Neural signatures for sustaining object representations attributed to others in preverbal human infants

A major feat of social beings is to encode what their conspecifics see, know or believe. While various nonhuman animals show precursors of these abilities, humans perform uniquely sophisticated inferences about other people’s mental states. However, it is still unclear how these possibly human-specific capacities develop and whether preverbal infants, similarly to adults form representations of other agents’ mental states, specifically metarepresentations. We explored the neuro-cognitive bases of 8-month-olds’ ability to encode the world from another person’s perspective, using gamma-band EEG activity over the temporal lobes, an established neural signature for sustained object representation after occlusion. We observed such gamma-band activity when an object was occluded from the infants’ perspective, as well as when it was occluded only from the other person (Experiment 1), and also when subsequently the object disappeared but the person falsely believed the object to be present (Experiment 2). These findings suggest that the cognitive systems involved in representing the world from infants’ own perspective are also recruited for encoding others’ beliefs. Such results point to an early developing, powerful apparatus suitable to deal with multiple concurrent representations; and suggest that infants can have a metarepresentational understanding of other minds even before the onset of language

Understanding the self in relation to others: Infants spontaneously map another's face to their own at 16–26 months

The current study probed whether infants understand themselves in relation to others. Infants aged 16-26 months (n = 102) saw their parent wearing a sticker on their forehead or cheek, depending on experimental condition, placed unwitnessed by the child. Infants then received a sticker themselves, and their spontaneous behavior was coded. Regardless of age, from 16 months, all infants who placed the sticker on their cheek or forehead, placed it on the location on their own face matching their parent's placement. This shows that infants as young as 16 months of age have an internal map of their face in relation to others that they can use to guide their behavior. Whether infants placed the sticker on the matching location was related to other measures associated with self-concept development (the use of their own name and mirror self-recognition), indicating that it may reflect a social aspect of children's developing self-concept, namely their understanding of themselves in relation and comparison to others. About half of the infants placed the sticker on themselves, while others put it elsewhere in the surrounding, indicating an additional motivational component to bring about on themselves the state, which they observed on their parent. Together, infants' placement of the sticker in our task suggests an ability to compare, and motivation to align, self and others

Altercentric bias in preverbal infants memory

Human infants would seem to face a daunting challenge in selecting what they should attend, encode and remember. We investigated whether early in life, infants might use others’ attention as an exploitable source of information filtering, by prioritizing the encoding of events that are co-witnessed with someone else over events witnessed alone. In a series of studies (n=255), we show that infants who can otherwise remember an object’s location, misremembered the object where another agent had seen it, even if infants themselves had subsequently seen the object move somewhere else. With further exploratory analyses, we also found that infants’ attention to the agent rather than the object seems to drive their memory for the object’s location. This series points to an initial encoding bias that likely facilitates information selection but which can, under some circumstances, lead to predictable memory errors

Theoretical and technological building blocks for an innovation accelerator

The scientific system that we use today was devised centuries ago and is inadequate for our current ICT-based society: the peer review system encourages conservatism, journal publications are monolithic and slow, data is often not available to other scientists, and the independent validation of results is limited. Building on the Innovation Accelerator paper by Helbing and Balietti (2011) this paper takes the initial global vision and reviews the theoretical and technological building blocks that can be used for implementing an innovation (in first place: science) accelerator platform driven by re-imagining the science system. The envisioned platform would rest on four pillars: (i) Redesign the incentive scheme to reduce behavior such as conservatism, herding and hyping; (ii) Advance scientific publications by breaking up the monolithic paper unit and introducing other building blocks such as data, tools, experiment workflows, resources; (iii) Use machine readable semantics for publications, debate structures, provenance etc. in order to include the computer as a partner in the scientific process, and (iv) Build an online platform for collaboration, including a network of trust and reputation among the different types of stakeholders in the scientific system: scientists, educators, funding agencies, policy makers, students and industrial innovators among others. Any such improvements to the scientific system must support the entire scientific process (unlike current tools that chop up the scientific process into disconnected pieces), must facilitate and encourage collaboration and interdisciplinarity (again unlike current tools), must facilitate the inclusion of intelligent computing in the scientific process, must facilitate not only the core scientific process, but also accommodate other stakeholders such science policy makers, industrial innovators, and the general public

A two-lab direct replication attempt of Southgate, Senju and Csibra (2007)

The study by Southgate et al. (2007 Psychol. Sci. 18, 587–592. (doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01944.x)) has been widely cited as evidence for false-belief attribution in young children. Recent replication attempts of this paradigm have yielded mixed results: several studies did not replicate the original findings, raising doubts about the suitability of the paradigm to assess non-verbal action prediction and Theory of Mind. In a preregistered collaborative study including two of the original authors, we tested one hundred and sixty 24- to 26- month-olds across two locations using the original stimuli, procedure and analyses as closely as possible. We found no evidence for action anticipation: only roughly half of the infants looked to the location of an agent’s impending action when action prediction did not require taking into account the agent’s beliefs and a similar number when the agent held a false-belief. These results and other non-replications suggest that this paradigm does not reliably elicit action prediction and thus cannot assess false-belief understanding in 2-year- olds. While the present results do not support any claim regarding the presence or absence of Theory of Mind in infants, we conclude that an important piece of evidence that has to date supported arguments for the existence of this competence can no longer serve that function

Synthetizing Qualitative (Logical) Patterns for Pedestrian Simulation from Data

This work introduces a (qualitative) data-driven framework to extract patterns of pedestrian behaviour and synthesize Agent-Based Models. The idea consists in obtaining a rule-based model of pedestrian behaviour by means of automated methods from data mining. In order to extract qualitative rules from data, a mathematical theory called Formal Concept Analysis (FCA) is used. FCA also provides tools for implicational reasoning, which facilitates the design of qualitative simulations from both, observations and other models of pedestrian mobility. The robustness of the method on a general agent-based setting of movable agents within a grid is shown.Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad TIN2013-41086-

Action anticipation based on an agent's epistemic state in toddlers and adults

Do toddlers and adults engage in spontaneous Theory of Mind (ToM)? Evidence from anticipatory looking (AL) studies suggests that they do. But a growing body of failed replication studies raised questions about the paradigm’s suitability. In this multi-lab collaboration, we test the robustness of spontaneous ToM measures. We examine whether 18- to 27-month-olds’ and adults’ anticipatory looks distinguish between two basic forms of an agent’s epistemic states: knowledge and ignorance. In toddlers [ANTICIPATED n = 520 50% FEMALE] and adults [ANTICIPATED n = 408, 50% FEMALE] from diverse ethnic backgrounds, we found [SUPPORT/NO SUPPORT] for epistemic state-based action anticipation. Future research can probe whether this conclusion extends to more complex kinds of epistemic states, such as true and false beliefs