"Cognitive Penetrability" - Ch 3 of Seemings and Epistemic Justification

In this chapter I introduce the thesis that perceptual appearances are cognitively penetrable and analyse cases made against phenomenal conservatism hinging on this thesis. In particular, I focus on objections coming from the externalist reliabilist camp and the internalist inferentialist camp. I conclude that cognitive penetrability doesn’t yield lethal or substantive difficulties for phenomenal conservatism

On Special Relativity and Temporal Illusions

According to metaphysical tensism, there is an objective, albeit ever changing, present moment corresponding to our phenomenal experiences (Ludlow in Philosophy of Language, \u27Oxford Handbook on Tense and Aspect\u27. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012; Brogaard and Marlow in \u27Analysis\u27 73(4):635-642, 2013). One of the principle objections to metaphysical tensism has been Einstein\u27s argument from special relativity, which says that given that the speed of light is constant, there is no absolute simultaneity defined in terms of observations of light rays (Einstein in \u27Ann Phys\u27 17:891-921, 1905). In a recent paper, Brogaard and Marlow (\u27Analysis\u27 73(4):635-642, 2013) argue that this objection fails. We argue that Brogaard and Marlow\u27s argument fails to show that special relativity does not pose a threat to metaphysical tensism

On Special Relativity and Temporal Illusions

According to metaphysical tensism, there is an objective, albeit ever changing, present moment corresponding to our phenomenal experiences :635–642, 2013). One of the principle objections to metaphysical tensism has been Einstein’s argument from special relativity, which says that given that the speed of light is constant, there is no absolute simultaneity defined in terms of observations of light rays . In a recent paper, Brogaard and Marlow :635–642, 2013) argue that this objection fails. We argue that Brogaard and Marlow’s argument fails to show that special relativity does not pose a threat to metaphysical tensis

Dimensionality, symmetry and the Inverse Square Law

Kant suggested that Newton's Inverse Square Law (ISL) determines the dimensions of space to be three. Much has been written in the philosophical literature about Kant's suggestion, including specific arguments attempting to link the ISL to three-dimensionality. In this article, we explore one such argument and demonstrate that it fails to support the link Kant purports to make between the ISL and the three-dimensionality of space. At best, the link that can be made is between the ISL and symmetry.</jats:p

Enhancing Student Understanding of Color Perception: A Teaching Activity on Intersubjective Color Variations

We present a teaching activity whose aim is to enhance students' understanding of color perception by introducing them to intersubjective color variations among normal perceivers. The approach can be used in different disciplines, including biology, philosophy, psychology, physics, or statistics, for different purposes and with college students having various levels of sophistication and scientific training.</jats:p

Enhancing Student Understanding of Color Perception: A Teaching Activity on Intersubjective Color Variations

We present a teaching activity whose aim is to enhance students\u27 understanding of color perception by introducing them to intersubjective color variations among normal perceivers. The approach can be used in different disciplines, including biology, philosophy, psychology, physics, or statistics, for different purposes and with college students having various levels of sophistication and scientific training