health research priorities in PSPs are fundamentally interpretive. PSPs are therefore an arena in which ‘hard’ evidence-informed ideals meet ‘soft’ participatory practices. This article provides an account of the challenges faced in one particular PSP. We explain the rationale for the approaches taken, difficulties faced and the limitations at each stage, because these aspects are particularly under-reported. The JLAPUP case is used to identify possible areas for evaluation and reporting across PSPs. Conclusion: Engaging people with very different health and life experiences in the complexities of health science based discussions of uncertainty is challenging. This is particularly the case when engaging groups routinely excluded from participating in health research, for example, older people with multiple comorbidities. The JLA principles of transparency, inclusivity and avoiding waste in research require paying close critical attention to PSP methodology, including full evaluation and reporting of PSP processes and outcomes. Assessing the impact of PSPs is contingent on the decision making processes of commissioners and funders