What Price Compromise? Testing a Possibly Surprising Implication of Nash Bargaining Theory

This paper identifies, and tests experimentally, a prediction of Nash Bargaining Theory that may appear counterintuitive. The context is a simple bargaining problem in which two players have to agree a choice from three alternatives. One alternative favours one player and a second favours the other. The third is an apparently reasonable compromise, but is in fact precluded as an agreed choice by the axioms of Nash Bargaining Theory. Experimental results show that agreement on this third alternative occurs rather often. So the axiomatic Nash theory is not well-supported by our evidence. Our subjects' behaviour could be interpreted as the paying of an irrationally (according to the Nash theory) high price in order to reach a compromise agreement.Experiments, Nash Bargaining Theory

Do People Plan?

We report the results of an experimental investigation of a key axiom of economic theories of dynamic decision making – namely, that agents plan. Inferences from previous investigations have been confounded with issues concerning the preference functionals of the agents. Here, we present an innovative experimental design which is driven purely by dominance- if preferences satisfy dominance, we can infer whether subjects are planning or not. We implement three sets of experiments: the first two (the Individual Treatments) in which the same player takes decisions both in the present and the future; and the third (the Pairs Treatment) in which different players take decisions at different times. The two Individual treatments differed in that, in one, the subjects played sequentially, while, in the other, the subjects had to pre-commit to their future move. In all contexts, according to economic theory, the players in the present should anticipate the decision of the player in the future. We find that over half the participants in all three experimental treatments do not appear to be planning ahead; moreover, their ability to plan ahead does not improve with experience, except possibly when we force subjects to pre-commit to their future decision. These findings identify an important lacuna in economic theories, both for individual behaviour and for behaviour in games.

Do people plan?

We report the results of an experimental investigation of a key axiom of economic theories of dynamic decision making – namely, that agents plan. Inferences from previous investigations have been confounded with issues concerning the preference functionals of the agents. Here, we present an innovative experimental design which is driven purely by dominance- if preferences satisfy dominance, we can infer whether subjects are planning or not. We implement three sets of experiments: the first two (the Individual Treatments) in which the same player takes decisions both in the present and the future; and the third (the Pairs Treatment) in which different players take decisions at different times. The two Individual treatments differed in that, in one, the subjects played sequentially, while, in the other, the subjects had to pre-commit to their future move. In all contexts, according to economic theory, the players in the present should anticipate the decision of the player in the future. We find that over half the participants in all three experimental treatments do not appear to be planning ahead; moreover, their ability to plan ahead does not improve with experience, except possibly when we force subjects to pre-commit to their future decision. These findings identify an important lacuna in economic theories, both for individual behaviour and for behaviour in games.We report the results of an experimental investigation of a key axiom of economic theories of dynamic decision making – namely, that agents plan. Inferences from previous investigations have been confounded with issues concerning the preference functionals of the agents. Here, we present an innovative experimental design which is driven purely by dominance- if preferences satisfy dominance, we can infer whether subjects are planning or not. We implement three sets of experiments: the first two (the Individual Treatments) in which the same player takes decisions both in the present and the future; and the third (the Pairs Treatment) in which different players take decisions at different times. The two Individual treatments differed in that, in one, the subjects played sequentially, while, in the other, the subjects had to pre-commit to their future move. In all contexts, according to economic theory, the players in the present should anticipate the decision of the player in the future. We find that over half the participants in all three experimental treatments do not appear to be planning ahead; moreover, their ability to plan ahead does not improve with experience, except possibly when we force subjects to pre-commit to their future decision. These findings identify an important lacuna in economic theories, both for individual behaviour and for behaviour in games.Refereed Working Papers / of international relevanc

Tillage Research in Ohio A Guide to the Selection of Profitable Tillage Systems

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A Simple Risk-Sharing Experiment

This paper reports on an experiment designed to test whether pairs of individuals are able to exploit efficiency gains in the sharing of a risky financial prospect. Observations from a previous experiment had suggested a general rejection of efficiency in favour of ex post equality. The present experiment explores some possible explanations for this. The results indicate that fairness is not a significant consideration, but rather that having to choose between prospects diverts partners from allocating the chosen prospect efficiently.This paper reports on an experiment designed to test whether pairs of individuals are able to exploit efficiency gains in the sharing of a risky financial prospect. Observations from a previous experiment had suggested a general rejection of efficiency in favour of ex post equality. The present experiment explores some possible explanations for this. The results indicate that fairness is not a significant consideration, but rather that having to choose between prospects diverts partners from allocating the chosen prospect efficiently.Refereed Working Papers / of international relevanc

The influence of the strength of bone on the deformation of acetabular shells : a laboratory experiment in cadavers

Date of Acceptance: 24/08/2014 ©2015 The British Editorial Society of Bone & Joint Surgery. The authors would like to thank N. Taylor (3D Measurement Company) for his work with regard to data acquisition and processing of experimental data. We would also like to thank Dr A. Blain of Newcastle University for performing the statistical analysis The research was supported by the NIHR Newcastle Biomedical Research Centre. The authors P. Dold, M. Flohr and R. Preuss are employed by Ceramtec GmbH. Martin Bone received a salary from the joint fund. The author or one or more of the authors have received or will receive benefits for personal or professional use from a commercial party related directly or indirectly to the subject of this article. This article was primary edited by G. Scott and first proof edited by J. Scott.Peer reviewedPostprin

Chance versus choice: Eliciting attitudes to fair compensations

This paper reports an experiment designed to elicit social preferences over income compensation schemes, where income differences between subjects have two independent components: one due to chosen effort and the other due to random chance. These differences can be compensated through social dividends, according to principles chosen beforehand by subjects themselves from behind a stylised Rawlsian veil of ignorance, or outside the society on which the principles will be implemented. We test the attractiveness in particular of Luck Egalitarianism, compensating inequalities due to chance but not those due to choice. We find modest but not overwhelming support for these principles, suggesting that subjects´ actual preferences are more complex

Are People in Groups More Farsighted than Individuals?

A dynamic decision making experiment recently conducted on individuals suggested that people may look ahead but seem either unable or unwilling to predict their own future behaviour. In order to distinguish between these two possibilities, we repeated the experiment with pairs of individuals. The experiment consisted of two decision nodes (interleaved with two chance nodes), with one of the pair choosing at the first decision node and the second of the pair choosing at the second. Given the structure of the experiment, it was simple for the first player to predict the decisions of the second player. Nevertheless, the decisions of the first player indicate strongly that the first player does not in fact do so. It seems that people are unwilling to predict not only their own future behaviour but also the future behaviour of others.A dynamic decision making experiment recently conducted on individuals suggested that people may look ahead but seem either unable or unwilling to predict their own future behaviour. In order to distinguish between these two possibilities, we repeated the experiment with pairs of individuals. The experiment consisted of two decision nodes (interleaved with two chance nodes), with one of the pair choosing at the first decision node and the second of the pair choosing at the second. Given the structure of the experiment, it was simple for the first player to predict the decisions of the second player. Nevertheless, the decisions of the first player indicate strongly that the first player does not in fact do so. It seems that people are unwilling to predict not only their own future behaviour but also the future behaviour of others.Non-Refereed Working Papers / of national relevance onl

What Price Compromise? Testing a Possibly Surprising Implication of Nash Bargaining Theory

This paper identifies, and tests experimentally, a prediction of Nash Bargaining Theory that may appear counterintuitive. The context is a simple bargaining problem in which two players have to agree a choice from three alternatives. One alternative favours one player and a second favours the other. The third is an apparently reasonable compromise, but is in fact precluded as an agreed choice by the axioms of Nash Bargaining Theory. Experimental results show that agreement on this third alternative occurs rather often. So the axiomatic Nash theory is not well-supported by our evidence. Our subjects’ behaviour could be interpreted as the paying of an irrationally (according to the Nash theory) high price in order to reach a compromise agreement.This paper identifies, and tests experimentally, a prediction of Nash Bargaining Theory that may appear counterintuitive. The context is a simple bargaining problem in which two players have to agree a choice from three alternatives. One alternative favours one player and a second favours the other. The third is an apparently reasonable compromise, but is in fact precluded as an agreed choice by the axioms of Nash Bargaining Theory. Experimental results show that agreement on this third alternative occurs rather often. So the axiomatic Nash theory is not well-supported by our evidence. Our subjects’ behaviour could be interpreted as the paying of an irrationally (according to the Nash theory) high price in order to reach a compromise agreement.Non-Refereed Working Papers / of national relevance onl