Uniform, Equal Division, and Other Envy-Free Rules between The Two

This paper studies the problem of fairly allocating an amount of a divisible resource when preferences are single-peaked. We characterize the class of envy-free and peak-only rules and show that the class forms a complete lattice with respect to a dominance relation. We also pin down the subclass of strategy-proof rules and show that the subclass also forms a complete lattice. In both cases, the upper bound is the uniform rule, the lower bound is the equal division rule, and any other rule is between the two

Maximal Domain for Strategy-Proof Rules in Allotment Economies

We consider the problem of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents. We study how large a preference domain can be to allow for the existence of strategy-proof, symmetric, and efficient allocation rules when the amount of the good is a variable. This question is qualified by an additional requirement that a domain should include a minimally rich domain. We first characterize the uniform rule (Bennasy, 1982) as the unique strategy-proof, symmetric, and efficient rule on a minimally rich domain when the amount of the good is fixed. Then, exploiting this characterization, we establish the following: There is a unique maximal domain that includes a minimally rich domain and allows for the existence of strategy-proof, symmetric, and efficient rules when the amount of good is a variable. It is the single-plateaued domain

Good collaborative practice: reforming capacity building governance of international health research partnerships

In line with the policy objectives of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals, this commentary seeks to examine the extent to which provisions of international health research guidance promote capacity building and equitable partnerships in global health research. Our evaluation finds that governance of collaborative research partnerships, and in particular capacity building, in resource-constrained settings is limited but has improved with the implementation guidance of the International Ethical Guidelines for Health-related Research Involving Humans by The Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS) (2016). However, more clarity is needed in national legislation, industry and ethics guidelines, and regulatory provisions to address the structural inequities and power imbalances inherent in international health research partnerships. Most notably, ethical partnership governance is not supported by the principal industry ethics guidelines - the International Conference on Harmonization Technical Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceutical for Human Use (ICH) Good Clinical Practice (ICH-GCP). Given the strategic value of ICH-GCP guidelines in defining the role and responsibility of global health research partners, we conclude that such governance should stipulate the minimal requirements for creating an equitable environment of inclusion, mutual learning, transparency and accountability. Procedurally, this can be supported by i) shared research agenda setting with local leadership, ii) capacity assessments, and iii) construction of a memorandum of understanding (MoU). Moreover, the requirement of capacity building needs to be coordinated amongst partners to support good collaborative practice and deliver on the public health goals of the research enterprise; improving local conditions of health and reducing global health inequality. In this respect, and in order to develop consistency between sources of research governance, ICH-GCP should reference CIOMS ethical guidelines as the established standard for collaborative partnership. Moreover, greater commitment and support should be given to co-ordinate, strengthen and enforce local laws requiring equitable research partnerships and health system strengthening

Une grève de la faim est un acte de protestation: quelle est la place des soignants? : l'alimentation forcée est contraire à la déontologie médicale

Une décision récente du Tribunal fédéral estime qu'il incombe aux autorités d'exécution des peines d'ordonner une alimentation forcée envers un détenu gréviste de la faim. les regards se tournent vers le soignant en milieu pénitentiaire qui est au risque de se voir sommer d'être l'exécutant d'une telle décision. celle-ci est contraire aux valeurs fondamentales de l'éthique médicale. le respect de l'autonomie d'un patient capable de discernement et qui choisit de protester contre sa situation par ce moyen doit rester au centre de la préoccupation du soignant. Pour préserver cette valeur éthique, l'indépendance du soignant, le respect de la déontologie, la garantie de la confidentialité et le droit à l'objection de conscience sont autant de données indispensables à l'exercice médical en prison autant que dans tout autre lieu de soins

Implementing efficient graphs in connection networks

We consider the problem of sharing the cost of a network that meets the connection demands of a set of agents. The agents simultaneously choose paths in the network connecting their demand nodes. A mechanism splits the total cost of the network formed among the participants. We introduce two new properties of implementation. The first property, Pareto Nash Implementation (PNI), requires that the efficient outcome is always implemented in a Nash equilibrium, and that the efficient outcome Pareto dominates any other Nash equilibrium. The average cost mechanism (AC) and other assymetric variations, are the only rules that meet PNI. These mechanisms are also characterized under Strong Nash Implementation. The second property, Weakly Pareto Nash Implementation (WPNI), requires that the least inefficient equilibrium Pareto dominate any other equilibrium. The egalitarian mechanism (EG), a variation of AC that meets individual rationality, and other assymetric mechanisms are the only rules that meet WPNI and Individual Rationality. PNI and WPNI provide the first economic justification of the Price of Stability (PoS), a seemingly natural measure in the computer science literature but not easily embraced in economics. EG minimizes the PoS across all individually rational mechanisms. JEL classification: C70, C72, D71, D85. ∗We would like to thank our advisor Hervé Moulin for his invaluable insights at the variou