On Estimating the Effects of Increased Aid to Education

[Excerpt] The 1983 report, A Nation at Risk, of the National Commission on Excellence in Education decried the state of public education in the United States and suggested a number of reforms. Among their recommendations was increased federal aid for education. The view was that this would lead to desirable outcomes such as reduced class sizes and higher teacher salaries, with the latter aiding in the recruitment and retention of high-quality teachers. Somewhat surprisingly, previous research on the economics of education provides us with very few insights about what the effects of such proposals might be. For example, while there is an extensive literature on the determinants of cross-section variations in teachers\u27 salaries and teacher/student ratios, virtually nothing has been written on how changes in aid levels influence changes in salaries, teacher/student ratios, other expenditure levels, and local tax rates. Similarly, while there are many studies of how grants-in-aid affect overall expenditure levels and some studies of the determinants of cross-section variations in the share of expenditures spent on various categories (e.g., instructional and administrative), virtually nothing has been written on how changes in aid affect the various expenditure shares. To provide answers to some of these questions, our paper examines data from a panel of approximately 700 school districts in New York State over a five-year period (1978-79 to 1982-83) and tries to infer how school districts will respond to future changes in aid from how they responded to changes in state aid during the period. We focus on how past aid changes have influenced teacher salaries, tax rates, teacher/student ratios, and other staff/student ratios. The analyses exploit the fact that although school aid formulas change frequently in New York State, each district is usually guaranteed at least the same aid level as the previous year ( save harmless provisions). As a result, over any given two-year period, the percentage increase in aid varies widely across districts. This provides a convenient form of natural experiment

Are School Superintendents Rewarded for “Performance”?

[Excerpt] This chapter presents analyses of the compensation and mobility of school superintendents in New York State during the 1978-79 to 1982-83 period. The focus is on school superintendents because they are the chief operating officers of school districts, their salaries are determined through individual negotiations with school boards, and their salary data were made available to us. In contrast, school principals\u27 salary data were not available to us. Especially in large districts, principals tend to be members of a union and their salary increases negotiated collectively, which limits the likelihood of observing individual principals\u27 salaries being related to measures of their school\u27s performance

Merit Pay for School Superintendents?

Given the important role that school district administrators play in the educational process, one might expect their "performance" to be of fundamental importance in determining both how much students learn and the cost of public education to taxpayers. Yet, while public debate has considered the issue of merit pay plans for teachers, virtually no attention has been directed to the methods by which school administrators are compensated. This paper provides evidence on whether school superintendents are explicitly or implicitly rewarded for their "performance" by higher compensation and/or greater opportunities for mobility. We analyze panel data from over 700 school 'districts in New Ycrk State during the 1978-79 to 1982-83 period. Measures of performance are defined and then entered into salary level, salary change, and mobility equations. While evidence is provided that school superintendents are rewarded for "performance", the magnitude of the rewards appear to be quite small.

Facilitating Conflict Resolution in Union-Management Relations: A Guide for Neutrals

Over fifty years ago George Taylor, one of the most highly respected labor-management neutrals of his time, called for third parties to take on what he termed a mantle of responsibility for labor-management relations. Today, wide ranges of practitioners are assuming this responsibility. They are playing a variety of internal and external roles, as labor arbitrators, mediators, consultants, facilitators, dispute system designers, leaders serving on joint committees, and countless others. These individuals strive to rise above the partisan pressures that are found in any union-management relationship by helping to resolve disputes, foster problem solving, and build new institutional relations. In doing so, they are helping the institution of collective bargaining adapt in ways necessary for it to continue to be a key societal element into the next century. As dispute resolution professionals, we need to understand the range of practices now found in different relationships, the types of roles neutrals might play, and the principles that should guide neutrals as they carry out these roles. The purpose of this report, therefore, is to outline principles for SPIDR members, other neutrals, and the parties who utilize the services of third party neutrals in contemporary labor-management relations. Specifically, we have three target audiences in mind: labor relations neutrals, steeped in the institutional nuances of industrial relations (primarily arbitrators and mediators), who are being challenged to help parties adapt to new circumstances; third-party neutrals experienced in settings outside of labor relations who are or will be working with parties in unionized settings; internal facilitator sand change agents (from labor or management) who are helping to solve problems and resolve disputes in the workplace. Some points in this report may be completely obvious to one part of the target audience but an essential caution to another. Some of the recommendations will be controversial since they reflect an activist view of third-party roles. Importantly, this is not an overall guide to best practice for labor-management relations; instead, it is a guide to the role of dispute resolution professionals in the labor-management context. We hope that it stimulates further constructive dialogue in the profession

Real-world incidence, severity, and management of bevacizumab-induced hypertension in patients with colorectal cancer

Introduction: Bevacizumab is a vascular endothelial growth factor (VEGF) inhibitor that is commonly used as a first line treatment in metastatic colorectal cancer. VEGF inhibition halts angiogenesis and tumor proliferation, but is also associated with adverse cardiovascular effects such as hypertension. The true incidence and severity of bevacizumab-induced hypertension is not well quantified outside of clinical trials. Additionally, literature is lacking on the most appropriate agent to treat patients experiencing bevacizumab-induced hypertension. Methods: This single-center, retrospective chart review evaluated patients treated with bevacizumab for metastatic colorectal cancer between April 4, 2014 and May 31, 2020. The study assessed the incidence and severity of bevacizumab-induced hypertension in patients with colorectal cancer and identified prescribing patterns of antihypertensive agents in this patient population. Blood pressure data and medication history was collected at 4 week time intervals (+/- 2 weeks) for up to 24 weeks post-initiation of bevacizumab. Results: Of the 77 patients identified, 33 (42.9%) had a diagnosis of hypertension at baseline. At week 4, 30 (39.0%) patients presented with CTCAE grade ≥ 1 (any grade) hypertension and 3 (3.9%) presented with CTCAE grade ≥ 3 (grade 3/4) hypertension. The most common antihypertensive prescribed to treat bevacizumab-induced hypertension was the calcium channel blocker, amlodipine, with 12 (15.6%) patients initiated on this medication. Conclusion: Treatment with bevacizumab is associated with high frequencies of any grade and grade 3/4 HTN in metastatic colorectal cancer. Overall, few antihypertensives were initiated or adjusted during the 24-week follow-up, suggesting a potential undertreatment of VEGF inhibitor-induced HTN. Our results inform future, prospective studies to continue to deduce the optimal antihypertensive regimen and the true incidence and severity of bevacizumab-induced hypertension in the real world setting.Doctor of Pharmac

Union and Firm Preferences for Bargaining Outcomes in the Private Sector

Afin de donner un certain aperçu de l'importance que syndicats et entreprises accordent aux différents enjeux en négociation, l'auteur examine un ensemble de données uniques, tirées d'une enquête portant sur les objectifs poursuivis dans la négociation par les parties dans le secteur privé au Canada. Suit une analyse empirique exploratoire d'un ensemble d'équations caractérisant le classement que font les parties de plusieurs enjeux de négociation. Essentiellement, l'auteur a adopté une méthode de recherche inductive en présumant que les particularités propres aux syndicats et aux employeurs, de même que le milieu ambiant susceptible de les influencer, sont sensés déterminer l'importance qu'ils associent à diverses modalités de règlement. Des questionnaires distincts ont été utilisés pour obtenir des présidents des syndicats locaux et des directeurs des relations du travail des entreprises leur évaluation de l'importance de chacune des douze catégories de clauses suivantes: sécurité syndicale; sécurité d'emploi; procédure de règlement des griefs et d'arbitrage; heures et semaine de travail; heures supplémentaires et primes; salaires et garantie du traitement; vacances et congés payés; allocations et indemnités; changements technologiques; prestations de maladie, de sécurité et d'invalidité; relations patronales syndicales; avantages sociaux. On a demandé aux répondants tant patronaux que syndicaux d'évaluer l'importance d'obtenir des résultats dans chacune de ces douze catégories s'ils avaient respectivement à négocier dans sa totalité une nouvelle convention collective à ce moment-là avec leur employeur ou leur syndicat. L'échantillon total de l'enquête comprenait 304 syndicats et 280 bureaux du personnel. Le taux des réponses a atteint 51 pour cent pour les entreprises et 26 pour cent pour les syndicats.Dans l'ensemble, les résultats de cette recherche fournissent une estimation valable des sujets de négociation susceptibles d'être d'une importance permanente pour les employeurs et pour les syndicats. D'une façon plus spécifique, les entreprises ont placé en tête de liste les salaires et la garantie du traitement, la sécurité d'emploi, les relations patronales-syndicales, les heures et la semaine de travail, alors que les syndicats ont opté pour la sécurité d'emploi, la sécurité syndicale, les salaires et la garantie du traitement. Les entreprises ont rangé la sécurité syndicale en queue de liste et les syndicats ont accordé la plus faible priorité aux relations patronales-syndicales.Le plus grand écart dans l'ordre de rangement pour les parties se constate dans les catégories se rapportant aux relations patronales-syndicales et à la sécurité syndicale.Toutes choses égales, on pourrait alors s'attendre à ce que les employeurs et les syndicats puissent s'entendre sur ces deux points plus facilement que sur les sujets auxquels ils tiennent tous les deux davantage, principalement les salaires et la garantie du traitement ainsi que la sécurité d'emploi.En second lieu, dans une analyse exploratoire du rapport entre les indices des priorités de négociation des parties et les facteurs susceptibles de donner lieu à la formulation de leurs préférences sous-jacentes en vue d'un règlement final, les indices de collocation des employeurs et des syndicats pour chacune des douze catégories d'enjeux de négociation de l'enquête ont été établis et analysés en fonction d'un vecteur de variables pour les entreprises, les syndicats et le milieu ambiant, ce dernier utilisé comme moyen de contrôle, de façon à prévoir le classement en tenant compte de chacune des parties. Les variables indépendantes avaient été tirées de 2148 conventions collectives négociées dans le secteur privé au Canada au cours de la période 1975-1984 ainsi que de diverses publications du gouvernement canadien. L'étude empirique consistait à évaluer 24 équations de forme abrégée correspondant aux douze enjeux précités, respectivement pour les syndicats et les entreprises. L'analyse exploratoire de l'établissement du classement des accords considérés individuellement révèle que, généralement, différentes variables concouraient à fixer le rang accordé par les parties: les caractéristiques propres aux syndicats, y inclus le sexe de ses membres, l'affiliation syndicale, l'importance de l'unité de négociation; les caractéristiques propres aux entreprises, tels que le type d'industrie et l'ampleur de l'unité de négociation, avaient des impacts significatifs mais différents sur le classement des divers enjeux. Alors que les résultats de la recherche confirment que les priorités varient selon les enjeux en négociation et qu'il semble y avoir une relation entre plusieurs des caractéristiques des parties et leur classement de ceux-ci, de nouvelles études seraient nécessaires pour savoir si les préférences des parties exercent une influence sur l'issuefinale du processus de négociation et sur la façon dont les fins de négociations recherchées se rattachent au pouvoir de négociation afin d'en arriver à une entente définitive.The relative importance that firms and unions place on bargaining issues in the long run is investigated for the Canadian private sector. Survey results suggest that rankings are similarfor some outcomes, but diverge markedly for others. Variations in union rankings are more sensitive to economic conditions than are firm rankings, and union characteristics such as bargaining unit size and percentage of female membership determine union rankings over alternative outcomes, whereas a firm's industrial classification is an important determinant of management priorities

Determinants of the Compensation and Mobility of School Superintendents

Analyzing 197-83 panel data from more than 700 New York State school districts, the authors find evidence that school superintendents were rewarded, both by higher salary increases and by enhanced opportunities to move to belter-paying jobs, for having low school tax rates and high educational achievement within their districts, relative to the values of those variables in comparable school districts in the state. The rewards were, however, quite small. The analysis also suggests that the superintendents themselves did not significantly influence either school tax rates or educational test scores in their districts