Integrating evidence, politics and society: a methodology for the science–policy interface

There is currently intense debate over expertise, evidence and ‘post-truth’ politics, and how this is influencing policy formulation and implementation. In this article, we put forward a methodology for evidence-based policy making intended as a way of helping navigate this web of complexity. Starting from the premise of why it is so crucial that policies to meet major global challenges use scientific evidence, we discuss the socio-political difficulties and complexities that hinder this process. We discuss the necessity of embracing a broader view of what constitutes evidence—science and the evaluation of scientific evidence cannot be divorced from the political, cultural and social debate that inevitably and justifiably surrounds these major issues. As a pre-requisite for effective policy making, we propose a methodology that fully integrates scientific investigation with political debate and social discourse. We describe a rigorous process of mapping, analysis, visualisation and sharing of evidence, constructed from integrating science and social science data. This would then be followed by transparent evidence evaluation, combining independent assessment to test the validity and completeness of the evidence with deliberation to discover how the evidence is perceived, misunderstood or ignored. We outline the opportunities and the problems derived from the use of digital communications, including social media, in this methodology, and emphasise the power of creative and innovative evidence visualisation and sharing in shaping policy

Senses of Sen: Reflections on Amartya Sen’s Ideas of Justice

This review essay explores how Amartya Sen’s recent book, The Idea of Justice, is relevant and important for the development and assessment of transnational theories and applications to transnational justice and legal education programs. The essay captures a trans-jural dialogue of multinational scholars and teachers, discussing Sen’s contributions to moral justice theory (criticizing programs for “transcendental institutionalism” (like Rawlsian theory) and instead focusing on “comparative broadening” including empirical, relative, and comparative assessments of programs to ameliorate injustice in the world in its comparative concreteness (as in Indian social justice theory and Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments and related work). The authors are professors in the transnational legal education program, the Center for Transnational Legal Studies, sponsored by over 25 different law schools, located in London. They teach courses in a wide variety of subjects, including comparative legal theory, constitutional law, business and legal ethics, moral and legal philosophy, international and comparative law, capital markets and business law, emergency powers, international dispute resolution and a variety of other common and civil law subjects

Reasons, Coherence, and Group Rationality

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView

The Complexity of Computing Minimal Unidirectional Covering Sets

Given a binary dominance relation on a set of alternatives, a common thread in the social sciences is to identify subsets of alternatives that satisfy certain notions of stability. Examples can be found in areas as diverse as voting theory, game theory, and argumentation theory. Brandt and Fischer [BF08] proved that it is NP-hard to decide whether an alternative is contained in some inclusion-minimal upward or downward covering set. For both problems, we raise this lower bound to the Theta_{2}^{p} level of the polynomial hierarchy and provide a Sigma_{2}^{p} upper bound. Relatedly, we show that a variety of other natural problems regarding minimal or minimum-size covering sets are hard or complete for either of NP, coNP, and Theta_{2}^{p}. An important consequence of our results is that neither minimal upward nor minimal downward covering sets (even when guaranteed to exist) can be computed in polynomial time unless P=NP. This sharply contrasts with Brandt and Fischer's result that minimal bidirectional covering sets (i.e., sets that are both minimal upward and minimal downward covering sets) are polynomial-time computable.Comment: 27 pages, 7 figure

Republicanism and Markets

The republican tradition has long been ambivalent about markets and commercial society more generally: from the contrasting positions of Rousseau and Smith in the eighteenth century to recent neorepublican debates about capitalism, republicans have staked out diverse positions on fundamental issues of political economy. Rather than offering a systematic historical survey of these discussions, this chapter will instead focus on the leading neo-republican theory—that of Philip Pettit—and consider its implications for market society. As I will argue, Pettit’s theory is even friendlier to markets than most have believed: far from condemning commercial society, his theory recognizes that competitive markets and their institutional preconditions are an alternative means to limit arbitrary power across the domestic, economic, and even political spheres. While most republican theorists have focused on political means to limit such power—including both constitutional means (e.g., separation of powers, judicial review, the rule of law, federalism) and participatory ones (democratic elections and oversight)—I will examine here an economic model of republicanism that can complement, substitute for, and at times displace the standard political model. Whether we look at spousal markets, labor markets, or residential markets within federal systems, state policies that heighten competition among their participants and resource exit from abusive relationships within them can advance freedom as non-domination as effectively or even more effectively than social-democratic approaches that have recently gained enthusiasts among republicans. These conclusions suggest that democracy, be it social or political, is just one means among others for restraining arbitrary power and is consequently less central to (certain versions of) republicanism than we may have expected. So long as they counteract domination, economic inroads into notionally democratic territory are no more worrisome than constitutional ones

Epistemic aspects of representative government

The Federalist, justifying the Electoral College to elect the president, claimed that a small group of more informed individuals would make a better decision than the general mass. But the Condorcet Jury Theorem tells us that the more independent, better-than-random voters there are, the more likely it will be that the majority among them will be correct. The question thus arises as to how much better, on average, members of the smaller group would have to be to compensate for the epistemic costs of making decisions on the basis of that many fewer votes. This question is explored in the contexts of referendum democracy, delegate-style representative democracy, and trustee-style representative democracy

Statistical mechanics of voting

Decision procedures aggregating the preferences of multiple agents can produce cycles and hence outcomes which have been described heuristically as `chaotic'. We make this description precise by constructing an explicit dynamical system from the agents' preferences and a voting rule. The dynamics form a one dimensional statistical mechanics model; this suggests the use of the topological entropy to quantify the complexity of the system. We formulate natural political/social questions about the expected complexity of a voting rule and degree of cohesion/diversity among agents in terms of random matrix models---ensembles of statistical mechanics models---and compute quantitative answers in some representative cases.Comment: 9 pages, plain TeX, 2 PostScript figures included with epsf.tex (ignore the under/overfull \vbox error messages