Price of Anarchy in Bernoulli Congestion Games with Affine Costs

We consider an atomic congestion game in which each player participates in the game with an exogenous and known probability $p_{i}\in[0,1]$, independently of everybody else, or stays out and incurs no cost. We first prove that the resulting game is potential. Then, we compute the parameterized price of anarchy to characterize the impact of demand uncertainty on the efficiency of selfish behavior. It turns out that the price of anarchy as a function of the maximum participation probability $p=\max_{i} p_{i}$ is a nondecreasing function. The worst case is attained when players have the same participation probabilities $p_{i}\equiv p$. For the case of affine costs, we provide an analytic expression for the parameterized price of anarchy as a function of $p$. This function is continuous on $(0,1]$, is equal to $4/3$ for $0<p\leq 1/4$, and increases towards $5/2$ when $p\to 1$. Our work can be interpreted as providing a continuous transition between the price of anarchy of nonatomic and atomic games, which are the extremes of the price of anarchy function we characterize. We show that these bounds are tight and are attained on routing games -- as opposed to general congestion games -- with purely linear costs (i.e., with no constant terms).Comment: 29 pages, 6 figure

Markovian traffic equilibrium

International audienceWe analyse an equilibrium model for traffic networks based on stochastic dynamic programming. In this model passengers move towards their destinatios by a sequential process of arc selection based on a discrete choice model at every intermediaete node in their trip. Route selection is the outcome of this sequential process while network flows correspond to the invariant measures of the underlying Markov chains. The approach may handle different discrete choice models at every node, including the possibility of mixing deterministic and stochastic distribution rules. It can also be used over a multimodal network in order to model the simultaneous selection of mode and route, as well as to treat the case of elastic demands. We establish the existence of a unique equilibrium. We report some numerical experiences comparing different methods

Continuous-time integral dynamics for Aggregative Game equilibrium seeking

In this paper, we consider continuous-time semi-decentralized dynamics for the equilibrium computation in a class of aggregative games. Specifically, we propose a scheme where decentralized projected-gradient dynamics are driven by an integral control law. To prove global exponential convergence of the proposed dynamics to an aggregative equilibrium, we adopt a quadratic Lyapunov function argument. We derive a sufficient condition for global convergence that we position within the recent literature on aggregative games, and in particular we show that it improves on established results

A sharp uniform bound for the distribution of sums of Bernoulli trials

In this note we establish a uniform bound for the distribution of a sum $S_n=X_1+\cdots+X_n$ of independent non-homogeneous Bernoulli trials. Specifically, we prove that $\sigma_n \mathbb{P}(S_n\!=\!j)\leq\eta$ where $\sigma_n$ denotes the standard deviation of $S_n$ and $\eta$ is a universal constant. We compute the best possible constant $\eta\sim 0.4688$ and we show that the bound also holds for limits of sums and differences of Bernoullis, including the Poisson laws which constitute the worst case and attain the bound. We also investigate the optimal bounds for $n$ and $j$ fixed. An application to estimate the rate of convergence of Mann's fixed point iterations is presented.Comment: This paper is a revised version of a previous articl