58 research outputs found

    Exposure to Phthalates and Phenols during Pregnancy and Offspring Size at Birth

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    Background: Data concerning the effects of prenatal exposures to phthalates and phenols on fetal growth are limited in humans. Previous findings suggest possible effects of some phenols on male birth weight

    Review of <i>The Diplomacy of Biological Disarmament</i>

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    6 Why Do Conclusions from the Experts Vary?

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    The Aftermath of Aum Shinrikyo: A New Paradigm for Terror?

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    Chapter 15. The Politics Of Biological Disarmament

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    The Biological Weapons Convention: The Third Review Conference

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    The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) of 1972 bans the development and possession of biological and toxin weapons. Yet the threat that a country may acquire and use biological and toxin weapons (BTW) persists—not all nations are party to the treaty, and doubts remain about the compliance of countries who are. Seventy of the 118 nations who are parties to the treaty met in Geneva from September 9 to 27, 1991, to review the performance of the treaty and to grapple with its weaknesses. This was the third such conference convened since the treaty went into force in 1975. The relatively low level of participation in the Third Review Conference was not the result of any protest, but most likely a reflection of disinterest or neglect.</jats:p

    Verifying the Unverifiable: Lessons from the Biological Weapons Convention

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    The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) is widely regarded as a treaty whose provisions are difficult to verify because of the paucity of measures to verify compliance within the treaty framework and the nature of the weapons themselves. Advances in biotechnology and their effect on the perceived military utility of biological weapons have focused international attention on this issue. This article examines the concepts of “adequate” and “effective” verification and argues that the treaty falls under the definition of adequate verification in the United States. For other countries, however, the lack of verification measures is of greater concern. The article describes measures that should be added to the BWC to detect violations and promote compliance with the treaty. These include improved methods of resolving allegations of noncompliance, increased reporting requirements for activities permitted under the treaty, greater openness in biological research, and inspections of laboratories and other facilities.</jats:p

    8 Chemical and Biological Weapons

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