Voluntary Environmental Governance Arrangements

Voluntary environmental governance arrangements have focal attention in studies on environmental policy, regulation and governance. The four major debates in the contemporary literature on voluntary environmental governance arrangements are studied. The literature falls short of sufficiently specifying whether or not voluntary environmental governance arrangements are successful in addressing environmental risks. This is due to the narrow focus of many contemporary studies and a tendency to study the form and content of voluntary environmental governance arrangements in isolation from their contextual settings. In order to gain a better understanding of voluntary environmental governance arrangements, scholars are challenged to study differently structured voluntary environmental governance arrangements in different contextual settings, to move beyond single country or single voluntary environmental governance arrangements studies, and to combine quantitative and qualitative data in studying these arrangements

The open method of coordination – effectively preventing welfare state retrenchment?

This article re-examines the division between "optimists" and "pessimists" within the literature on the Open Method of Coordination’s (OMC) effectiveness. Each of those "camps" tends to focus on a different question. "Optimists" are more concerned with the question of whether the OMC exerts an influence on the national level and through which mechanisms, whilst "pessimists" concentrate on the question of whether the OMC can "strengthen" EU social policy and therefore European welfare states. This article combines these two perspectives and argues that the OMC is indeed capable of influencing national policies through the dissemination of ideas and "learning" as the "optimists" stress. However, policy "learning" at the member state level is shaped and constrained by a variety of internal and external pressures. Against the hopes of most of the OMC "optimists", this makes the OMC largely ineffective in preventing welfare state retrenchme

Poverty and social policy in Europe 2020: ungovernable and ungoverned

This is a post-peer-review, pre-copy edited version of an article published in Policy and Politics. The definitive publisher-authenticated version of: Copeland, Paul, and Mary Daly. "Poverty and social policy in Europe 2020: ungovernable and ungoverned." Policy & Politics 42.3 (2014): 351-365 is available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1332/030557312X655503This article examines the latest iteration of EU social policy – the target to reduce poverty and social exclusion by 20 million. The application of a three-part conceptual matrix – focused on ideas, politics and governance – indicates key weaknesses. The target is ungovernable because it melds different approaches to poverty and social exclusion and because of the leeway to Member States to adopt an approach of their own choice. And the target is ungoverned because of low political priority and uncertainty around its legal status, as well as ambiguity over how it fits into the Europe 2020 governance process

Financing social and cohesion policy in an enlarged EU: plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose?

The development of the Open Method of Coordination, agreement on the Lisbon Agenda and EU enlargement offered the prospect of a new and substantial EU social policy agenda. This article considers EU social and cohesion policies in the context of the recent negotiation of the EU budget for 2007—13. We find the Commission's wish to redistribute EU spending in favour of these policy areas and new member states was thwarted by key political features of EU budget making: CAP spending levels which are downwardly sticky; institutional arrangements which provide for budget making as, at best, a zero-sum game; and the preferences of contributor member states in the EU-15 to contain overall spending while preserving their net budget positions. Questions are thus raised as to the ability of the EU to make any progress, from a budgetary perspective, on the social and cohesion policy agenda in an enlarged EU

Responsible Research and Innovation between \u201cnew governance\u201d and fundamental rights

This chapter frames RRI as an emerging governance approach in the EU regulatory context. We argue that reference to fundamental rights makes RRI a distinctive approach to responsibility compared to other existing paradigms and that human rights, in particular those laid down in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, are not necessarily a constraint but can instead be a catalyst of innovation. Eventually we maintain that a governance framework based on the complementarity between legal norms and voluntary commitments might successfully combine the respect of fundamental rights with the openness and flexibility of the innovation process

A Trojan Horse Behind Chinese Walls?: Problems and Prospects of US-Sponsored "Rule of Law" Reform Projects in the People’s Republic of China

The US government has announced an initiative to promote the "rule of law" in the People’s Republic of China. However, though China has also endorsed building the "rule of law" as a goal, the American and Chinese views of what "rule of law" entails differ substantially. In the US government, rule of law reform is seen as a way to promote human rights and political reform, whereas the Chinese government wants to restrict law reform to those areas closely related to developing a market economy. To deal with this divergence in goals, the US has adopted a "Trojan Horse" strategy: the belief is that the Chinese will allow US-sponsored law reform programs for economic reasons, but once established, these programs will lead to broader political reform. However, this view is not well-supported by theory or empirical evidence. Thus, while law reform programs in China may be worthwhile, we should be skeptical of their ability to trigger more fundamental political reform.rule of law; China; legal reform; political reform

1. Strengthening International Regulation Through Transnational New Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit. 2. International Regulation without International Government: Improving IO Performance through Orchestration

1. A new kind of international regulatory system is spontaneously arising out of the failure of international 'Old Governance' (i.e., treaties and intergovernmental organizations) to adequately regulate international business. Nongovernmental organizations, business firms, and other actors, singly and in novel combinations, are creating innovative institutions to apply transnational norms to business. These institutions are predominantly private and operate through voluntary standards. The Authors depict the diversity of these new regulatory institutions on the 'Governance Triangle,' according to the roles of different actors in their operations. To analyze this complex system, we adapt the domestic 'New Governance' model of regulation to the international setting. 'Transnational New Governance' potentially provides many benefits of New Governance and is particularly suitable for international regulation because it demands less of states and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). However, Transnational New Governance does require states and IGOs to act as orchestrators of the international regulatory system, and that system currently suffers from a significant orchestration deficit. If states and IGOs expanded 'directive' and especially 'facilitative' orchestration of the Transnational New Governance system, they could strengthen high-quality private regulatory standards, improve the international regulatory system, and better achieve their own regulatory goals. 2. International organizations (IOs) have been widely criticized as ineffective. Yet scholars and practitioners assessing IO performance frequently focus on traditional modes of governance such as treaties and inter-state dispute-resolution mechanisms. When they observe poor performance, moreover, they often prescribe a strengthening of those same activities. We call this reliance on traditional state-based mechanisms 'International Old Governance' (IOG). A better way to understand and improve IO performance is to consider the full range of ways in which IOs can and do operate - including, increasingly, by reaching out to private actors and institutions, collaborating with them, and supporting and shaping their activities. Such actions are helping to develop an intricate global network of public, private and mixed institutions and norms, partially orchestrated by IOs, that we call 'Transnational New Governance' (TNG). With proper orchestration by IOs, TNG can ameliorate both 'state failure' - the inadequacies of IOG - and 'market failure' - the problems that result when the creation and evolution of norm-setting institutions is highly decentralized. Orchestration thus provides a significant way for IOs to improve their regulatory performance. Some IOs already engage actively with private actors and institutions - we provide a range of illustrations, highlighting the activities of the UN Environment Programme (UNEP). Yet there remains a significant 'orchestration deficit' that provides real opportunities for IOs. We draw on the lessons of existing IO activities to suggest additional possibilities for improving IO performance. -- 1. Ein internationales regulatorisches System neuer Art entsteht derzeit spontan aus dem Versagen der internationalen 'Old Governance' - also der bestehenden internationalen Verträge und Organisationen - dabei, den internationalen Handel angemessen zu regulieren. Nichtregierungsorganisationen, Unternehmen und andere Akteure - allein und in ganz neuen Kombinationen - schaffen sich neue internationale Einrichtungen, um transnationale Normen auf internationale Geschäftstätigkeit anzuwenden. Es geht dabei vornehmlich um private Einrichtungen, die vor allem über freiwillige Standardbefolgung wirken. In diesem Beitrag werden die unterschiedlichen Regulierungseinrichtungen als Teil eines 'Governance Dreiecks' beschreiben und das geschieht vor allem in Blick darauf, welche Rollen die unterschiedlichen Akteure in ihrer Tätigkeit spielen. Um dieses komplexe System zu untersuchen passen wir das innenpolitische Regulierungsmodell der 'New Governance' an den internationalen Rahmen an. Die 'Transnational New Governance' enthält viele Vorteile der 'New Governance' und sie ist für die internationale Regulierung besonders angemessen, weil sie geringere Anforderungen an die Staatenwelt und an die intergouvernementalen Organisationen, die IGOs, stellen. Allerdings ist es für eine wirksame 'Transnational New Governance' weiterhin erforderlich, dass die Staaten und die IGOs das internationale regulatorische System 'orchestrieren'. Das heutige internationale regulatorische System leidet allerdings unter einem Orchestrierungsdefizit. Würden die Staaten und die IGOs die 'anweisende' und 'ermöglichende' Orchestrierungsfunktion des 'Transnational New Governance System' ausbauen, dann stärkten sie die privaten regulatorischen Standards von hoher Qualität, verbesserten das internationale regulatorische System und könnten ihre eigenen regulatorischen Ziele besser verwirklichen. 2. Internationale Organisationen (IOs) werden vielfach ob Ihrer Ineffizienz kritisiert. Allerdings konzentrieren sich Wissenschaftler und Praktiker bei dieser Bewertung der Leistungsfähigkeit von IOs häufig auf Maßstäbe, die den herkömmlichen Formen von Governance - wie internationalen Verträgen und den Mechanismen für die Schlichtung zwischenstaatlicher Konflikte - entlehnt sind. Soweit eine ungenügende Leistung festgestellt wird, empfehlen sie zudem meist, Tätigkeiten der traditionellen Art zu verstärken. Wir bezeichnen dies als ein Sich-Verlassen auf die herkömmlichen staats-basierten Mechanismen, als 'International Old Governance' (IOG). Man versteht die IOs besser und verbessert ihre Leistungsfähigkeit aber der Situation weitaus angemessener, wenn man die gesamte Vielfalt wirklicher und möglicher IO-Tätigkeiten in den Blick nimmt: Das umfasst vor allem, dass die IOs private Akteure und Organisationen einbeziehen, mit ihnen zusammenarbeiten, ihre Aktivitäten stützen, sie formen und ihnen Richtung geben. Diese Tätigkeiten schaffen ein fein gesponnenes globales Netzwerk von öffentlichen, privaten und gemischten Organisationen und Normen, das seinerseits teilweise durch die IOs orchestriert wird. Dieses Netzwerk bezeichnen wir als 'Transnational New Governance' (TNG). Wenn die Orchestrierung durch IOs gut funktioniert kann sie auch Staatsversagen (state failure) abmildern - also hier die Inadäquanzen von 'International Organization Governance' - und ebenso kann sie Marktversagen ausgleichen, also die Probleme, die sich ergeben wenn Herausbildung und Schaffung normgebender Einrichtungen höchst dezentralisiert verläuft. Über die Orchestrierung können die IOs auch die Leistungsfähigkeit ihrer Regulierungen erhöhen. Einige IOs sind schon jetzt stark zusammen mit privaten Akteuren und Einrichtungen unterwegs; in diesem Beitrag mustern wir das Spektrum solcher Aktivitäten. Wir betonen dabei die Unternehmungen des UN Environment Programme (UNEP), des Umweltprogramms der VN. Allerdings verbleibt ein erhebliches 'Orchestrierungsdefizit', das für die IOs zugleich Herausforderung und Chance ist. Wir stützten uns auf den Erfahrungsschatz der vorgefundenen IO-Aktivitäten, um den Möglichkeitsraum der IOs für die Zukunft auszumessen und Maßnahmen zur Verbesserung der Leistungsfähigkeit von IOs anzuregen.

Old Wine in New Bottles: Public Interest Lawyering in an Era of Privatization

Both the theory and practice of public interest lawyering are in transition. Whereas the public interest lawyer of the 1960s and 1970s typically advocated before administrative agencies and courts on behalf of poor people and underrepresented groups, the public interest lawyer of today assumes a much greater variety of roles and is involved in a broader array of tasks. One of the causes of this development is the privatization of government, which has been defined as an increased reliance on the private institutions of society to satisfy public needs

Rule of Law in Central and Eastern Europe

Pursuant to the same logic that prevailed when Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman reached out to Germany after the end of World War II, and in keeping with the promise made in the Preamble of the founding treaty, the EU now reached out to Central and Eastern Europe after the end of the Cold War and offered integration. In recognition of the difficulties for the EU on the one side of absorbing a large number of countries without jeopardizing the functioning of the institutions, and the difficulties for the Central and Eastern European Countries ( CEECs ) on the other side of transforming themselves into modern democracies with rule of law and functioning market economies, a number of pre-conditions for accession and a number of support schemes for the transformation were established. The present Article analyzes those pre-conditions that were supposed to promote the development of rule of law, as well as those schemes that were intended to support this development. It concludes that first, the concept of “rule of law,” although often quoted, is poorly defined and understood and this is an obstacle for countries aspiring to build a system based on rule of law. Second, Western support for the transformation in Central and Eastern Europe was and continues to be a combination of trial and error with a lack of appreciation of historic precedent and lessons