The conduct of monetary policy in Uganda: an assessment

Money supply, Liquidity, Cash flows, Demand and Price Analysis, Financial Economics, Institutional and Behavioral Economics, International Relations/Trade, Public Economics,

The Interwar Trade Collapse Revisited

Was the collapse of world trade between 1928 and 1937 caused by higher transport costs, increased protectionism or the collapse of the gold standard? Using recent advances in the estimation of gravity equations, I examine the partial and general equilibrium effects of bilateral distance, international borders, and the payment system on trade. My results suggest that had average tariff and non-tariff trade barriers remained at their 1928 level, total international trade would have been 64.6% higher in 1937. Had the gold standard not collapsed in 1931 and had the British Empire not departed to establish its own currency and trade blocs, international trade would have been 3% larger. Finally, had transport costs remained at their 1928 level, global trade would not have been significantly different nine years on. These results are supported by over 6,000 new hand-collected observations of ad-valorem ocean freight rates for cotton, which show an average increase of only 1.2 percentage points between 1928 and 1936. When expressed as an index, the movement of freight rates mirrors the evolution of the elasticity of trade to distance over the period

The Transactions Demand for Money in Chile

This paper examines the transactions demand for money in Chile over the period from 1986 to 2000. Using systems cointegration methods suggested by Johansen (1995), we find that although macroeconomic data for Chile exhibit strong trend-stationarity during this period it is possible to recover relatively robust single-equation specifications for the transactions demand for money. Error-correction models in which money demand is conditioned on real wealth, the level of economic activity, and the nominal Central Bank policy rate provide robust basis for inference. Controlling for a shift in velocity in the end of 1998 the models exhibit a high-degree of out-of-sample predictive power over the period from 1998 to mid 2000.

Modelling multilateral trade resistance in a gravity model with exchange rate regimes

In estimating a gravity model it is essential to analyse not just bilateral trade resistance, the barriers to trade between a pair of countries, but also multilateral trade resistance (MTR), the barriers to trade that each country faces with all its trading partners. Without correctly modelling MTR, it is impossible either to obtain accurate estimates of the effects on trade of exchange rate regimes and other variables or to perform accurate counterfactual simulations of trade patterns under other assumptions about exchange rate regimes or other variables. In this paper we implement a number of different ways of modelling MTR – both for a standard gravity model and for an extended model which includes a full range of bilateral exchange rate regimes – notably several variants of the technique developed by Baier and Bergstrand (2006), which turn out to produce broadly similar results. We then illustrate our preferred approach by carrying out simulations of the effects of the creation of an East African currency union and the effects of a withdrawal from EMU by Italy.gravity, geography, trade, exchange rate regime, currency union, transactions costs, multilateral trade resistance.

international crisis, doctrinal conflict and american exceptionalism in the federal reserve 1913-1932

This paper seeks to explain the collapse of the market for bankers’ acceptances between 1931 and 1932 by tracing the doctrinal foundations of Federal Reserve policy and regulations back to the Federal Reserve Act of 1913. I argue that a determinant of the collapse of the market was Carter Glass’ and Henry P. Willis’ insistence on one specific interpretation of the “real bills doctrine”, the idea that the financial system should be organized around commercial bills. The Glass- Willis doctrine, which stressed non-intervention and the self-liquidating nature of real bills, created doubts about the eligibility of frozen acceptances for purchase and rediscount at the Reserve Banks and caused accepting banks to curtail their supply to the market. The Glass-Willis doctrine is embedded in a broader historical narrative that links Woodrow Wilson’s approach to foreign policy with the collapse of the international order in 1931

Aid versus trade revisited

This paper examines the (non) equivalance between aid flows and trade preferences as alternative forms of donor assistance in the presence of learning-by-doing externalities in recipient country export production. Using a two-period model based on vanWijnbergen (1985), in which the productivity externality consistitues the only (inter-temporal) distortion, we show that switching donor support on the margin from aid to trade preferences can increase recipient country welfare. To evaluate the size of this potential welfare gain to small African economies we simulate donor policy reforms using a dynamic CGE model where the productivity externality may also interact with private capital accumulation. We show that for reasonable values of key behavioural parameters, the potential growth and welfare gains from a (donor) revenue neutral re-orientation of assistance to developing countries could be substantial. The paper concludes by considering why these potential dynamic gains appear to be unexpoited by both donors and recipients.Foreign Aid, Trade Preferences, Africa.

Aid and Fiscal Instability

We show that a combination of temporariness and spending pressure is intrinsic to the aid relationship. In our analysis, recipients rationally discount the pronouncements of donors about the duration of their commitments because in equilibrium they know that some donors will honor those commitments while others will not. Donor types pool in equilibrium; in sharp contrast to conventional signaling situations, there is no separating equilibrium in pure strategies. Moreover, pooling necessarily creates what we call ex ante fiscal instability: expenditure smoothing is perfect ex post if the donor proves permanent, but if the donor is temporary the recipient faces an aid collapse and a fiscal adjustment problem. The Samaritan’s dilemma is at work here, in the guise of a use-it-or-lose-it restriction on spending out of aid. This restriction can produce ex ante fiscal instability even when information is symmetric.Aid, Fiscal instability, Use it or lose it, Samaritan’s dilemma, Pooling

Monetary Policy Rules For Manging Aid Surges In Africa

We examine the properties of alternative monetary policy rules in response to large aid surges in low-income countries characterized by incomplete capital market integration and currency substitution. Using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model, we show that simple monetary rules that stabilize the path of expected future seigniorage for a given aid flow have attractive properties relative to a range of conventional alternatives including those involving heavy reliance on bond sterilization or a commitment to a pure exchange rate float. These simple rules, which are shown to be robust across a range of fiscal responses to aid inflows, appear to be consistent with actual responses to recent aid surges in a range of post-stabilization countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.Basle Committee, capital adequacy, financial governance, financial architecture, financial reform, international standards, capital flows, poor countries, cost of capital, international development

Aid volatility, monetary policy rules and the capital account in African economies

We examine the properties of simple quantity-based monetary policy rules of the kind widely used in low-income African economies. Using a DSGE model and focusing our attention on responses to positive aid shocks, we suggest that policy rules involving substantial reserve accumulation in the face of aid surges serve to ease macroeconomic adjustment to shocks, particularly when a portion of aid is used to support fiscal adjustment. These rules are robust to assumptions about the degree of integration of the domestic public debt market with world capital markets. Although an open capital account facilitates smoother adjustment to temporary aid surges when an aid inflow is fully spent, it exacerbates the adjustment problem when aid is accompanied by fiscal adjustment and hence reinforces the case for a managed float in such circumstances.Monetary policy, Africa, Aid volatility, foreign capital flows, stochastic simulation models