2,868 research outputs found

    Welfare and Revenue Guarantees for Competitive Bundling Equilibrium

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    We study equilibria of markets with mm heterogeneous indivisible goods and nn consumers with combinatorial preferences. It is well known that a competitive equilibrium is not guaranteed to exist when valuations are not gross substitutes. Given the widespread use of bundling in real-life markets, we study its role as a stabilizing and coordinating device by considering the notion of \emph{competitive bundling equilibrium}: a competitive equilibrium over the market induced by partitioning the goods for sale into fixed bundles. Compared to other equilibrium concepts involving bundles, this notion has the advantage of simulatneous succinctness (O(m)O(m) prices) and market clearance. Our first set of results concern welfare guarantees. We show that in markets where consumers care only about the number of goods they receive (known as multi-unit or homogeneous markets), even in the presence of complementarities, there always exists a competitive bundling equilibrium that guarantees a logarithmic fraction of the optimal welfare, and this guarantee is tight. We also establish non-trivial welfare guarantees for general markets, two-consumer markets, and markets where the consumer valuations are additive up to a fixed budget (budget-additive). Our second set of results concern revenue guarantees. Motivated by the fact that the revenue extracted in a standard competitive equilibrium may be zero (even with simple unit-demand consumers), we show that for natural subclasses of gross substitutes valuations, there always exists a competitive bundling equilibrium that extracts a logarithmic fraction of the optimal welfare, and this guarantee is tight. The notion of competitive bundling equilibrium can thus be useful even in markets which possess a standard competitive equilibrium

    The Combinatorial World (of Auctions) According to GARP

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    Revealed preference techniques are used to test whether a data set is compatible with rational behaviour. They are also incorporated as constraints in mechanism design to encourage truthful behaviour in applications such as combinatorial auctions. In the auction setting, we present an efficient combinatorial algorithm to find a virtual valuation function with the optimal (additive) rationality guarantee. Moreover, we show that there exists such a valuation function that both is individually rational and is minimum (that is, it is component-wise dominated by any other individually rational, virtual valuation function that approximately fits the data). Similarly, given upper bound constraints on the valuation function, we show how to fit the maximum virtual valuation function with the optimal additive rationality guarantee. In practice, revealed preference bidding constraints are very demanding. We explain how approximate rationality can be used to create relaxed revealed preference constraints in an auction. We then show how combinatorial methods can be used to implement these relaxed constraints. Worst/best-case welfare guarantees that result from the use of such mechanisms can be quantified via the minimum/maximum virtual valuation function

    Staphylococcus aureus virulence factors identified by using a high-throughput Caenorhabditis elegans-killing model

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    Staphylococcus aureus is an important human pathogen that is also able to kill the model nematode Caenorhabditis elegans. We constructed a 2,950-member Tn917 transposon insertion library in S. aureus strain NCTC 8325. Twenty-one of these insertions exhibited attenuated C. elegans killing, and of these, 12 contained insertions in different genes or chromosomal locations. Ten of these 12 insertions showed attenuated killing phenotypes when transduced into two different S. aureus strains, and 5 of the 10 mutants correspond to genes that have not been previously identified in signature-tagged mutagenesis studies. These latter five mutants were tested in a murine renal abscess model, and one mutant harboring an insertion in nagD exhibited attenuated virulence. Interestingly, Tn917 was shown to have a very strong bias for insertions near the terminus of DNA replication

    Biophysical Measurements of Cells, Microtubules, and DNA with an Atomic Force Microscope

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    Atomic force microscopes (AFMs) are ubiquitous in research laboratories and have recently been priced for use in teaching laboratories. Here we review several AFM platforms (Dimension 3000 by Digital Instruments, EasyScan2 by Nanosurf, ezAFM by Nanomagnetics, and TKAFM by Thorlabs) and describe various biophysical experiments that could be done in the teaching laboratory using these instruments. In particular, we focus on experiments that image biological materials and quantify biophysical parameters: 1) imaging cells to determine membrane tension, 2) imaging microtubules to determine their persistence length, 3) imaging the random walk of DNA molecules to determine their contour length, and 4) imaging stretched DNA molecules to measure the tensional force.Comment: 29 page preprint, 7 figures, 1 tabl

    Webteaching: sequencing of subject matter in relation to prior knowledge of pupils

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    Two experiments are discussed in which the sequencing procedure of webteaching is compared with a linear sequence for the presentation of text material.\ud \ud In the first experiment variations in the level of prior knowledge of pupils were studied for their influence on the sequencing mode of text presentation. Prior knowledge greatly reduced the effect of the size of sequencing procedures.\ud \ud In the second experiment pupils with a low level of prior knowledge studied a text, following either a websequence or a linear sequence. Webteaching was superior to linear teaching on a number of dependent variables. It is concluded that webteaching is an effective sequencing procedure in those cases where substantial new learning is required

    Parameterized Supply Function Bidding: Equilibrium and Efficiency

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    We consider a model where a finite number of producers compete to meet an infinitely divisible but inelastic demand for a product. Each firm is characterized by a production cost that is convex in the output produced, and firms act as profit maximizers. We consider a uniform price market design that uses supply function bidding: firms declare the amount they would supply at any positive price, and a single price is chosen to clear the market. We are interested in evaluating the impact of price-anticipating behavior both on the allocative efficiency of the market and on the prices seen at equilibrium. We show that by restricting the strategy space of the firms to parameterized supply functions, we can provide upper bounds on both the inflation of aggregate cost at the Nash equilibrium relative to the socially optimal level, as well as the markup of the Nash equilibrium price above the competitive level: as long as N > 2 firms are competing, these quantities are both upper bounded by 1 + 1/(N − 2). This result holds even in the presence of asymmetric cost structure across firms. We also discuss several extensions, generalizations, and related issues.National Science Foundation (U.S.) (Graduate Research Fellowship)National Science Foundation (U.S.) (grant ECS-0312921

    The introduction of modern physics: overcoming a deformed vision of science

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    In this paper, we try to show initially that modern physics is usually introduced in high school curricula without reference to the difficulties of classical physics, simply juxtaposing the two paradigms or even mixing them up. As a result, serious misconceptions arise. We then present another way of introducing modern physics, based on a contructivist view of science learning, and give some results obtained with the new materials

    The role of TcdB and TccC subunits in secretion of the photorhabdus Tcd toxin complex

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    The Toxin Complex (TC) is a large multi-subunit toxin encoded by a range of bacterial pathogens. The best-characterized examples are from the insect pathogens Photorhabdus, Xenorhabdus and Yersinia. They consist of three large protein subunits, designated A, B and C that assemble in a 5:1:1 stoichiometry. Oral toxicity to a range of insects means that some have the potential to be developed as pest control technology. The three subunit proteins do not encode any recognisable export sequences and as such little progress has been made in understanding their secretion. We have developed heterologous TC production and secretion models in E. coli and used them to ascribe functions to different domains of the crucial B+C sub-complex. We have determined that the B and C subunits use a secretion mechanism that is either encoded by the proteins themselves or employ an as yet undefined system common to laboratory strains of E. coli. We demonstrate that both the N-terminal domains of the B and C subunits are required for secretion of the whole complex. We propose a model whereby the N-terminus of the C-subunit toxin exports the B+C sub-complex across the inner membrane while that of the B-subunit allows passage across the outer membrane. We also demonstrate that even in the absence of the B-subunit, that the C-subunit can also facilitate secretion of the larger A-subunit. The recognition of this novel export system is likely to be of importance to future protein secretion studies. Finally, the identification of homologues of B and C subunits in diverse bacterial pathogens, including Burkholderia and Pseudomonas, suggests that these toxins are likely to be important in a range of different hosts, including man
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