Support for Redistribution in Western Europe: Assessing the role of religion

Previous sociological studies have paid little attention to religion as a central determinant of individual preferences for redistribution. In this article we argue that religious individuals, living in increasingly secular societies, differ in political preferences from their secular counterparts. Based on the theory of religious cleavages, we expect that religious individuals will oppose income redistribution by the state. Furthermore, in contexts where the polarization between religious and secular individuals is large, preferences for redistribution will be lower. In the empirical analysis we test our predictions in a multilevel framework, using data from the European Social Survey 2002–2006 for 16 Western European countries. After controlling for a wide range of individual socio-economic factors and for welfare-state policies, religion plays and important explanatory role. We find that both Catholics and Protestants strongly oppose income redistribution by the state. The cleavage between religious and secular individuals is far more important than the difference between denominations. Using a refined measure of religious polarization, we also find that in more polarized context the overall level of support for redistribution is lower

Aversão à desigualdade e preferências por redistribuição: A percepção de mobilidade econômica as afeta no Brasil?

Resumo A noção de que a redistribuição é dos ricos para os pobres permitiria concluir a priori que os pobres são os principais partidários de medidas redistributivas, ao serem os potenciais beneficiários. Não obstante, estudos realizados principalmente para países desenvolvidos sugerem que a aversão à desigualdade e as preferências por redistribuição são moldadas por fatores que vão além do pecuniário. Neste trabalho, analisa-se o efeito da mobilidade econômica subjetiva na aversão à desigualdade e na demanda por redistribuição dos brasileiros, usando-se uma base de dados única, representativa do país, coletada em 2012. Os resultados sugerem que, em contradição com previsões teóricas e com evidências de países desenvolvidos, mesmo pessoas que aspiram ascender socialmente no futuro incomodam-se com a desigualdade e são favoráveis a políticas redistributivas. Brasileiros que perceberam uma piora na sua situação econômica também mostram-se favoráveis à redistribuição, resultado mais convencional. Ambos os conjuntos de resultados são confirmados por estimações feitas em subamostras definidas por renda familiar. Levantam-se hipóteses para se tentar explicar os resultados inesperados

Fixed and random effects models: making an informed choice

This paper assesses the options available to researchers analysing multilevel (including longitudinal) data, with the aim of supporting good methodological decision-making. Given the confusion in the literature about the key properties of fixed and random effects (FE and RE) models, we present these models’ capabilities and limitations. We also discuss the within-between RE model, sometimes misleadingly labelled a ‘hybrid’ model, showing that it is the most general of the three, with all the strengths of the other two. As such, and because it allows for important extensions—notably random slopes—we argue it should be used (as a starting point at least) in all multilevel analyses. We develop the argument through simulations, evaluating how these models cope with some likely mis-specifications. These simulations reveal that (1) failing to include random slopes can generate anti-conservative standard errors, and (2) assuming random intercepts are Normally distributed, when they are not, introduces only modest biases. These results strengthen the case for the use of, and need for, these models

The Externalities of Inequality: Fear of Crime and Preferences for Redistribution in Western Europe

© 2016 by the Midwest Political Science Association. Why is the difference in redistribution preferences between the rich and the poor high in some countries and low in others? In this article, we argue that it has a lot to do with the rich and very little to do with the poor. We contend that while there is a general relative income effect on redistribution preferences, the preferences of the rich are highly dependent on the macrolevel of inequality. The reason for this effect is not related to immediate tax and transfer considerations but to a negative externality of inequality: crime. We will show that the rich in more unequal regions in Western Europe are more supportive of redistribution than the rich in more equal regions because of their concern with crime. In making these distinctions between the poor and the rich, the arguments in this article challenge some influential approaches to the politics of inequality

The Externalities of Inequality: Fear of Crime and Preferences for Redistribution in Western Europe

Why is the difference in redistribution preferences between the rich and the poor high in some countries and low in others? In this article, we argue that it has a lot to do with the rich and very little to do with the poor. We contend that while there is a general relative income effect on redistribution preferences, the preferences of the rich are highly dependent on the macrolevel of inequality. The reason for this effect is not related to immediate tax and transfer considerations but to a negative externality of inequality: crime. We will show that the rich in more unequal regions in Western Europe are more supportive of redistribution than the rich in more equal regions because of their concern with crime. In making these distinctions between the poor and the rich, the arguments in this article challenge some influential approaches to the politics of inequality