963 research outputs found

    A Nonlinear Super-Exponential Rational Model of Speculative Financial Bubbles

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    Keeping a basic tenet of economic theory, rational expectations, we model the nonlinear positive feedback between agents in the stock market as an interplay between nonlinearity and multiplicative noise. The derived hyperbolic stochastic finite-time singularity formula transforms a Gaussian white noise into a rich time series possessing all the stylized facts of empirical prices, as well as accelerated speculative bubbles preceding crashes. We use the formula to invert the two years of price history prior to the recent crash on the Nasdaq (april 2000) and prior to the crash in the Hong Kong market associated with the Asian crisis in early 1994. These complex price dynamics are captured using only one exponent controlling the explosion, the variance and mean of the underlying random walk. This offers a new and powerful detection tool of speculative bubbles and herding behavior.Comment: Latex document of 24 pages including 5 eps figure

    Regulating financial conglomerates

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    We investigate the optimal regulation of financial conglomerates which combine a bank and a non-bank financial institution. The conglomerate’s risk-taking incentives depend upon the level of market discipline it faces, which in turn is determined by the conglomerate’s liability structure. We examine optimal capital requirements for stand-alone institutions, for integrated financial conglomerates, and for financial conglomerates that are structured as holding companies. For a given risk profile, integrated conglomerates have a lower probability of failure than either their stand-alone or decentralized equivalent. However, when risk profiles are endogenously selected, conglomeration may extend the reach of the deposit insurance safety net and hence provide incentives for increased risk-taking. As a result, integrated conglomerates may optimally attract higher capital requirements. In contrast, decentralised conglomerates are able to hold assets in the socially most efficient place. Their optimal capital requirements encourage this. Hence, the practice of “regulatory arbitrage”, or of transferring assets from one balance sheet to another, is welfare-increasing. We discuss the policy implications of our finding in the context not only of the present debate on the regulation of financial conglomerates but also in the light of existing US bank holding company regulation

    Critical Market Crashes

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    This review is a partial synthesis of the book ``Why stock market crash'' (Princeton University Press, January 2003), which presents a general theory of financial crashes and of stock market instabilities that his co-workers and the author have developed over the past seven years. The study of the frequency distribution of drawdowns, or runs of successive losses shows that large financial crashes are ``outliers'': they form a class of their own as can be seen from their statistical signatures. If large financial crashes are ``outliers'', they are special and thus require a special explanation, a specific model, a theory of their own. In addition, their special properties may perhaps be used for their prediction. The main mechanisms leading to positive feedbacks, i.e., self-reinforcement, such as imitative behavior and herding between investors are reviewed with many references provided to the relevant literature outside the confine of Physics. Positive feedbacks provide the fuel for the development of speculative bubbles, preparing the instability for a major crash. We demonstrate several detailed mathematical models of speculative bubbles and crashes. The most important message is the discovery of robust and universal signatures of the approach to crashes. These precursory patterns have been documented for essentially all crashes on developed as well as emergent stock markets, on currency markets, on company stocks, and so on. The concept of an ``anti-bubble'' is also summarized, with two forward predictions on the Japanese stock market starting in 1999 and on the USA stock market still running. We conclude by presenting our view of the organization of financial markets.Comment: Latex 89 pages and 38 figures, in press in Physics Report

    A Computational and Experimental Study of the Regulatory Mechanisms of the Complement System

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    The complement system is key to innate immunity and its activation is necessary for the clearance of bacteria and apoptotic cells. However, insufficient or excessive complement activation will lead to immune-related diseases. It is so far unknown how the complement activity is up- or down- regulated and what the associated pathophysiological mechanisms are. To quantitatively understand the modulatory mechanisms of the complement system, we built a computational model involving the enhancement and suppression mechanisms that regulate complement activity. Our model consists of a large system of Ordinary Differential Equations (ODEs) accompanied by a dynamic Bayesian network as a probabilistic approximation of the ODE dynamics. Applying Bayesian inference techniques, this approximation was used to perform parameter estimation and sensitivity analysis. Our combined computational and experimental study showed that the antimicrobial response is sensitive to changes in pH and calcium levels, which determines the strength of the crosstalk between CRP and L-ficolin. Our study also revealed differential regulatory effects of C4BP. While C4BP delays but does not decrease the classical complement activation, it attenuates but does not significantly delay the lectin pathway activation. We also found that the major inhibitory role of C4BP is to facilitate the decay of C3 convertase. In summary, the present work elucidates the regulatory mechanisms of the complement system and demonstrates how the bio-pathway machinery maintains the balance between activation and inhibition. The insights we have gained could contribute to the development of therapies targeting the complement system.Singapore. Ministry of Education (Grant T208B3109)Singapore. Agency for Science, Technology and Research (BMRC 08/1/21/19/574)Singapore-MIT Alliance (Computational and Systems Biology Flagship Project)Swedish Research Counci

    Keeping the Board in the Dark: CEO Compensation and Entrenchment

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    We study a model in which a CEO can entrench himself by hiding information from the board that would allow the board to conclude that he should be replaced. Assuming that even diligent monitoring by the board cannot fully overcome the information asymmetry visà- vis the CEO, we ask if there is a role for CEO compensation to mitigate the inefficiency. Our analysis points to a novel argument for high-powered, non-linear CEO compensation such as bonus pay or stock options. By shifting the CEO’s compensation into states where the firm’s value is highest, a high-powered compensation scheme makes it as unattractive as possible for the CEO to entrench himself when he expects that the firm’s future value under his management and strategy is low. This, in turn, minimizes the severance pay needed to induce the CEO not to entrench himself, thereby minimizing the CEO’s informational rents. Amongst other things, our model suggests how deregulation and technological changes in the 1980s and 1990s might have contributed to the rise in CEO pay and turnover over the same period
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