305 research outputs found

    Troublesome guests Turkey’s plans regarding the Syrian refugee issue. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 310 | 09.10.2019

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    The presence of Syrian refugees is putting increasing strain on Turkey. Since the migration agreement was signed with the EU in March 2016, the number of refugees in Turkey has risen from more than 2.7 million to more than 3.6 million. The growing anti-Syrian sentiment among the public poses a threat to the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP). Faced with the prospect of a new wave of refugees from the Syrian province of Idlib, Ankara is determined and prepared to take radical measures to reduce the danger the migration issue presents for the government. The most important measure taken is the preparations being made to set up a buffer zone in northern Syria. This would serve as a location for returning at least a portion of the Syrians from Turkey, as well as a destination for potential new refugees from Idlib. This will be a difficult undertaking, even in view of the White House’s announcement of withdrawal of US troops from northern Syria. This makes it even more important for Ankara to seek political and financial support in the EU for its actions. If the West does not get on board for the buffer zone project or accept requests to revisit current cooperation with regard to migration, Turkey might resort to lapses in control of illegal people’s movement, or even stimulate it, which could open a new chapter in the migration crisis in Europe

    From purges to a ‘new Turkey’ – the final stage of the state’s reconstruction. OSW Commentary NUMBER 228 | 07.12.2016

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    The purges in the state apparatus which have been underway in Turkey since the failed military coup represent a decisive stage in the construction of a ‘new Turkey’, involving both the final elimination of the remaining elements of the old Kemalist establishment and the crackdown on the group centred around Fethullah Gülen, a preacher and former government ally accused of plotting the coup. The authorities view him as the greatest threat. In a broader context, the aim of the purges is to ultimately replace the present elites with new ones. This may lead to the elimination of any conceivable opposition capable of threatening the rule of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan

    Cadres decide everything – Turkey’s reform of its military. OSW Commentary NUMBER 274 | 26.06.2018

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    Over the last two years, the Turkish Armed Forces (Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerı – TSK) have been subject to transformations with no precedent in the history of Turkey as a republic. The process of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) subordinating the army to civilian government has accelerated following the failed coup that took place on 15 July 2016. The government has managed to take away the autonomy of the armed forces which, while retaining their enormous significance within the state apparatus, ceased to be the main element consolidating the old Kemalist elites. However, the unprecedented scale of the purges and the introduction of formal civilian control of the military are merely a prelude to a much more profound change intended to create a brand new military, one that would serve the authorities and be composed of a new type of personnel – individuals from outside the army’s traditional power base. This reflects the reshuffle of the elites that happened during AKP’s rule. However, due to the fact that the TSK are a highly complex structure and the political situation both in Turkey itself and in its neighbourhood is tense, the military needs to retain its significance within the state system. Military actions are being carried out in northern Syria and in the south-eastern part of Turkey. In a situation of profound distrust between the political leadership and the military, the government is trying to impact the internal divisions within the TSK by favouring anti-Western, pro-Russian and nationalist groups. At the same time, it is consolidating the interior ministry’s structures, which could potentially defend it against another possible coup. It is also forming voluntary structures subordinated to it. This means that the process of the armed forces’ reconstruction and redefinition of their role in the system, alongside the ultimate creation of a new army, are markedly elevating the potential for internal conflicts and translating into a weakening of Turkey’s institutional ties with the West by gradually weakening its involvement in NATO. The planned purchase of S-400 systems from Russia, which the government intends to use to defend itself against its own army, is another manifestation of this trend

    The coup as a founding myth. The ideological pillars of the New Turkey. OSW Point of View Number 66 October 2017

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    The Justice and Development Party (AKP), which has governed Turkey since 2002, has been engaged in reconstructing the Republic of Turkey in a revolutionary manner. This process is highly dynamic; in 2002–2016 the state was being reconstructed in an inconsistent manner. Furthermore, a broad spectrum of ideas has been employed on the ideological level, and the government’s actions have met with resistance from various circles. However, the unsuccessful coup attempt of 15 July 2016 marked a turning point in Turkey’s modern history. The changes that began at that time are irreversible, and the process of the construction of a New Turkey gained fresh momentum

    A breakthrough year in relations between Turkey and the European Union – an attempt to take stock. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 224 | 18.10.2016

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    September 2016 marks the passing of one year has passed since the outbreak of the EU migration crisis which became the basis of unprecedented co-operation between Turkey and the EU. Paradoxically, although this co-operation in containing the crisis has proven surprisingly effective, the climate of Turkish-EU relations has significantly deteriorated. This situation comes in part as a result of internal tensions in Turkey (and within the EU). However, genuine changes in the power relations between Turkey and the EU have occurred and Turkey feels that issues it attaches importance to are not being appropriately addressed by the EU—the frustration this causes has been even more instrumental in the deterioration of relations. This shift in relations between Turkey and the EU also stems from Turkey’s aspirations to emancipate itself in its relations with the West; there has been an upward trend in this regard for years. The instruments the EU has so far been employing in order to put Turkey under pressure (above all the EU integration process) are losing their effectiveness, which is in stark contrast with Turkey’s emancipation and assertiveness. However, irrespective of the present and future inevitable tensions in Turkish-EU relations, Turkey’s aim is not to break off with the EU but to develop a new model of strategic relations which better serves its own interests. Despite the recent rapprochement with Russia, Ankara seems to be aware of a lack of alternatives to strategic co-operation with the EU and, more broadly, with the West

    A constitution for Erdoğan. Consequences of the political conflict in Turkey. OSW COMMENTARY No. 213, 2016-06-01

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    Since mid-2015 Turkey has been affected by a deep internal crisis, caused by rising political polarisation, increased levels of terrorist threat (posed by the Kurds and Islamic radicals) and the revived conflict with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). As a consequence of this crisis, over 350,000 residents of south-eastern Turkey have been forced to leave their homes. At the same time, due to the migration crisis and despite mutual distrust in relations between Turkey and the EU, cooperation between Ankara and Brussels has been intensifying. Turkey’s ongoing destabilisation does not challenge the status of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), which is de facto controlled by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan; paradoxically, it strengthens the party. The internal crisis which the authorities have been deliberately fuelling is an element of a plan to rubber-stamp political change by introducing a presidential system of government. This is happening amid a thorough reconstruction of the socio-political order which has been underway for over a decade. In the upcoming months it is expected to result in the constitution being changed and, as a consequence, the institutionalisation of Erdoğan’s autocratic rule

    Stability of the Popoviciu type functional equations on groups

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    We consider the stability problem for a class of functional equations related to the Popoviciu equation

    My enemy’s enemy–Turkey’s stance on Islamic State. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 198/24.02.2016

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    In the context of the civil war in Syria, Turkey has been accused of intense co-operation with Islamic State. The accusations have been coming for some time from the West, and also from the Turkish opposition and the Kurds. The Russian government has also joined in the accusations over the past few months

    Periodic solutions in multivariate invariance arguments

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    Inspired by the recent results of A. E. Abbas we determine continuous multivariate utility functions invariant with respect to a wide family of transformations related to the shift transformations

    Homomorphisms from functional equations: the Goldie equation

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    The theory of regular variation, in its Karamata and Bojani´c-Karamata/de Haan forms, is long established and makes essential use of the Cauchy functional equation. Both forms are subsumed within the recent theory of Beurling regular variation, developed elsewhere. Various generalizations of the Cauchy equation, including the Gołab–Schinzel functional equation (GS) and Goldie's equation (GBE) below, are prominent there. Here we unify their treatment by algebraicization: extensive use of group structures introduced by Popa and Javor in the 1960s turn all the various (known) solutions into homomorphisms, in fact identifying them 'en passant', and show that (GS) is present everywhere, even if in a thick disguise
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