Strategic Ignorance in Bargaining

In his classic article "An Essay on Bargaining" Schelling (1956) argues that ignorance might actually be strength rather than weakness. We test and confirm Schelling's conjecture in a simple take-it-or-leave bargaining experiment where the proposer can choose between two possible offers. Option A always gives the proposer a higher payoff than option B. The payoff of the responder depends on the (randomly determined) state of nature, i.e., in state s2 payoffs of the two players are aligned while they are not in state s1. The responder is always informed about the actual state. The proposer knows the actual state in our first treatment but not in the second. We find that proposers indeed benefit from ignorance because the responders accept almost all offers (even the unfavorable ones) if the payoffs of the responder have not been transparent for the proposer. In additional treatments we investigate situations where the proposer can deliberately remain ignorant. One could assume that remaining ignorant on purpose would be punished by the responder at least if an unfavorable outcome results. Surprisingly, we find that strategically remaining ignorant tends to be beneficial for the proposer particularly if the responder does not know with certainty whether it was the proposer's intention to remain ignorant or whether it was not her intention.strategic ignorance, bargaining, intentions, experiment

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Thermodynamic approach to rheological modeling and simulations at the configuration space level of description

The so-called matrix model is a general thermodynamic framework for microrheological modeling. This model has already been proven to be applicable for a wide class of systems, in particular to models formulated at the configuration tensor level of description. For models formulated at the configuration space level of description a matrix formulation is readily obtained, but for the subsequent analysis one still needs an explicit solution of the configuration space distribution functions. In the present paper we describe an approach in which this problem is solved by combining the matrix model with a Lagrangian simulation method in configuration space developed recently by Szeri and Leal. The result is a consistent and unified formulation of stress tensor expressions, including the stress averaging, and the evolution equations. This formulation is also suited for numerical simulations. In this way, the range of applicability of the matrix model is extended substantially. In order to clarify the principles of the method and some aspects of its implementation, a simple example is discussed in some detail

Strategic ignorance in bargaining

In his classic article An Essay on Bargaining Schelling (1956) argues that ignorance might actually be strength rather than weakness. We test and confirm Schelling's conjecture in a simple take-it-or-leave bargaining experiment where the proposer can choose between two possible offers. Option A always gives the proposer a higher payoff than option B. The payoff of the responder depends on the (randomly determined) state of nature, i.e., in state s2 payoffs of the two players are aligned while they are not in state s1. The responder is always informed about the actual state. The proposer knows the actual state in our first treatment but not in the second. We find that proposers indeed benefit from ignorance because the responders accept almost all offers (even the unfavorable ones) if the payoffs of the responder have not been transparent for the proposer. In additional treatments we investigate situations where the proposer can deliberately remain ignorant. One could assume that remaining ignorant on purpose would be punished by the responder at least if an unfavorable outcome results. Surprisingly, we find that strategically remaining ignorant tends to be beneficial for the proposer particularly if the responder does not know with certainty whether it was the proposer's intention to remain ignorant or whether it was not her intention

Lying and Team Incentives

We investigate the influence of two widespread compensation schemes, individual piece-rates and team incentives, on participants' inclination to lie, by adapting the experimental setup of Fischbacher and Heusi (2008). Lying turns out to be more pronounced under team incentives than under individual piece-rates, which highlights a so far fairly neglected feature of these compensation schemes.compensation schemes, lying, team, experiment

People are more likely to promise to help you if you ask them in person or by phone

Synchronous communication usually gets people to say yes, but follow through will always be low, write Julian Conrads and Tommaso Reggian

The Effect of Communication Channels on Promise-Making and Promise-Keeping

This paper investigates the effect of different communication channels on promise-making and promise-keeping in a helping situation. Four treatments differ with respect to the communication channel employed to solicit unincentivized cooperation, i.e., face-to-face, phone call and two different sorts of computer-mediated communication. The less anonymous (face-to-face, phone) the interpersonal interaction is due to the different communication channels, the higher the propensity of an agent to make a promise. Treatment effects, however, vanish if we then look at the actual promise-keeping rates across treatments as more anonymous channels (computer-mediated) do not perform relatively worse than more direct channels

Gorenstein toric Fano varieties

We investigate Gorenstein toric Fano varieties by combinatorial methods using the notion of a reflexive polytope which appeared in connection to mirror symmetry. The paper contains generalisations of tools and previously known results for nonsingular toric Fano varieties. As applications we obtain new classification results, bounds of invariants and formulate conjectures concerning combinatorial and geometrical properties of reflexive polytopes.Comment: AMS-LaTeX, 29 pages with 5 figure